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PUBLISH, SHARE, RE-TWEET, AND REPEAT
Michal Lavi*
ABSTRACT
New technologies allow users to communicate ideas to a broad audience easily 
and quickly, affecting the way ideas are interpreted and their credibility. Each and 
every social network user can simply click “share” or “retweet” and automatically 
republish an existing post and expose a new message to a wide audience. The 
dissemination of ideas can raise public awareness about important issues and 
bring about social, political, and economic change.
Yet, digital sharing also provides vast opportunities to spread false rumors, 
defamation, and Fake News stories at the thoughtless click of a button. The 
spreading of falsehoods can severely harm the reputation of victims, erode 
democracy, and infringe on the public interest. Holding the original publisher 
accountable and collecting damages from him offers very limited redress since the 
harmful expression can continue to spread. How should the law respond to this 
phenomenon and who should be held accountable?
Drawing on multidisciplinary social science scholarship from network theory 
and cognitive psychology, this Article describes how falsehoods spread on social 
networks, the different motivations to disseminate them, the gravity of the harm 
they can inflict, and the likelihood of correcting false information once it has been 
distributed in this setting. This Article will also describe the top-down influence of 
social media platform intermediaries, and how it enhances dissemination by 
exploiting users’ cognitive biases and creating social cues that encourage users to 
share information. Understanding how falsehoods spread is a first step towards 
providing a framework for meeting this challenge.
The Article argues that it is high time to rethink intermediary duties and 
obligations regarding the dissemination of falsehoods. It examines a new 
perspective for mitigating the harm caused by the dissemination of falsehood. The 
Article advocates harnessing social network intermediaries to meet the challenge of 
dissemination from the stage of platform design. It proposes innovative solutions 
for mitigating careless, irresponsible sharing of false rumors.
The first solution focuses on a platform’s accountability for influencing user 
decision-making processes. “Nudges” can discourage users from thoughtless 
sharing of falsehoods and promote accountability ex ante. The second solution 
* Ph.D. (Law). Research Fellow, Hadar Jabotinsky Center for Interdisciplinary Re-
search of Financial Markets, Crisis and Technology; Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Haifa, 
Faculty of Law; Cyberlaw Fellow, Federmann Center Hebrew University; Cheshin Fellow, 
Hebrew University, Faculty of Law, 2018. I thank Michal Shur-Ofry and Emily Cooper. Spe-
cial thanks are due to Nick Adkins, Hannah Basalone, Nicole Frazer, Sumner Truax, and 
their colleagues on the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform staff.
I dedicate this Article to the memory of my mother—Aviva Lavi—who died suddenly 
and unexpectedly. My mother taught me to love knowledge and gave me the strength to 
pursue it. She will always be loved, remembered, and dearly missed.
442 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:2
focuses on allowing effective ex post facto removal of falsehoods, defamation,
and fake news stories from all profiles and locations where they have spread. 
Shaping user choices and designing platforms is value laden, reflecting the 
platform’s particular set of preferences, and should not be taken for granted. 
Therefore, this Article proposes ways to incentivize intermediaries to adopt these 
solutions and mitigate the harm generated by the spreading of falsehoods. Finally, 
the Article addresses the limitations of the proposed solutions yet still concludes 
that they are more effective than current legal practices.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, a man named Ariel Ronis came across a defamatory 
post on Facebook accusing him of racism. The post was not restrict-
ed to the publisher’s friends but was public to all Facebook users.
Over 6,000 individuals disseminated the post using the “share”
button, without knowing whether the statements made about this 
person were actually true. Recipients of the post continued to share 
it while some even added comments condemning Ronis. The post 
went viral as it spread rapidly and garnered media attention. The 
man felt his good reputation was ruined and ended up committing 
suicide.1
In the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, falsehoods and 
fake news were spread about both candidates. For example, it was 
rumored that Hillary Clinton helped to fund and arm ISIS,2 that 
she and her campaign chief were running a pedophilia ring from 
the basement of a pizza parlor,3 and that the Pope had endorsed 
Donald Trump,4 even though none of this had actually happened. 
Many believe that these rumors and others like them influenced the 
results of the elections.
The advent of technology and social media have revolutionized 
interpersonal communication. Within seconds, a message or a post 
can travel around the world and be viewed by thousands of users.5
Individuals publish and spread messages thoughtlessly and almost
automatically at the click of a button (e.g., publish, share, re-
tweet). Sharing information has many benefits. Each and every in-
ternet user can replicate valuable ideas and raise public awareness 
of important issues, even though they are not affiliated with a press 
organization. As a result, free speech has become easily accessible 
1. This is the story of Ariel Ronis, an official from Israel’s Population, Immigration 
and Border Crossing Authority, part of the Ministry of Interior, who shot himself to death 
after a Facebook post accusing him of racism went viral. See Interior Ministry Official Commits 
Suicide After Accusation of Racism Goes Viral, JERUSALEM POST (May 24, 2015, 2:50 AM), https:
//www.jpost.com/israel-news/interior-ministry-official-commits-suicide-after-accusation-of-
racism-goes-viral-403924 [hereinafter RONIS].
2. See YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 139–44
(2018) (“The ‘Hillary helped fund and arm ISIS’ story depends on a rich shared narrative 
created by media that have longer and deeper purchase on the minds of those who are ex-
posed to it.”).
3. See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
4. Id. at 142.
5. See Haewook Kwak, Changhyun Lee, Hosung Park & Sue Moon, What Is Twitter, a 
Social Network or a News Media?, 19 INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB 591, 591 (2010) (find-
ing that every re-tweeted tweet on Twitter will reach an average audience of 1,000 people 
regardless of the number of the original publisher’s followers).
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to all. This brave new technological world has enabled individuals 
to voice their opinions on important social, political, and econom-
ic issues.
Yet, there is a flip side. Information wants to be free, but so does 
misinformation. The information revolution allows for the vast 
spreading of rumors, speculations, and assumptions about private 
individuals and public figures without any checks on the accuracy 
of the content. False rumors, defamation, and fake news stories are 
amazingly powerful and dangerous; it is difficult to reverse them;6
they can have serious consequences for a person’s reputation, and 
they can even cost life.7 Falsehoods can also cause harm to their 
audiences and to society in general.8 In rare cases, false stories can 
even result in physical harm to the recipients of the rumor. For ex-
ample, fake news regarding potential cures for the Covid-19 pan-
demic resulted in people consuming “miracle cure[s]” that caused 
physical damage.9 Such “misinformation pose[s a] threat to public 
health.”10
Moreover, as false rumors spill into the digital ecosystem, they 
pollute the flow of information.11 Consequently, it becomes more 
and more difficult to distinguish between true and false infor-
mation and to engage in truthful discussions on matters of public 
importance. Thus, politics, democracy, and the public interest in 
general are impaired.12
Spreading falsehoods raises complex challenges as the more 
times people are exposed to falsehoods, the more credible they 
6. See Neil Levy, The Bad News About Fake News, 6 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY REV. & REPLY 
COLLECTIVE 20, 20 (2017) (“[F]ake news is more pernicious than most of us realise, leaving 
long lasting traces on our beliefs and our behavior even when we consume it know [sic] it 
is fake or when the information it contains is corrected.”).
7. See, e.g., RONIS, supra note 1.
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 
388 (2020) (“Some falsehoods are harmful. They ruin lives. They lead people to take un-
necessary risks or fail to protect themselves against serious dangers.”).
9. Hugo Mercier, Opinion, Fake News in the Time of Coronavirus: How Big Is the Threat?,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2020/mar/30/fake-news-coronavirus-false-information (describing a man exposed to fake 
news on the cure for Covid-19 who “ingest[ed] a product meant to clean fish tanks, as it 
contains chloroquine, a drug currently being tested (inconclusively so far) as a treatment for 
Covid-19” and died as a result).
10. See COVID-19 Global Roundup: Conspiracy and Fake News Challenge Public Health and Big 
Tech, CGTN (May 13, 2020, 4:27 PM), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-13/COVID-19-
Global-Roundup-Conspiracy-and-fake-news-a-test-for-big-tech-QsqUXgDpHa/index.html.
11. See Omri Ben Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 105, 112–13 (2019)
(treating “fake news” as “data pollution” that disrupts social institutions and public interests 
in a similar manner to environmental pollution).
12. See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a 
Post-Truth World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535, 540 (2020); Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artifi-
cial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 144–45 (2019); An-
thony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Parti-
san Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 68 (2017).
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become.13 These falsehoods start to feel so true that people believe 
them even when provided with evidence of their falsity.14 Research 
reveals that falsehoods “diffused significantly farther, faster, deep-
er, and more broadly” than truthful content,15 and in many cases,
private efforts to refute a falsehood by publishing the truth not on-
ly fail to cancel out the falsehood’s impact but can even increase its 
credibility.16 Even when attempts to correct a falsehood do succeed 
in mitigating its influence, their effect remains limited, as they are 
often less widely viewed than the original falsehood.17
Victims of defamation can file suit when they have access to the 
alleged defamer’s name. In their terms of service, many social net-
works such as Facebook and Linkedin require users to provide 
their real names.18 Thus, victims of defamation can file a lawsuit 
against the publisher.19 Filing an action against the original speaker 
and collecting damages, however, provides very limited redress be-
cause it cannot counteract complications arising from the wide-
13. Gerd Gigerenzer, External Validity of Laboratory Experiments: The Frequency-Validity Re-
lationship, 97 AM. J. PSYCH. 185, 185, 192–93 (1984) (“[M]ere repetition of plausible but un-
familiar assertations increases the belief in the validity of the assertations, independent of 
their actual truth or falsity.”).
14. Whitney Phillips, The Toxins We Carry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall 2019), 
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/truth-pollution-disinformation.php (“It shows that 
when people are repeatedly exposed to false statements, those statements start to feel true, 
even when they are countered with evidence. In short, a fact check is no match for a repeat-
ed lie.”).
15. Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News Online,
359 SCI. MAG. 1146, 1147 (2018).
16. See Gordon Pennycook, Tyrone D. Cannon & David G. Rand, Prior Exposure Increases 
Perceived Accuracy of Fake News, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 1865 (2018). Research also shows 
that false information might psychologically cancel out the influence of truthful statements. 
See Sander van der Linden, Anthony Leiserowitz, Seth Rosenthal & Edward Maibach, Inocu-
lating the Public Against Misinformation About Climate Change, 1 GLOB. CHALLENGES 1, 2, 5 
(2017).
17. See Mark Scott & Melissa Eddy, Europe Combats a New Foe of Political Stability: Fake 
News, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), nyti.ms/2SEP0ej (discussing the unsuccessful trials of EU 
teams to correct fake news due to their dissemination).
18. See Terms of Service 3.1, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
[https://perma.cc/PE52-AGWJ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) (“[U]se the same name that you 
use in real life.”); User Agreement 2.1(2), LINKEDIN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com
/legal/user-agreement [https://perma.cc/M2TS-EWAY] (“[Y]ou will only have one 
LinkedIn account, which must be in your real name.”); Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno 
Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The “Soft eID” Conundrum, 74 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1336–37 (2013) (referring to the possibility of removing or blocking 
profiles that do not reflect a real identity); This Woman Changed Her Name Just so She Could 
Log In to Facebook, TIME (July 13, 2015, 1:17 AM), https://time.com/3955056/facebook-
social-media-jemma-rogers-uk/ [https://perma.cc/SH23-EYJ6] (after creating an alias for 
her Facebook account, a woman resorted to legally changing her name to avoid being 
locked out of her account).
19. See, e.g., Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019) (dismissing a defamation 
case because the defendant added question marks to his allegedly defamatory tweets); see 
also Patrick H. Hunt, Comment, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defa-
mation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559 (2013) (reviewing defamation lawsuits regard-
ing libel claims for statements posted on Twitter, referred to as “twibel claims”).
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spread dissemination of falsehoods. In this context, § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) reflects the “internet excep-
tionalism” that “diverge[s] from regulatory precedents in other 
media.”20 It directs that “no provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in-
formation provided by another information content provider.”21
Courts have interpreted § 230 broadly as providing immunity to in-
ternet users who share information of other users who are not pro-
viders.22 Consequently, lawsuits against disseminators of posts au-
thored by third parties are usually blocked. Moreover, filing an ac-
action against all users who share a falsehood is impractical due to 
their large number and the administrative costs of filing an action 
against each and every one of them. It might also be unfair to hold 
an individual accountable for content he did not originally author 
because, unlike conventional news outlets that have a duty to de-
vote time and resources to vetting stories prior to publication,23 a
private citizen cannot be expected to ascertain the credibility of 
such content let alone have a duty to do so once content has al-
ready been published online.24 Imposing liability on disseminators 
may also deter individuals from social sharing of content and have 
a chilling effect on free speech.25 It can also dilute the liability of 
the person who created and published a post and, therefore, re-
20. Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG
(Mar. 11, 2009), https://bit.ly/2KGhOkP; see also John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Inde-
pendence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org
/cyberspace-independence; JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE 
INTERNET 77–78 (2019).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230. For further discussion of this provision, see infra Section II.A.
22. See KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 145–47; see also, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 
529 (Cal. 2006) (“Nor is there any basis for concluding that Congress intended to treat ser-
vice providers and users differently.”). It should be noted however that if the defendant au-
thored content that accompanies republished content, he might become a provider of con-
tent and § 230 might not apply. See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020); Loeb & 
Loeb LLP, La Liberte v. Reid, LEXOLOGY (July 15, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=2e200267-569e-41aa-b7eb-f04939246c8b (“Reid herself had authored the 
content that accompanied the photograph of La Liberte and did not merely republish the 
photograph from another ‘information content provider.’ ”).
23. See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230 Immunity,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1511–12 (2015) (exploring traditional standards of liability for 
defamation and explaining that traditional publishers face strict liability).
24. See Matt C. Sanchez, Note, The Web Difference: A Legal and Normative Rationale Against 
Liability for Online Reproduction of Third-Party Defamatory Content, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 301, 
311, 319–20 (2008) (explaining that unlike traditional media, “online speakers as a class do 
not have the experience or resources” to verify “the facts contained in every piece of infor-
mation they reproduce,” and, therefore, they should not bear liability).
25. For more in the related context of intermediaries (websites or public pages) that 
republish users’ content and make it more visible, see Michal Lavi, Taking Out of Context, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145, 179–80 (2017).
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duce his incentives to prevent harm.26 It would also have adminis-
trative costs that exceed its benefits.27
Due to these considerations, this Article does not focus on the 
liability of users who disseminate third-party falsehoods. Instead, it 
focuses on online intermediaries, such as Facebook and Twitter,
that design network tools and facilitate social sharing of organic 
content for profit.28
This Article further focuses on the extensive dissemination of 
negative false rumors through social media. The discussion is not 
limited to fake news about politicians and public figures but ex-
tends to lies and defamation about ordinary people. It focuses on 
social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, due to their central-
ity and the socio-technological context, which facilitates sharing 
valuable content easily while also exacerbating speech-related 
harm.
The liability and accountability of intermediaries for user con-
tent currently exists in the realm of policy discussion; the law does 
not yet provide solutions to the problem of spreading falsehoods.29
This Article aspires to bridge the gap by proposing to harness in-
termediaries to the mission of mitigating the dissemination of 
falsehoods. It proposes to promote accountability from the stage of 
platform design. It aims to offer an ex ante solution for accommo-
dating the challenge of spreading falsehoods at the stage of the us-
er’s decision to post the falsehood and share it. It also proposes an 
ex post solution for mitigating the harm of falsehoods that have al-
ready been shared. Keeping this goal in mind, the Article is divided 
into the following parts:
Part I describes how ideas spread online. Drawing on network 
theory, psychology, marketing, and information systems, it outlines 
26. Ronen Perry, The Law and Economics of Online Republication, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forth-
coming 2021) (manuscript at 32–36), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3552301# (presenting the theory of dilution of liability and expanding it to liability of 
republishers).
27. Id. at 38 (addressing the administrative costs of legal actions against republishers).
28. See Kyunghee Lee, Byungtae Lee & Wonseok Oh, Thumbs Up, Sales Up? The Contin-
gent Effect of Facebook Likes on Sales Performance in Social Commerce, 32 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 109, 
110–11, 139 (2015) (explaining that social sharing enhances the flow of information, at-
tracts users, and can be translated into sales). The Article addresses social sharing of organic 
content and not targeting of advertisements by intermediaries. For expansion on ad target-
ing of political advertisements for profit, see Editorial, Twitter Is Banning Political Ads. If 




29. The Article will address the current legal realm, which focuses on removal of harm-
ful content ex post, allowing content to spread up until and even subsequent to removal. See 
generally James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 217, 224–25 
(2018).
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the myriad of motivations for spreading falsehoods. Afterwards, it 
explores “bottom-up” social dynamics among users and “top-down”
influences of intermediaries on social network platforms. These 
dynamics increase the likelihood that falsehoods will spread rapid-
ly, inflicting severe harm on the defamed individual and the pub-
lic’s interest.
Part II explores the law governing the secondary liability of in-
termediaries. It argues that with respect to spreading falsehoods, 
current policy models fall short. Therefore, complementary mech-
anisms should be formulated. The Article will argue that due to the 
growing power and influence of intermediaries on the flow of in-
formation, they should bear more responsibility. As a first step, in-
termediaries should be accountable for embedding complemen-
tary mechanisms to accommodate for the damages of replication 
and dissemination of falsehoods.
Part III proposes solutions to mitigate the problem of spreading 
falsehoods. It argues that intermediaries, which encourage users to 
share content and profit from sharing, should promote user ac-
countability. First, it suggests using “nudges” to influence user deci-
sions to share content.30 Nudges are expected to influence the con-
text of user decision-making before publishing and sharing 
content and have the potential to mitigate the spread of falsehoods 
ex ante. The second solution focuses on efficient removal of harm-
ful content ex post facto. Accordingly, an intermediary that designs 
features for simplifying dissemination should provide technology 
for efficient removal of the content shared from all profiles and lo-
cations. This solution is already applied by some social network 
platforms.31 Choice architecture, however, “is value-laden, and re-
flects a particular set of preferences that should not be taken for 
granted.”32 Thus, the Article proposes incentives for intermediaries 
to adopt architecture for efficient removal and addresses their lim-
itations. The proposals focus on the initial stage of platform design 
that have a much better chance of hindering the spread of false-
30. See RICHARD THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 6 (2009) (defining a nudge as “any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any op-
tions or significantly changing their economic incentives”).
31. For example, Facebook facilitates social sharing by embedding posts. Thus, if the 
original post is deleted, the content becomes unavailable in the profiles it was embedded in. 
See Embedded Posts, FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/embedded-
posts [https://perma.cc/TDV3-QB77] (last visited Sept. 19, 2020); Toby Headdon, An Epi-
logue to Swenson: The Same Old New Public and the Worms that Didn’t Turn, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
& PRAC. 662, 666 (2014) (explaining that embedded links allows efficient removal from
YouTube).
32. Michal Lavi, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Behavior, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597, 2671 
(2019).
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hoods. These proposals could have been particularly useful during 
the 2020 election cycle, as they mitigate the harm of defamation 
and fake news stories to the reputation of individuals, including 
candidates for president. By allowing intermediaries to correct 
failures in the marketplace of ideas, the proposals promote peo-
ple’s sense of reality, keeping them more invested in facts and real 
news. Thus, the proposals also preserve the public interest. 
I. SHARING CONTENT ON SOCIAL NETWORKS
Why do falsehoods spread within social networks? Bringing to-
gether multidisciplinary insights, this part explores the process of 
dissemination online, explains the motivation behind spreading 
falsehoods, and provides answers to this initial question. After-
wards, it explores the “bottom-up” social dynamics among users 
and the “top-down” influence of intermediaries on social dissemi-
nation. It concludes that these dynamics can exacerbate the harm 
caused by falsehoods.
A. Why Do False Rumors Spread?
Falsehoods, defamation, and fake news spread rapidly and gain 
credibility. For example, in the 2016 U.S. election cycle, people 
disseminated a fake story that the Pope endorsed Donald Trump, 
and almost a million people shared it.33 Traditional media pointed 
out the falsity of the story, but many voters could not care less. 
Truth is no longer as important as seeming or feeling something to 
be true since “people often tune in to ideologically resonant 
sources of information,”34 engage in confirmation bias, resist in-
formation that is inconsistent with their ideology, and promote 
their favorite narratives regardless of truth. 
As technology advances, automation and artificial intelligence 
now allow for the creation of deepfakes—believable videos, photos, 
and audio of people doing and saying things they never did35—that 
33. Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Is in Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion [https://perma.cc/6S5X-8HXM]; 
ZEYNEP TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED 
PROTEST 264–65 (2017) [hereinafter TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS]
34. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 40.
35. Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes: A Looming Crisis for National Security, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deepfakes-looming-crisis-national-
security-democracy-and-privacy# [https://perma.cc/KZ97-K9KP] (“Machine-learning algo-
rithms . . . combined with facial-mapping software enable the cheap and easy fabrication of 
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generates even greater manipulation of the truth.36 Liars can easily 
avoid accountability, claiming that true statements are fake stories. 
In contrast, truth-tellers can be portrayed as liars.37 Falsehoods 
spread faster than truth, grab the attention of the audience, and 
enhance dissemination.38 In this environment, false rumors have 
particular importance. The internet enables these rumors to 
spread even faster than previously and cause great harm to the 
reputations of individuals in particular and society in general. But 
what are the possible motives for publishing falsehoods in the first 
place?
1. Motivations for Publishing Falsehoods
Propagators of false rumors have diverse motivations.39 They can 
spread falsehood intentionally, negligently, or recklessly.40 There 
are four principle motives for publishing falsehoods.41 Some prop-
agators are narrowly self-interested: by spreading falsehoods, they
content that hijacks one’s identity—voice, face, body.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 
387, 419.
36. See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, 
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1759–60 (2019) (explaining the 
emergence of machine learning through neural network methods that increase the capacity 
to create false images, videos, and audio and that generative adversarial networks can lead to 
the production of increasingly convincing and nearly impossible to debunk deep fakes);
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 423. Neural networks can also be used for AI creation of news sto-
ries that mimic the style and substance of real news stories. See Sarah Kreps, The Role of Tech-
nology in Online Misinformation, BROOKINGS: FOREIGN POLICY 1, 6 (2020), brook.gs/2Y6KzL1.
37. See Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News,” 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 234 
(2018) (“In that spirit, President Trump has deployed the ‘fake news’ trope to demonize 
and dismiss the traditional press as the ‘enemy of the American people.’ ”); Chesney & Cit-
ron, supra note 36, at 1785 (describing that difficulty in separating truth from falsehood al-
lows a “liar’s dividend” because anyone can claim that a true story is fake while his lies are 
the truth).
38. Vosoughi et al., supra note 15, at 1147.
39. ANDREW MARANTZ, ANTISOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS, TECHNO-UTOPIANS, AND THE 
HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION 120 (2019) (“[Y]ou can post something because 
you believe it, or because you didn’t believe it and you wanted to see who would. You can 
post something because you valued freedom of thought for its own sake; you can post some-
thing solely to get a reaction; you can post something without even knowing why, just be-
cause you felt like it.”).
40. BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 23–37 (differentiating between different types of 
dissemination of political fake news under the umbrella of propaganda and dividing it into 
four types: 1) manipulation- “directly influencing a person’s beliefs, attitudes, or preferences 
in ways that fall short of what an empathetic observer would deem normatively appropriate 
in the context”; 2) misinformation- “communication of false information without intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or otherwise obtain an outcome”; 3) disinformation- “dissemination of 
explicitly false or misleading information”; and 4) bullshit- “commercial actors with no ap-
parent political agenda who propagate[] made-up stories to garner [business] engagements 
and advertising revenue” and are indifferent to whether the stories are true or false).
41. See CASS R SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE 
THEM, WHAT CAN BE DONE 12–15 (2009).
WINTER 2021] Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat 451
aim to promote their own interest. In other words, they aim to 
harm a particular person, group, or competitor in the political or 
commercial realm and promote themselves by degrading their ri-
vals.42 “Other propagators are generally self-interested[: t]hey . . .
seek to attract [an audience] by spreading rumors.”43 In contrast to 
the narrowly self-interested, generally self-interested propagators 
are indifferent to whether the rumor is true or false. Another type 
of propagator is actually altruistic and disseminates rumors they be-
lieve to be true without checking the facts.44 Finally, malicious propa-
gators intentionally seek to disseminate damaging information 
about individuals and institutions simply to inflict harm.45
2. Why Do People Disseminate Falsehoods?
An initial post may have a limited number of recipients; howev-
er, these recipients may then share it with others, leading to exten-
sive dissemination and severe harm. Initiating a rumor is one 
thing, but what makes another person spread it? Or, why do peo-
ple share information in general?
The nature of the internet’s social environment fuels the distri-
bution of ideas, information, and rumors at minimal cost. Constant 
connection to the internet allows anyone to share information. 
Thus, an idea can spread exponentially and reach a global audi-
ence at the click of a button.46 Furthermore, as a falsehood circu-
lates, it tends to become more menacing since the more individu-
als are exposed to a particular statement, the more likely they are 
to believe it and perceive it as a known fact.47 Additionally, on the 
42. For instance, individuals may spread rumors in order to make money, win a compe-
tition or political race, including by spreading negative, fake stories about competitors, or 
otherwise to get ahead. See id.; see also, e.g., Ronan Bergman, Twitter Network Uses Fake Accounts 
To Promote Netanyahu, Israel Watchdog Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/03/31/world/middleeast/netanyahu-fake-twitter.html [https://perma.cc
/XQ6M-36X8.
43. SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13 (emphasis added); see JACOB SILVERMAN, TERMS OF 
SERVICE: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PRICE OF CONSTANT CONNECTION 45 (2015) (explaining 
that an important reason for publishing information is that people want to show others they 
are active on the social network and get their attention).
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13.
45. See id. at 14.
46. The internet simplifies the dissemination of information and allows sharing with a 
large audience with the click of a button. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES 
IN CYBERSPACE (2014); LEE RAINIE & BARRY WELLMAN, NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL 
OPERATING SYSTEM 67 (2012); DAVID A POTTS, CYBERLIBEL: INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 30 (2011); Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Para-
digm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919 (2010).
47. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND OTHER DANGEROUS IDEAS 25–27 
(2014); NICHOLAS DIFONZO & PRASHANT BORDIA, RUMOR PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL AND 
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internet, word-of-mouth information is not ephemeral. It remains 
accessible indefinitely through a Google search.48 The more widely 
shared a falsehood is, the higher it appears in Google and other 
search engines’ results, leading to even greater exposure and caus-
ing users to ascribe it more and more relevance.49 Thus, the dis-
semination of a falsehood has the potential to cause tremendous 
harm to a person’s reputation.50
Yet, not all falsehoods are spread as extensively as others; some 
are only disseminated locally. Why do some falsehoods spread 
widely while others remain limited in reach? In his seminal work 
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, Mark Granovetter introduced
the idea of “threshold” and maintains that it explains these pro-
cesses of adoption of behavior.51 Threshold refers to the propor-
tion of the group that needs to join an activity before an individual
follows suit.52 Thus, “[o]ne’s social network has a huge potential to 
affect one’s decisions to adopt and disseminate certain ideas”53 be-
cause people respond to the influences and preferences of oth-
ers.54
A well-known U.S. election study serves as a good example.55
Many Facebook users were shown a button to click to indicate that 
they had voted. Clicking the button created and shared a post 
about voter participation. For some users, the post included a
graphic sign and pictures of friends in the social network who also 
indicated they had voted. “Researchers cross-referenced names 
with actual voting records and found that those people who saw 
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES 225 (2007); Pennycook et al., supra note 16 (explaining that 
the more people hear information, the more likely they are to believe it and pass it on).
48. See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 11
(2014); Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET 15, 15–19 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010); Lavi, supra note 32, 
at 2603.
49. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE
SHOULD WORRY) 20–21 (2011); Bing Pan, Helene Hembrooke, Thorsten Joachims, Lori 
Lorigo, Geri Gay & Laura Granka, In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and 
Relevance, 12 J. COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMMC’N 801 (2007); Lavi, supra note 32, at 2604.
50. See CITRON, supra note 46, at 197–99.
51. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOCIO. 1420, 1422 
(1978).
52. Id.
53. Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 16 (2018).
54. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE SURPRISING 
POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 127 (2009); Michal Lavi,
Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 889 (2016).
55. Robert M. Bond, Christopher J. Fariss, Jason J. Jones, Adam D. I. Kramer, Cameron 
Marlow, Jaime E. Settle & James H. Fowler, A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence 
and Political Mobilization, 489 NATURE 7415 (2012), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature
11421. For a discussion of the study and its results, see Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Elec-
tion, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335–36 (2014).
WINTER 2021] Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat 453
posts [indicating] that their friends [had] voted were more likely 
to vote” themselves.56
In addition to collective thresholds, each individual has his own 
personal threshold for adopting and disseminating ideas.57 In this 
context, one can identify three types of individuals. “Receptives”
are individuals who are already disposed to favor a newly presented 
idea or share the same ideology.58 Therefore, they have the lowest 
threshold and tend to adopt information they receive and pass it 
on.59 Another group of disseminators is the “neutrals.” This group 
has no inclination in favor or against an idea. If they notice that a 
few people have accepted and disseminated an idea, they may 
come to accept it and disseminate it as well.60 Finally, there are the
“skeptics,” who have a high threshold for accepting and dissemi-
nating ideas and may have a prior disposition against certain ideas. 
Skeptics require a great deal of information before accepting new 
ideas. Once the evidence becomes overwhelming—and this evi-
dence may include beliefs shared by many others—the skeptics will 
follow suit and accept the idea.61
Because individuals influence one another, ideas, including 
falsehoods, can spread through informational cascades.62 In other 
words, people disseminate falsehoods, because others previously 
disseminated them, without holding a prior disposition or ideology 
that supports them. When an increasing number of people believe 
a falsehood, it can begin to appear credible and consequently in-
fluence others to believe it as well. Social pressure can also push 
people to spread information. In such cases, “people think they 
know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonethe-
less go along with the crowd in order to maintain their status.”63
56. Lavi, supra note 53, at 15 n.79; Lavi, supra note 25, at 147 n.8; see also Zittrain, supra
note 55, at 335–36.
57. Granovetter, supra note 51, at 1423.
58. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 19–20; Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More 
Speech Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (2014) (explaining that people have dif-
ferent prior beliefs and hence different degrees of skepticism and that “[i]ndividuals who 
believe that the messenger is a truth teller” tend to give credence to their statements).
59. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 19 (explaining that the individual threshold de-
pends on a person’s prior disposition regarding the information).
60. See id. at 20.
61. See id.; Lavi, supra note 53, at 17.
62. “Informational cascades are generated when individuals follow the statements or 
actions of predecessors and refrain from expressing opposing opinions because they believe 
their predecessors are right.” Lavi, supra note 32, at 2602 n.14. As a result, important infor-
mation is omitted from the social network. See Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of 
Deliberating Groups 2 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 215, 2008); see also, e.g., Mat-
thew Salganik, Peter Dodds & Duncan Watts, Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictabil-
ity in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCI. MAG. 854 (2006).
63. Lavi, supra note 53, at 18 n.107; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY 
MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 91 (2006); Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 62.
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This is the phenomenon of reputation cascades. As the crowd 
grows, the risk that a large number of people will believe entirely 
false information becomes reality.64 Diffusion of ideas, trends, or 
behavior starts slowly. The idea can, however, spread rapidly “when 
a critical mass of individuals publicly share[s the] idea [and] a
‘tipping point’ occurs.”65
The spreading and adoption of a rumor depends on encounter-
ing individuals with low thresholds who are willing to spread it fur-
ther. When individuals are surrounded by peers with similar low 
thresholds, the diffusion of a rumor can accelerate. Yet, overlap-
ping social circles might create structural holes and hinder dissem-
ination.66 It is difficult, however, to predict these tipping points 
when ideas are widely spread, as every individual in the network 
has a different threshold and they operate in different types of 
networks that can be random or homogenous.67 The threshold is 
reliant on a variety of personal elements and social structures.68
Changes in the social network’s composition, social structures, and 
the transition path of an idea can significantly change the likeli-
hood of widespread dissemination.69 Social networks have a tre-
mendous impact on the flow of information. They can withhold or 
accelerate the dissemination of rumors and this is the key to un-
derstanding how information and, in particular, falsehoods are dis-
seminated.70
Having presented the threshold as an important factor influenc-
ing the spread of rumors, the next section addresses the central 
factors impacting the likelihood of reaching this threshold: the 
strength of social network ties and the influence of online inter-
mediaries.71
64. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 2.
65. Lavi, supra note 53, at 17; see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW 
LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 12 (2002) (defining a tipping point as “the 
moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point”). These principles were demon-
strated in many contexts such as diffusion of innovation. See EVERETT M ROGERS: DIFFUSION 
OF INNOVATION (5th ed. 2003).
66. Cf. CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS: THEORIES, CONCEPTS 
AND FINDINGS 158 (2012).
67. See Granovetter, supra note 51, at 1423 (demonstrating this point by using diffusion 
of rumors).
68. Lavi, supra note 53, at 17; see also KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 156, 160–61 (2011).
69. See KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 159–61.
70. Cf. CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 54, at 3–32.
71. It should be noted that there are additional factors such as the interference of for-
eign countries, hackers, and the norms of traditional media in the context of fake news. Yet, 
the main factors are “bottom-up” network structures and “top-down” influences of interme-
diaries on networks including manipulation through algorithms. For further information, 
see BENKLER ET AL. supra note 2, at 8–23, which explains how network architecture, includ-
ing a right-wing website that repeated fake news, allowed and exacerbated the spread of ru-
mors ascribing corruption to Hillary Clinton during the 2016 U.S. election campaign and 
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B. Connected: Network, Ties, and Social Structures
A social network is a set of relationships.72 These relationships 
structure the flow of interactions and social life today.73 They are 
always present, influencing our choices, actions, thoughts, feelings, 
and desires.74 Social networks shape norms and impact every aspect 
of the human experience.75
Network theory explains how connections between discrete ob-
jects are created, develop, and change.76 Sociologists of networks 
focus on the influences of networks on communication patterns
and the ties between individuals rather than on what a given indi-
vidual thinks or does independently.77 These ties shape interactions 
among members of social networks and, therefore, show how in-
formation is disseminated within social networks.78 Thus, studying
social networks can provide an enlightened understanding of so-
cial dynamics and information dissemination.79 Understanding so-
cial networks makes it possible to explain the flow of information 
and is the first step towards outlining information policy for online
dissemination of rumors.
Sociologists have addressed how different types of ties on social 
networks influence the flow of information.80 When information is 
transmitted in a network characterized by strong ties (such as close 
found that the structure of social networks was more important than intervention by Russian 
hackers, Facebook algorithms, online echo chambers, or Cambridge Analytica. However, 
these findings focused on the 2016 U.S. election campaign and do not purport to reach 
general conclusions regarding the most influential factors for spreading false rumors on the 
whole. Moreover, network structure and intermediaries both have an impact in directing the 
flow of information; the factors influence each other, and both have significant sway on dis-
semination.
72. See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 54, at 9.
73. Lavi, supra note 54, at 889; see also Manuel Castells, Afterword: Why Networks Matter, in 
NETWORK LOGIC 219, 221 (2004). On networks in general, see also JULIE E. COHEN,
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 40
(2019) (“A network is a mode of organization in which hubs and nodes structure the flows of 
transactions and interactions.”).
74. Lavi, supra note 54, at 889.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 890; cf. KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 27. Kadushin’s book focuses on social 
networks and sociological theory. For a wider understanding of network science, see gener-
ally DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2004); and ALBERT-
LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2014).
77. Lavi, supra note 54, at 890; see also BARABÁSI, supra note 76; KADUSHIN, supra note 
66, at 27; RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 46, at 42; cf. Caroline Haythornthwaite, Social Net-
works and Internet Connectivity Effects, 8 INFO. COMMC’N. & SOC’Y, 125, 127 (2005).
78. Lavi, supra note 54, at 889–90; see also CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 54, at 7–9.
79. Lavi, supra note 54, at 890.
80. See e.g., Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOCIO. 1360, 1361 
(1973); Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOCIO.
THEORY 201 (1983) [hereinafter Granovetter, A Network Theory Revisited]; Ronald S. Burt, The 
Network Structure of Social Capital, 22 RSCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 345, 345–49, 353, 359 
(2000).
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friends and family), the recipient ascribes credibility to the infor-
mation because he knows and trusts its source.81 In addition, interde-
pendency between people increases social pressure and the likelihood 
of crossing the threshold and disseminating an idea.82 Information 
transmitted in this kind of network tends to spread quickly among fol-
lowers but slows down outside the cluster of ties due to overlapping 
social circles that hinder dissemination between distant parts of the 
social network.83 In contrast, weak ties facilitate fast dissemination of 
information. In fact, they can bridge the structural holes between 
non-overlapping clusters of strong ties.84 Yet, individuals who receive 
information via weak ties may ascribe it less weight. 85
The following two subsections focus on the dissemination of 
rumors on social network platforms. Section I.C describes briefly 
the social structures of these platforms and their “bottom-up” in-
fluences on dissemination, and Section I.D describes the “top-
down” influences of intermediaries on these platforms. Due to 
these dynamics, it argues that social network platforms lend a high 
probability of users meeting their individual thresholds for dissem-
inating falsehoods.
C. Social Network Platforms and Dissemination of Rumors: Strength of 
Ties, Thresholds, and “Bottom-up” Influence on Social Dynamics
More than twenty years ago, sociologists Gustavo Mesch and Ilan 
Talmud mapped three social factors affecting the quality of online 
ties: (1) social similarity (homophily); (2) the intensity of contact 
(relationship duration); and (3) different dimensions of the rela-
tionship (multiplexity).86 An application of these factors to social 
81. David Krackhardt, The Strength of Strong Ties: The Importance of Philos in Organizations,
in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM AND ACTION 216, 218 (N. Nohria & 
Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992) (“Strong ties constitute a base of trust that can reduce re-
sistance and provide comfort in the face of uncertainty.”).
82. See Lavi, supra note 53, at 17; cf. Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Co-
hesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1290 (1987); Mark Granovetter & 
Roland Soong, Threshold Models of Diffusion and Collective Behavior, 9 J. MATH. SOC. 165, 165–
66 (1983) (focusing on the homogeneity assumption in models where the network is com-
posed of homogenous individuals).
83. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
956 (2005) (“Information transmitted via strong ties generally spreads less quickly, but is 
more accurate and credible.”).
84. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 21–22 (explaining how a mixture 
of strong and weak ties impacts the diffusion of protest movements)
85. Granovetter, A Network Theory Revisited, supra note 80, at 218–19; Strahilevitz, supra 
note 83, at 965; Krackhardt, supra note 81, at 218; KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 69;.
86. Gustavo S. Mesch & Ilan Talmud, The Quality of Online and Offline Relationships: The 
Roles of Multiplexity and Duration of Social Relationships, 22 INFO. SOC’Y 137 (2006).
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network platforms reveals that these platforms facilitate the for-
mation of strong ties.
Social network platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, are 
“web-based services that allow individuals to: (1) construct a public 
or semi-public profile within a bounded system; (2) articulate a list 
of other users with whom they share a connection; and (3) view 
and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system.”87 The design and interfaces of the network have 
significant implications on the types of interactions.88 The design 
allows people to cluster around similar users who share a common 
denominator and, thus, participants are relatively homogenous 
within clusters. Moreover, social network platforms allow continu-
ing interactions among repeat players, each of whom has a person-
al profile that represents their real identity in the physical world.89
Finally, people discuss diversified and personal subjects on social 
network platforms. Thus, strong ties are likely to form among par-
ticipants of social network platforms, in contrast to other types of 
platforms,90 and these ties have an extensive “bottom-up” effect on 
the flow of information.
Strong social ties influence a recipient’s perception of speech. 
Information transmitted via strong ties may be complex, personal,
and perceived as more credible.91 Due to the likelihood of strong 
ties on social network platforms, the harm to reputation and public 
interest in this setting can be extensive. First, in most social net-
works, speech is not anonymous. The personal profile a user cre-
ates within the system usually represents his real identity. The 
source of the message is known and, thus, the message is perceived 
as more credible than if it were to come from an anonymous 
source.92 Second, social similarity and homogeneity on social net-
87. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2009) (citing
Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMMC’N 210, 211 (2008)).
88. See IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 118–19 (2013); Grimmel-
mann, supra note 87, at 1143.
89. Cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1198 (explaining that Facebook has discretion 
to remove users who do not use their real identity).
90. On social networks, strong ties are likely to form due to overlapping social circles 
and similarity among users who cluster around one another, continuous two-way interaction 
between repeat players, and various complex subjects of discussion. See Lavi, supra note 54, 
at 903. Strong ties are less likely to form on other types of platforms. Id. at 893–94. Drawing 
on network theory, especially the key factors affecting the quality of social ties, I outlined a 
descriptive taxonomy of online platforms. I identified three categories of platforms based on 
the strength of ties formed between their users: (1) freestyle discourse; (2) peer-production 
and (3) deliberation and structuring communities (including social networks). Id. at 895–
908.
91. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 890–91.
92. Id. at 893–94; Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1198.
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works may lead to interdependence among participants,93 and 
their social network influences their decisions.94 Clusters of strong 
ties can create echo chambers where similar individuals support 
and echo information, confirming prior convictions and entrench-
ing their credibility, while voiding other viewpoints.95 Such “bot-
tom-up” influence of strong ties on social dynamics increases the 
likelihood that members will reach their thresholds for accepting 
and spreading information.96 Third, users may add comments to 
the shared content, thereby validating and reinforcing it. Thus, the 
process of social sharing has “bottom-up” influences that amplify
the gravity of harm.97
On social network platforms, content can spread by word-of-
mouth among actors who know each other, interact, or have mu-
tual interests.98 It can also spread by imitation via “memes”99 or in-
formation cascades.100 When many people simultaneously forward a 
specific item of information over a short period of time and it 
spreads beyond their own social network, the content becomes vi-
ral.101
Further, a message shared through social networks may be more 
influential than a message shared by mass media.102 For example, 
“friends” on social networks generate similar types of content.103
93. See Granovetter & Soong, supra note 82 (referring to the homogeneity assumption).
94. James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Dynamic Spread of Happiness in a Large So-
cial Network: Longitudinal Analysis Over 20 Years in the Framingham Heart Study, 337 BMJ a2338 
(2008); Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Net-
work over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370–79 (2007).
95. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA,
11, 116–135, 155 (2017); see also BENKLER ET AL. supra note 2, at 80–83 (expanding on the 
confirmation bias in the right wing media outlet that affected the dissemination of fake news 
in the 2016 U.S. election campaign).
96. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that with the shared view of a few people, 
they might come to accept the rumor).
97. Id. at 40; CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: CONSPIRACY THEORIES 85 (2015).
98. See KARINE NAHON & JEFF HEMSLEY, GOING VIRAL 36 (2013).
99. See AN XIAO MINA, MEMES TO MOVEMENTS HOW THE WORLD’S MOST VIRAL MEDIA IS 
CHANGING SOCIAL PROTEST AND POWER 6, 20 (2019); LIMOR SHIFMAN, MEMES IN DIGITAL 
CULTURE 2, 9–15 (2013) (explaining how the term “meme” was coined by Richard Dawkins 
in 1976 to describe small units of culture that spread from person to person through copy-
ing or imitation; internet memes are posts in which shared norms and values are construct-
ed through cultural artifacts) (referring to RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976)).
100. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 38–39; see also Burt, supra note 82, at 1290 (re-
ferring to imitation and stickiness that increase the likelihood of diffusing information).
101. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 16.
102. See ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED BY 
PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATION 32 (1955) (explaining that most people ex-
press their opinions under the influence of central hubs in their social networks (the “opin-
ion leaders”)).
103. In a scientific experiment, “Facebook showed some users fewer of their friends’ 
posts containing emotional language [and] then analyzed the users’ own posts to see 
whether their emotional language changed.” James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of 
Experiments on Social Media Users, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 222 (2015) (citing Adam D.I. 
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The strength of ties and context formed on social network plat-
forms allows “top-down” social dynamics that enhance social pres-
sures.104 It also increases the likelihood that multiple users will 
reach their threshold for accepting and disseminating speech 
through their social ties. Thus, even neutral individuals who do not 
have a prior disposition to support information may adopt and 
spread a rumor. Moreover, even skeptics, who see that other indi-
viduals in their social network have disseminated a rumor, may 
eventually reach their threshold for adopting and disseminating 
it.105 Due to the strong ties on social networks, the likelihood for 
correcting false rumors, defamation, and fake news decreases.106
Indeed, not all ties in a social setting are strong, and alongside 
strong ties, there are weak ties. These weak ties create a bridge be-
tween structural holes in the network and allow for vast dissemina-
tion. As a result, in online social networks, information is perceived 
as credible because of the strong ties and may travel between dis-
tant parts of the social network, disseminating vastly over a short 
period of time due to weak ties that bridge between non-
overlapping clusters of strong ties.107 Thus, weak ties accelerate the 
dissemination of information beyond clusters of strong ties, where-
as strong ties enhance the credibility of information.
D. The “Top-down” Influence of Online Intermediaries on Networks and 
Thresholds
The social dynamics of content dissemination are not the whole 
story. In addition to “bottom-up” dynamics, intermediaries of social 
network platforms influence users from the “top-down,” causing 
users to cross their thresholds and disseminate ideas.108
Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emo-
tional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S.A. 8788, 8788 
(2014)). A change was indeed found. Id.
104. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO 
MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 85–86 (2014).
105. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 33 (explaining that the effects of the social 
network enhance the dissemination of information).
106. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 918; SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 97, at 25–27 (explain-
ing that in some cases efforts to correct a false rumor or conspiracy theory can have the op-
posite effect and even cause more people to believe it).
107. See KADUSHIN, supra note 66, at 69 (explaining that since weak ties form among ac-
quaintances, they facilitate the dissemination of information beyond the cluster of strong 
ties).
108. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING DIGITAL LIBERTIES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 170–74 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate 
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1456 (2011); 
see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL 
MONEY AND INFORMATION 60 (2015); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE 
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Individuals operate in a social context, and their behavior de-
pends on the architecture of their environment. The technological 
design of platforms has political dimensions.109 Values can be 
“baked into” the technological architecture, offering a “seductively 
elegant and effective means of control.”110 Each and every choice of 
architecture affects the social network’s context and interpersonal 
dynamics between users.111 Intermediaries can influence decisions 
to generate and disseminate content through their choice of archi-
tecture.112 Such a choice also creates “affordances”—the possible 
actions and uses that can be performed on the platform. These af-
fordances, in turn, influence how people use the platform.113 Just a 
few tweaks in the design of an intermediary’s platform can make a 
huge difference in how it is used and, consequently, its potential 
for the widespread circulation of ideas. Understanding social dy-
namics on social networks allows intermediaries to harness tech-
nology and design their platform to influence the flow of infor-
mation from the top down.
Intermediaries earn more revenue from advertisers as participa-
tion increases, since social engagement keeps users on the plat-
form longer. Continued participation allows intermediaries to col-
lect more information on users,114 monetize “social graph,” target 
personalized advertisements, and maximize profits.115 Therefore, 
J.L. & TECH. 42, 55 (2015) (expanding on governing mechanisms that structure participa-
tion in a community to facilitate cooperation).
109. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980) (discuss-
ing in detail the political dimensions of technological design).
110. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2019)
(“[D]esign’s awesome yet invisible capacity to manipulate those who exist inside its ecosys-
tem requires us to consider the values we want design to promote.”); Deirdre K. Mulligan & 
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design, 106 CAL. L. REV. 697, 701, 721 (2018); 
see also Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1257, 1299 (2018) (discussing the value in body cameras that track police officers’ behav-
ior).
111. See NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 82 (explaining that Twitter limits the num-
ber of characters in tweets. The platform was intentionally structured this way by its design-
ers. Consequently, people use it for short reports on what they are doing); TUFECKI,
TWITTER AND TEARGAS, supra note 33, at 267 (noting the possibilities for technology to shape 
and influence the dissemination of rumors).
112. See Lavi, supra note 53, at 14. Technology plays an important role in influencing 
contexts. See, e.g., NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 98, at 82. (giving an example of how char-
acter limitations influence the flow of information). See generally B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE THINK AND DO 5 (2003).
113. RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 46, at 65; Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013) (“[O]ur artifacts organize the world for us, subtly shaping 
the ways that we make sense of it.”)
114. COHEN, supra note 73, at 65, 83 (“Platform-based, massively intermediated envi-
ronments enable people seeking connection with each other to signal their affinities and 
inclinations using forms of shorthand—‘Like’, ‘Follow,’ ‘Retweet,’ and so on—that simulta-
neously enable data capture and extraction.”).
115. Id. at 55; MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 171 (2019) (“The 
more content users voluntarily provide (posts, shares, likes etc.), the more users interact on 
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intermediaries strive to maximize the participation of users and so-
cial sharing.116 To accomplish this, they use insights gleaned from 
sociology, psychology, and management.117 “These insights allow 
intermediaries to predict cognitive biases and social dynamics, de-
ploy new socio-technical systems, and influence flows of infor-
mation.”118 Such influences are operating from the top down.119
Similar to the gaming industry, design and technology can turn the 
use of social media addictive.120
For example, social network intermediaries bolster user motiva-
tion to spread content, make it easier for them to share infor-
mation, and trigger them to do so.121 They excel in making users 
feel socially connected. Pictures, names, and other informal signs 
create the feeling that mere contacts are close friends.122 Moreover,
intermediaries frequently “utilize algorithms to prioritize newsfeed 
content created by a user’s close friends and family, which rein-
the platform, and the more companies like Facebook can target users with increasingly per-
sonal advertising. If harmful content provided by a user generates a high level of engage-
ment from a large number of users, then the advertising benefit of that post goes up, which 
means more money in Facebook’s pocket.”); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019)
(coining the term “surveillance capitalism” to describe tracking users’ engagements in order 
to enhance commercial profits); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, 
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1555 (2018); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as 
It Should Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1085–86 (2020) (reviewing NICK DRNASO, SABRINA
(2018)).
116. See MARANTZ, supra note 39, at 80 (“Facebook’s larger goal, which always went un-
stated, was not to spread high-quality content; it was to entice more users into spending 
more time on Facebook.”); JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING 
INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 72, 102 (2012); ARI EZRA WALDMAN,
PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 90 (2018); Julie E Co-
hen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 140 (2017); Daniel J. Solove, The 
Myth of the Privacy Paradox 14 (George Wash. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-10, 
2020). See generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD FROM EDISON TO 
GOOGLE 154–57 (2009) (discussing the development of intermediary dynamics across vari-
ous industries).
117. Lavi, supra note 53, at 12.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 12, 18–19.
120. ZUBOFF, supra note 115, at 466 (“[J]ust as ordinary consumers can become compul-
sive gamblers at the hands of gaming industry, behavioral technology draws ordinary young 
people into an unprecedented vortex of social information . . . .”); see also Karen Mettler, A
Lawmaker Wants to End ‘Social Media Addiction’ by Killing Features that Enable Mindless Scrolling,
WASH. POST (July 30, 2019), wapo.st/2KBQ3X5; WOODROW HARTZOG: PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT:
THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 198 (2018) (expanding on 
architecture that makes the platform sticky and causes users to become addicted to the en-
gagement);
121. See HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 197; JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING 
YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 18 (2018). See generally FOGG, supra note 112, at 
198 (referring to socio-technical tools for enhancing users’ motivation and ability to spread 
content, which intermediaries use to trigger users to spread information).
122. Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1162–63.
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forces existing biases and further encourages dissemination.”123
Consequently, users share content they would not have necessarily 
shared offline.124 This choice in architecture frames relationships 
and increases the likelihood that an individual will reach his 
threshold for accepting and spreading content.125 It should also be 
noted that intermediaries can influence the content of infor-
mation that users share, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal has 
demonstrated.126 This Part, however, will focus on the influence in-
termediaries have on user decisions to share more information, re-
gardless of its content or topic.
Intermediaries on social network platforms allow users to create 
personal profiles and declare that other users are their “friends.”
This framing of relationships enhances social trust and motivates 
users to divulge and share personal information. Defining every 
connection as a “friend” increases the likelihood of reaching the 
threshold to adopt and disseminate information, even though not 
all connections are actually their friends in the traditional sense of 
the word. 127
Another example of how architecture choices can impact dis-
semination is social mirroring. This strategy reflects a user’s behav-
ior back to them via their newsfeed, leading to implied feedback 
and enforcing group identity.128 Social mirroring enhances the 
123. Lavi, supra note 53, at 30 n.213 (citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 16). In a related 
context Sacha Baron-Cohen demonstrated how the algorithmic code and algorithmic rec-
ommendations it targets encourages users to share specific types of content. See Sacha Baron 
Cohen, Read Sacha Baron Cohen’s Scathing Attack on Facebook in Full: ‘Greatest Propaganda Ma-
chine in History,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2019/nov/22/sacha-baron-cohen-facebook-propaganda [https://perma.cc/7YPM-R8C7].
124. See Lavi, supra note 53, at 6 n.14; Samantha L. Miller, The Facebook Frontier: Respond-
ing to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 546 (2008); cf. NICHOLAS 
CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 179–82 (2014) (explaining the psychological 
impacts of techniques used by technology companies to facilitate bonds with their users).
125. See James Grimmelmann, Accidental Privacy Spills, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2008); Dan-
iel Solove, Introduction: Privacy, Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880, 1886–88 (2013).
126. See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; Sam Meredith, Here’s Everything You Need to 
Know About the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, CNBC (Mar. 23, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-cambridge-analytica-scandal-everything-you-need-to-know
.html.
127. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 19, 221–22 (2016); see also BERNARD E HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 86, 99–100 (2015); Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, WASH. U. L. REV.
1535, 1565–66 (2019); Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Par-
adox,” CURRENT ISSUES  PSYCH. (forthcoming, 2020).
128. See Meng Ma & Ritu Agarwal, Through a Glass Darkly: Information Technology Design, 
Identity Verification, and Knowledge Contribution in Online Communities, 18 INFO. SYS. RES. 42, 58 
(2007); cf. Joan Morris DiMocco, Anna Pandolfo & Walter Bender, Influencing Group Partici-
pation with a Shared Display, 6 PROC. A.C.M. CONF. ON COMPUT. SUPPORTED COOP. WORK 614, 
619 (2004) (discussing the results of experiments into the impacts of group dynamics on 
social processes).
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network’s influence on the individual user and increases the user’s
likelihood of reaching the threshold to join his “friends” and dis-
seminate a rumor.129 The power of social mirroring has been prov-
en in an experiment conducted by Facebook. The social network 
only displayed the negative posts of “friends,” omitting positive 
ones. As a result, users created and shared negative posts at higher 
rates than other types of content.130
Intermediaries selectively influence the content users see in 
their newsfeed and content is not always presented chronological-
ly. Intermediaries can use Artificial Intelligence algorithms to tailor 
a users’ newsfeed to present relevant content and prioritize the 
content of close friends and family.131 This strategy increases the 
visibility of such content and the motivation to spread the infor-
mation, because it increases confirmation bias among homoge-
nous participants and enforces their beliefs.132
Intermediaries also allow explicit feedback by facilitating mech-
anisms for voting and the formation of reputations.133 These mech-
anisms bolster mutual influence within the social network and pave 
the way for extensive dissemination of ideas within the network.134
129. See ZUBOFF, supra note 115, at 21, 306 (addressing social pressures and architecture 
that replace politics and democracy (confluence) and describing how social networks create 
context and influence the engagement of individuals); Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & 
George Loewenstein, The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. MKTG.
RSCH. 160, 162 (2012).
130. BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 117–18 (2008)
(describing Facebook’s cognition experiment, testing users’ emotions).
131. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 14 (“ ‘[T]he goal of [the] News Feed is to show people 
the stories that are most relevant to them.’ With that point in mind, why does Facebook rank 
stories in its News Feed? ‘So that people can see what they care about first, and don’t miss 
important stuff from their friends.’ ”); see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA:
HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 77–105 (2018).
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 122–24; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 76 (“[Individu-
als] look for media outlets and politicians that will inform them as best as possible without 
suffering too much cognitive discomfort.”); see also Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the 
Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 88 (2019) (“Algorithmic processes 
optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt social sharing heighten the volatility of 
online interactions, and surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for con-
tent targeting and behavioral marketing create powerful — and easily weaponized — stimu-
lus-response feedback loops.”). See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE 
INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 35–48 (2011) (providing one of the first warnings that algo-
rithms show links that users are more likely to click on).
133. For example, the “like” button on Facebook.
134. See COHEN, supra note 73, at 85 (“[S]ocial networking as Facebook and microblog-
ging platforms, such as Twitter function as de facto aggregators for a wide range of content 
and deliver feeds optimized to everything that is known or inferred about particular users’ 
opinions and beliefs. By design, all of those algorithms incorporate feedback effects, and so 
their operation both reflects and continually reinforces the powerful economic motivation 
to pursue viral spread.”); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT 80–82 (2009); FOGG,
supra note 112, at 44; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and 
Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. & SCI. 1407, 1418 (2003) (discussing stud-
ies on the impacts of online feedback loops on establishing linkages between disconnected 
networks).
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Intermediaries can also function as social actors and reward users 
for certain kinds of activity.135 For example, Twitter used to reply 
automatically to every user who re-tweets and disseminates content 
with the message: “very nice.” The ability of intermediaries to func-
tion as social actors has expanded with the development of Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Machine Learning algorithms that allow the 
operation of social bots. Such algorithmic software programs that 
operate according to intermerdiaries’ instructions can interact so-
cially with users, enhance their trust in the communication of the 
intermediary, and increase the likelihood of disseminating ideas.136
Intermediaries not only enhance the motivation to disseminate 
content but also simplify the ability to do so. For example, “for-
ward,” “share,” or “re-tweet” buttons facilitate quick dissemination 
at the click of a button. There is no need for users to undergo the 
cumbersome copy and paste process in order to spread content. 
Due to the low cost of sharing and disseminating information, it is 
more likely that individuals will cross their “threshold” and join in-
dividuals already engaged in dissemination of information.137 Sim-
plifying dissemination encourages users to share information intui-
tively and almost automatically,138 bypassing reflective thinking 
about the consequences of dissemination.139 This choice of archi-
tecture engineers social behavior and influences decision-making,
by promoting the fast dissemination of information to a wide audi-
ence.140
135. See B.J. Fogg & Clifford Nass, Silicon Sycophants: The Effects of Computers That Flatter, 46 
INT’L J. HUM. COMPUT. STUDS. 551, 559–60 (1997) (discussing intermediaries as social actors 
and persuasive socio-technical tools).
136. See Emilio Ferrara, Onur Varol, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer & Alessandro 
Flammini, The Rise of Social Bots, 59 COMMC’NS A.C.M. 96, 96 (2016) (“A social bot is a com-
puter algorithm that automatically produces content and interacts with humans on social 
media, trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior.”); WALDMAN, supra note 116, at 
141 (expanding on the social communication of bots that motivate people to waive privacy 
protections, as a result of technological design); JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR 
DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 55–58 (2018) (“If your extended peer 
group contains a lot of fake people, calculated to manipulate you, you are likely be influ-
enced without even realizing it.”).
137. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 108. 
138. Julie E. Cohen, Tailoring Election Regulation: The Platform Is the Frame, 4 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 8) (explaining that platform-based, massively in-
termediated information environments are not designed for eliciting automatic, precogni-
tive interactions with online content and discussing the aspects of platform interfaces that 
are designed for automatic, habitual engagement).
139. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 237 (2011) (explaining two sys-
tems of thinking: intuitive thinking, “system 1,” and deliberative analytic thinking, “system 
2”).
140. FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 130, at 235 (“The smart social media environ-
ment that has emerged in the past decade of which Facebook is an important part – encour-
ages people to accept what is presented to them without pushing for reflection or delibera-
tion.”).
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This Section focused on the intermediaries’ top-down influence 
on engagement and dissemination of any type of content. Beyond 
the focus of this Article,141 it should be noted that intermediaries 
can prioritize false information on users’ newsfeeds because such 
content inspires surprise and enhances engagement.142 In short,
social dynamics influence content dissemination from the bottom
up and social network platform intermediaries enhance dissemina-
tion from the top down, both pushing users past their thresholds 
for dissemination of information. Although it is difficult to predict 
exactly when ideas will spread widely, both the strength of ties on 
social networks and the intermediary’s choice architecture make it 
more likely that rumors will spread on online social network plat-
forms than on other types of platforms.
E. Publish, Share, Re-tweet, and Repeat: Benefits and Challenges
Sharing content online can have a snowball effect and com-
pound dissemination. As content gains more attention, users as-
cribe more weight to it.143 Information disseminated can include 
harmful content, false rumors, defamation, and fake news, all in-
flicting tremendous harm. Despite this, the dissemination of in-
formation online can afford many benefits.
First, the sharing of information online promotes freedom of 
speech and the rationales at the base of this constitutional right.144
It promotes individual autonomy and approval for the speaker’s
141. For a discussion about the dangerous results of algorithmic recommendations in-
volving harmful content, see Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 
500–05 (2020). In a related context, algorithmic impact assessment was proposed to ac-
commodate the problem of discrimination and other harmful effects of algorithmic biases. 
For an expansion on the topic, see Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th 
Cong. (2019). For further discussion and criticism on the proposed bill, see Margot E. Ka-
minski & Andrew D. Selbst, Opinion, The Legislation That Targets the Racist Impacts of Tech,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/tech-racism-
algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/F4FL-7BMA].
142. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 131, at 5–6; see also Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Oppor-
tunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867, 894 (2020); Mark Bergen, YouTube Executives Ignored Warnings, 
Letting Toxic Videos Run Rampant, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/features/2019-04-02/youtube-executives-ignored-warnings-letting-toxic-videos-run-
rampant [https://perma.cc/LU9A-SW5N]; Cohen, supra note 132 (describing intermediar-
ies as “the greatest propaganda machine in history”).
143. The more times individuals are exposed to information, the more they tend to be-
lieve it. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 21 (“[R]umors frequently spread through infor-
mation cascades. The basic dynamic behind such cascades is simple: once a certain number 
of people appear to believe a rumor, others will believe it to, unless they have good reason 
to believe it is false.”); DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 47, at 225, Lavi, supra note 53, at 20.
144. Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for 
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004); Lavi, supra note 25, at 179; Lavi, supra
note 54, at 879.
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way of life.145 It also promotes a vibrant marketplace of ideas as it en-
hances content accessibility and the right to receive information.146
Dissemination also promotes democracy because it helps to keep cit-
izens informed about acts of government and guarantees that poli-
cy is reached intelligently,147 as almost every member of Congress 
operates a social media account.148 Copying and disseminating con-
tent “promotes democracy by literally putting information in citi-
zens’ hands.”149 It also enhances civic involvement and collective 
action to promote important social and political goals,150 even ena-
bling protest.151 In addition, dissemination protects a participatory 
democratic culture by enhancing dialogue on information from a 
broader variety of sources152 and allowing all members a fair chance 
to develop and share ideas within the communities to which they 
belong.153
Second, dissemination of content encourages novel ways of con-
suming, transacting, and making a living.154 It promotes efficiency 
by reducing the cost of information searches and increasing the 
145. See Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 
313–16 (1991) (focusing on the importance of free speech in promoting individual autono-
my).
146. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5–9 (1869) (the search for truth ensures that 
every expression enters the marketplace of ideas); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH 
FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1958). The search for truth theory was popular-
ized by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 630 (1919), in which he stated that “the best test for truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” See Sanchez, supra note 24, at
314–16.
147. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
26 (1948) (discussing the rationale for promoting democracy).
148. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1725–36 (2017) (“On Facebook, 
for example, users can debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors or share 
vacation photos. On LinkedIn, users can look for work, advertise for employees, or review 
tips on entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can petition their elected representatives 
and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and 
almost every Member of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose.”).
149. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565 (2004) (on the importance of copying and republish-
ing expressions in maintaining democracy in the related context of copyright).
150. For instance, the dissemination of content allows unconnected individuals to organ-
ize and promote important goals such as attending the funeral of a lone soldier or efficient-
ly organizing a civil protest. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF 
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATION 146–64 (2008); CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS:
CREATIVITY AND GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED AGE 175 (2010).
151. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 264.
152. Sanchez, supra note 24, at 316–17; see also Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shap-
ing the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59, 71 (Lucie M. C. R. Guibault 
& P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
153. Balkin, supra note 144, at 3–4 (explaining that an individual’s ability to participate 
in the production and distribution of culture promotes freedom of speech).
154. See Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J.
ENV’T L. & LITIG. 1, 4–5 (2012).
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accessibility of information about businesses, services, or commodi-
ties. This kind of information can help assess reputations and facil-
itate beneficial transactions, thereby minimizing inefficient services 
and streamlining markets.155
Third, dissemination of content promotes innovation, which is 
cumulative by nature, with most inventors building upon the work 
of their predecessors. Knowledge produces ideas that can be com-
bined and recombined over and over again.156 The free flow of in-
formation thus fosters the discussion of valuable ideas, promoting 
incremental innovation and enriching culture.
Fourth, dissemination of content allows the condemnation of 
immoral behavior, promotes desirable social norms and expands
the scope of traditional shaming.157 Today, “we live in a virtual 
‘global village’ and events occurring across the world simultane-
ously occur in our living rooms.”158 This allows the public to ex-
press disapproval of individuals who violate social norms, empow-
ering people to implement shaming sanctions and enforce social 
norms, which would otherwise go unenforced.159 When the content 
155. On the benefits of information flow between customers in promoting transparency 
in digital markets and improving various aspects of the standard form contract, see Shmuel 
I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard in the Age of Online User Participa-
tion, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 314 (2008) (“Consumers advised of biased 
terms might refrain from contracting with specific vendors, should such contracting lead to 
inefficient outcomes. This information flow would stop vendors from including biased and 
unfair provisions in their SFCs to begin with, to avoid the loss of consumers.”); Shmuel I. 
Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Online Consumer Contracts: No One Reads but Does Anyone Care, 12
JERUSALEM REV. L. STUDS. 105, 109 (2015) (giving an example of information on mandatory 
arbitration clauses in online terms that “further circulated and, as a result, the firm’s reputa-
tion seemed to be coming under attack”).
156. See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 82 (2014) (“[K]nowledge 
itself increases over time as previous seed ideas are recombined into new ones. This is an 
innovative-as-building-block view of the world . . . .”). There is a virtually infinite number of 
potentially valuable reconfigurations of existing pieces of knowledge. On the cumulative 
nature of most innovation, see White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 
(9th Cir. 1993): “All creators draw in part on the work of those who came before, referring 
to it, building on it, poking fun at it, we call this creativity, not piracy.”
157. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 611 
(1996) (referring to the development of the shaming sanction in its early days and analyzing 
social condemnation through shaming as a valid form of criminal sanction).  It is worth not-
ing that several years later, Kahan acknowledged the shortcomings of shaming. See Dan M. 
Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075 (2005). Accordingly, 
everyone has different values and there remains ambiguity regarding the scope of immoral 
behavior that should be punished by shaming.
158. Lauren M. Goldman, Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in Public Shaming 
Punishments, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415, 443 n.237 (quoting Deni Smith Garcia, Three Worlds 
Collide: A Novel Approach to the Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 105, 111 (1999)).
159. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2601–02; Goldman, supra note 158, at 450 (2015) (“[T]he 
inclusion of online social media websites in public shaming sanctions may prove to be an 
effective form of punishment that takes into account the societal conditions that exist to-
day.”). An example of condemnation by shaming is a video recording a person’s ugly behav-
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disseminated is true and the dissemination does not violate the 
law,160 sharing has many virtues161 that may outweigh its vices.162
The conclusion may be different when the content disseminated 
includes falsehoods, defamation, fake news, or other information 
that causes harm without legitimate purpose.163 In such cases, 
harmful information can spread rapidly, causing severe, unjustified 
reputational harm and even infringing on public interest. This can 
occur even when the original expression published is true if, dur-
ing the process of dissemination, users add falsehoods to the origi-
nal statement or cite the information and repeat it out of its origi-
nal context.164 Thus, even if the original expression reflects the 
truth, the process of dissemination can change the way the infor-
mation is interpreted and increase misinformation, disinfor-
mation, and defamation.165
Individuals generally ascribe greater credibility to negative con-
tent than to other types of content.166 This result is due to “negativi-
ty bias” and the strength of bad events, information, or feedback 
ior. As the video is shared via social networks and goes viral, that individual is punished by 
being shamed. See also, e.g., JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED ch. 1 (2015) 
(describing shaming that led to removal of a fake Twitter profile which hijacked a person’s 
identity); Amit Cotler, The Ugliest Kind of Israeli: Passengers Hurl Abuse at Flight Attendant, YNET 
ISRAEL NEWS (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4629380,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/B8XY-RTN7].
160. Dissemination of certain types of content is illegal. For example, many states, and 
even other countries, criminalize the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography. See
Mary Anne Frank, Revenge Porn Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1256 
(2017) (referring to state laws and the process of federal legislation in the United States); 
James Vincent, Sharing Revenge Porn in the UK Now Carries a Two-Year Jail Sentence, THE VERGE
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/13/8398691/revenge-porn-laws-uk-jail-
time.
161. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 92–94 (2007). In a world of increasingly rude and uncivil behavior, shaming 
helps society maintain a norm of civility and etiquette. Online shaming also gives people the 
chance to fight back, voice their disapproval of inappropriate behavior and even poor cus-
tomer service. This kind of shaming allows the little guy to fight back against big corpora-
tions and also provides valuable information to help us assess another’s reputation. Moreo-
ver, without the sanction of shaming, people would be able to continue rude and wrongful 
behavior without repercussion.
162. It should be noted that although Internet shaming has many benefits, it can also 
lead to some serious problems. For example, internet shaming is hard to control, can be 
disproportional, lacks due process and may lead to bullying. See SOLOVE, supra note 161, at 
94–98; Lavi, supra note 32, at 2621.
163. See generally Danielle K. Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1908–24, 1929 
(2019) (discussing the dissemination of intimate photos without consent and explains that 
current legal practices are ill equipped to accommodate the problem of abuses of digital 
dissemination).
164. Even dissemination of true information can develop into defamation when the dis-
seminators combine new additions and headlines to the post and remove it from its original 
context. See Lavi, supra note 25, at 199–200; Lavi, supra note 32, at 2607 n.30.
165. MINA, supra note 99, at 148–50 (explaining that shared posts that spread norms and 
values (memes), can develop different interpretations and narratives and increase disinfor-
mation).
166. Lavi supra note 25, at 152.
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compared to good events.167 As a result, negative ideas receive
more weight than other types of expression. Moreover, falsehoods 
tend to provoke and activate emotions and thereby be disseminat-
ed “farther, faster, deeper, and broader” than true statements.168
Therefore, negative, defamatory content is likely to outweigh ef-
forts by other social media users to counter it and continue to 
spread rapidly, ruining reputations.169
Alongside reputational harm, dissemination of defamatory re-
marks infringes on the same values that sharing strives to promote: 
freedom of expression, efficiency, innovation, and enforcement of 
norms.
First, the dissemination of falsehoods infringes upon the victim’s
free speech.170 Due to the “negativity bias”171 and “the weight as-
cribed to repeated content,”172 diffusion of negative falsehoods 
“may lead to self-exclusion”173 and “deny victims the ability to en-
gage with others as equals, which might suppress a free public de-
bate,”174 harm the victim’s autonomy, and hinder the free market 
of ideas and public participation.175 Moreover, due to the techno-
logical and social context that allows the spread of falsehoods at 
the click of a button and bypasses deliberative thinking, dissemina-
tion may infringe on the disseminator’s autonomy and free will.
167. Id.; Roy Baumeister, Ellen Bartslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer & Kathleen D. Vohs, Bad 
Is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 323, 346 (2001); see also Elizabeth A. Kensinger, 
Negative Emotion Enhances Memory Accuracy: Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 16 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 213, 213 (2007) (“[N]egative emotion enhances not only the subjec-
tive vividness of a memory but also the likelihood of remembering some (but not all) event 
details.”).
168. Vosoughi et al., supra note 15, at 1147; see also Jonah Berger & Katherine L. Milk-
man, What Makes Online Content Viral?, 49 J. MKTG. RSCH. 192, 197 (2012).
169. Lavi supra note 25, at 152.
170. See Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-to-
regulate-and-not-regulate-social-media (explaining that the values that free speech is de-
signed to serve are at risk).
171. See Baumeister et al., supra note 167, at 346.
172. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 47, at 225 (discussing the weight ascribed to re-
peated hearsay).
173. Lavi, supra note 25, at 182.
174. Lavi, supra note 53, at 53; see also Balkin, supra note 170 (“[A]ntagonistic sources of 
information do not serve the values of free expression when people don’t trust anyone and 
professional norms dissolve.”); CITRON, supra note 46, at 47–49 (referring to the potential of 
falsehoods to exclude individuals from public debate); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin 
Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 401, 420 (2017) (“Individuals have difficulty expressing themselves in the face of online 
assaults.”); Citron, supra note 115, at 1083. (“Online falsehoods, privacy invasions, and 
threats imperil targeted individuals’ life opportunities, including their ability to express 
themselves.”).
175. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1994 (2018) (“[A]rguments involving speech on both sides focus on 
the degree to which one party’s expressive activity compromises the ability of other private 
parties to exercise their own First Amendment rights.”).
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This is because the technological context might manipulate indi-
viduals to disseminate falsehoods without consideration, which 
they might regret at a later stage.176
In addition, spreading falsehoods within online social networks 
can distort the marketplace of ideas and the public interests of 
truth and democracy. Due to the technological context that allows 
sharing at the click of a button and the social context that facili-
tates information and reputation cascades, negative falsehoods can 
spread widely and users are more likely to perceive them as credi-
ble. The wide dissemination of falsehoods, defamation, and fake 
news erodes the truth and distorts the marketplace of ideas.177 The 
socio-technological context of dissemination might not allow equal 
access to both “wise” and “unwise” ideas.178 Falsehoods will spread 
farther than the truth, leading to an erosion of democracy and in-
fringement of public interest.179
Second, beyond the infringement of free speech, spreading def-
amation and negative falsehoods about individuals injures their 
reputation, which is the basis for inclusion in market transactions. 
Thus, it may lead recipients to mistakenly avoid efficient transac-
tions with individuals due to unchecked false information on them.
As individuals are free to form contracts, can choose the people 
they contract with, and can avoid contracting with others, they are 
likely to avoid forming contracts with people who have had nega-
tive information disseminated about them, even if the information 
is false.180 Third, the unjustified exclusion of individuals from mar-
kets may also hinder the development of new products and ser-
vices. Fourth, due to negativity bias and the power of repetition, 
176. See Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Saranga Komanduri, Pedro Giovanni 
Leon, Gregory Norcie & Yang Wang, I Regretted the Minute I Pressed Share: A Qualitative Study of 
Regrets on Facebook, PROC. A.C.M. SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY, July 20-22, 2011, at 
§ 4.3; Yang Wang, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Xiaoxuan Chen & Saranga Komanduri, From Face-
book Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1320–23 (2013).
177. FRANKS, supra note 115, at 119 (“[E]ven if people had strong preferences for the 
truth, there is no reason for confidence that the marketplace would help them discover it.”); 
Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech De-
lusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 894 (2019) (“[D]eliberately deceptive speech undermines, not 
enhances, the pursuit of truth.”); see also Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage, and Other Human 
Dispositions: Reflections on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 48–49 
(2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY,
SPEECH AND REPUTATION 91, 102 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nusbaum eds., 2010).
178. Cf. Dan Laidman, When the Slander Is the Story: The Neutral Reportage Privilege in Theory 
and Practice, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 74, 99 (2010); Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No 
Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM.
L.J. 55, 69 (2018); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 406 (“[T]he marketplace of ideas can fail, en-
suring that false statements will spread and become entrenched.”).
179. See Hasen, supra note 12, at 544; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 394 (“[I]f people spread 
false statements—most obviously about public officials and institutions—democracy itself 
will suffer.”)
180. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 266–67 (8th ed. 2011).
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dissemination of defamation validates falsehoods and develops un-
desirable social perceptions.
In sum, dissemination of content has many benefits. It promotes 
values of free expression, efficiency, innovation, and the enforce-
ment of desirable social norms. Yet, when the content disseminat-
ed is false and negative, the same values can be infringed and se-
vere harm can be inflicted. The law should not stop the flow of 
information and it must avoid a disproportionate “chilling effect”
on speech. Solutions, however, should be developed to mitigate 
harm caused by the dissemination of falsehood. Protecting indi-
vidual reputations and the public interest of access to the truth, 
without curbing free speech, is one of the main challenges internet 
regulation faces today.
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY OF INTERMEDIARIES
How does the law deal with dissemination of falsehoods on so-
cial network platforms? This Part provides a comparative overview 
focusing on intermediary liability for defamation.181 It continues 
with a critical review of international policy models governing sec-
ondary liability of online intermediaries that facilitate the harmful 
exchange of information.
A. United States
In the United States, freedom of speech has greater protection 
than in other Western democracies: there is a presumption against 
restrictions on speech.182 Section 230 of the CDA provides one of 
181. This Part will focus on the intermediary and not on the liability of the publisher of 
the harmful expression. The liability of the publisher can only be helpful in limited con-
texts, and cannot prevent the further spread of information, as the law immunizes online 
republishers. The Article will not address the potential liability of individuals who share in-
formation since it is difficult and even impractical to hold them responsible and receive full 
compensation for the aggregated reputational damage. Litigation can be cumbersome since 
none of the repolishes that shared content is solely responsible for the damage and there is 
a large number of defendants. For further information on this aspect of dissemination, see 
Perry, supra note 26. This Part will also not address specific election campaign finance laws 
that apply to publishers. For further information on this topic, see Hasen, supra note 12, at 
554–63.
182. Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech From “Posts-as-Trumps” to Proportionality and 
Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11–12); Oreste Pollicino 
& Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and the Limits to Freedom of Expression in the EU: A Com-
parative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 513–28 (Andrej Savin & Jan 
Trzaskowski eds., 2014) (demonstrating that in the United States, there are stronger protec-
tions on the freedom of speech than in the EU, and that the different balance between val-
ues is even more prominent online). But see FRANKS, supra note 115 (arguing that legislators, 
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the most important protections of freedom of expression in the 
United States in the digital age.183 This federal legislation repre-
sents the mindset of internet exceptionalism, differentiating the 
internet from the media before.184 It generally blocks lawsuits 
against online intermediaries. Section 230(c)(1), under the sub-
section header “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and 
Screening of Offensive Material,” directs that “[n]o provider or us-
er of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by another infor-
mation content provider.”185 “Congress declared that online service 
providers could never be treated as publishers for material they did 
not develop.”186
By declaring that online intermediaries cannot be treated as 
publishers of content authored by others, the aim of Congress was 
to promote self-regulation, freedom of expression, and support the 
rise of lively internet enterprises.187 Under § 230(c)(1), online ser-
vice providers, including website operators, are immune from pri-
mary and secondary liability for a wide variety of claims.188 This is 
because an individual user who is considered “another information 
content provider” published the original defamatory content.189 In-
termediaries are not held responsible for that user’s conduct or for 
republishing content. This applies even when the intermediary it-
courts and civil rights organizations have interpreted the First Amendment selectively, just 
like religious fundamentalists, and in fact infringe on the rights of minorities and the un-
derprivileged to free speech, shifting even more power from vulnerable populations to pow-
erful ones).
183. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2313 
(2014); see also Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2019).
184. KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 78.
185. Communication Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
186. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 651 (2014). The 
Protection for Good Samaritan subsection aims to promote self-regulation and encourage 
intermediaries to screen offensive materials without bearing liability. See Citron & Wittes,
supra note 174, at 403; Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 253, 262–63 (2006).
187. For further information on the history and objectives of § 230, see JEFF KOSSEFF,
supra note 20, at 11–35 (2019); Chander, supra note 186, at 651–52; and Lavi, supra note 32, 
at 2636.
188. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain 
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service 
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service” (emphasis 
added).); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that inter-
mediaries are immune even if they pay third parties to write columns on their platforms, 
which contain defamatory speech); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F. 3d 
980, 984–86 (10th Cir.  2000) (holding that intermediaries are immune even when they pro-
vide access to information from third parties and this information is erroneous).
189. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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self republishes the user’s content.190 Courts have interpreted § 230 
broadly and have also shielded intermediaries from liability as dis-
tributers of content.191 As a result, this section has “repeatedly 
shielded web enterprises from lawsuits in a plethora of cases” when 
they failed to remove harmful content, when they operated edito-
rial discretion and discriminated content, and even when they per-
formed more active roles in dissemination of content.192 It should 
be noted that this immunity is gradually eroding. First, intermedi-
aries are only immune with regard to information that is “provided 
by another content provider.”193 If a plaintiff can demonstrate that 
the intermediary provided the content, the intermediary will not 
benefit from § 230 immunity. Second, even if a third party is held 
accountable for creating the content, § 230 only prevents the court 
from treating the platform as “publisher or speaker.” If a plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the lawsuit stemmed from an action by the 
defendant that was not publishing or speaking, the court should 
find that § 230 does not block the lawsuit.194
190. Lavi, supra note 25; see also, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that a moderator of a listserv and operator of a website who posted a defam-
atory e-mail authored by a third party may be exempt from liability if the material is “provid-
ed” by someone else); Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Opinion Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 
1318–20 (M.D. Fla. 2015). It is worth noting that § 230 also exempts internet users who 
share content published by others. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 525, 528–29 (Cal. 
2006) (“[C]ongressional purpose of fostering free speech on the Internet supports the ex-
tension of section 230 immunity to active individual ‘users.’ ”).
191. Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. 
America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 585–87 (2008); cf.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2).
192. Lavi, supra note 54, at 867–70; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“By its plain language, 
§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); Nemet Chevrolet, 
Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009); Giordano v. Romeo 
76 So. 3d 1100, 1101–02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 
3d 1056, 1064–66 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that immunity applies even when the interme-
diary knew of the defamatory content and did not remove it), aff’d, No. 16-15610, 2017 WL 
2445063 (9th Cir. June 6, 2017); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, No. 18-396, 2019 WL 1384092 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 27, 2019); Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding 
that activity of intermediaries to restrict materials is covered by § 230’s immunity as inter-
mediaries are not state actors and are not subjected to the First Amendment); Fyk v. Face-
book, Inc., No. 19-16232, 2020 WL 3124258, at *1 (9th Cir. June 12, 2020) (noting that § 
230 protects intermediaries’ editorial discretion to moderate content); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 
1030–33 (holding that immunity applies even when  an operator of a listserv repeated users’ 
content in a listserv).
193. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (referring to immunity for “any information provided by an-
other information content provider”); KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 166.
194. KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 166; Lavi, supra note 32, 2659 n.251; see also Harrington v. 
Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (D. Or. 2018) (noting that “because a local regulation  
did not require the Platforms to monitor third-party content” or to remove it, it does not 
treat them as publishers, and thus falls outside the preemptive scope of § 230); Eric Gold-
man, Racial Discrimination Lawsuit Against Airbnb Has the Potential to Change Online Marketplac-
es–Harrington v. Airbnb, TECH. & MKTG. LAWBLOG (Nov. 2, 2018) (explaining that although 
the case does not discuss § 230, it offers a roadmap around it); Bolger v Amazon.com, Inc., 
53 Cal. App. 5th 431 (2020) (holding that Amazon is not immune from liability to market-
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Section 230, however, recently sustained an attack regarding 
immunity for user generated content. Recently, Twitter added a
fact checking label to tweets of the 45th President of the United 
States, Donald Trump, stating that viewers could “get the facts” by 
clicking on the addendum.195 Following this labeling, President 
Donald Trump attempted to curb the online platform’s protection 
for “Good Samaritans.”
On May 28, 2020, Trump issued an executive order on “Prevent-
ing Online Censorship” pertaining to online platforms.196 After a 
policy statement on the need to “seek transparency and accounta-
bility from online platforms, and . . . preserve the integrity and 
openness of American discourse and freedom of expression,”197F197 the 
order outlines a narrow interpretation to § 230. It clouds the legal 
landscape for content moderation decisions, explaining that §
230(c)(2) applies only to “good faith” moderation decisions.198F198 It,
thus, allows stripping the shield from moderation decisions that 
the government does not see as moderation in “good faith.” The 
order further directs “all executive departments and agencies” to 
“ensure that their application of [S]ection 230(c) properly reflects 
the narrow purpose of the section and take all appropriate actions 
in this regard.”199F199
In addition, the order directs each executive department and 
agency to review media advertising spent on online platforms and 
restrict platforms’ receipt of advertising dollars.200 “The Depart-
ment of Justice shall review in the viewpoint-based speech re-
strictions imposed by each online platform . . . and assess whether 
any online platforms are problematic vehicles for government 
speech due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, 
or other bad practices.”201 The order further provides that the 
White House “will submit” reports of purported “online censor-
place items); Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2016) (alleging that the in-
termediary and its employees wrote the defamatory statements). For criticism of extending 
§ 230 liability to other activities, see Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet 
as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Speech Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 45, 51–52.
195. See Makena Kelly, Twitter Labels Trump Tweets as ‘Potentially Misleading’ for the First 
Time, THE VERGE (May 26, 2020, 6:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/26
/21271207/twitter-donald-trump-fact-check-mail-in-voting-coronavirus-pandemic-california.
196. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).
197. Id. § 1.
198. See id. § 2 (“[U]nder the law, this provision is not distorted to provide liability pro-
tection for online platforms that—far from acting in “good faith” to remove objectionable 
content — instead engage in deceptive or pretextual actions (often contrary to their stated 
terms of service) to stifle viewpoints with which they disagree.”).
199. Id. § 2(b).
200. Id. § 3.
201. Id. § 3(c).
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ship” received through its “Tech Bias Reporting Tool” to the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).202
The latter can “consider taking action” under applicable law, in-
cluding under Section 5 of the FTC Act,203 which makes unfair 
methods of competition unlawful.204
Legal experts agree that the order is without legal foundation,
unenforceable, and without legal impact.205 Recently the Center for 
Democracy & Technology filed a lawsuit against the executive or-
der to invalidate it.206 In addition, the Court of the Northern Dis-
trict of New York ruled that the executive order precluded a pri-
vate right of action even if defendants in that case arbitrarily 
removed the plaintiff’s account or prevented him from creating a 
new account.207 It is therefore likely that the immunity provided 
under § 230 will remain strong where platforms host harmful con-
tent created by third parties, moderate content, and allow users to 
share it.
In addition to the order, recent legislative bills strive to narrow 
§ 230’s immunity.208 The shadow of the order and the legislative 
bills, however, might impair how intermediaries apply their First 
Amendment rights to moderate content and lead all platforms to 
chill more protected speech.209
B. A Comparative Perspective
In Europe, the scope of intermediary liability is much broader 
than in the United States, and the balance between freedom of 
speech and protection of reputation is very different.210 The E-
202. Id. § 4(b).
203. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C § 45.
204. Exec. Order, supra note 196, at § 4(c).
205. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Trump’s “Preventing Online Censorship” Executive Order Is Pro-
Censorship Political Theater, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 29, 2020), https://bit.ly/2B33vSk;
Jan Wolfe, Trump’s Order Taking Aim at Twitter Is ‘Bluster’: Legal Experts, REUTERS (May 28, 
2020, 2:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-trump-executive-order-analysis
/trumps-order-taking-aim-at-twitter-is-bluster-legal-experts-idUSKBN234361 [https://
perma.cc/4CRN-759Z].
206. Complaint, Ctr. For Tech. & Democracy v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-01456 (D.D.C. Dec. 
11, 2020), 2020 WL 2858041.
207. Gomez v. Zuckerburg, No. 5:20-cv-00633-TJM-TWD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130989 
(N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020); see also Eugene Volokh, No Claim Against Facebook Based on President’s 
Social Media Executive Order, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2020), https://reason.com
/volokh/2020/07/31/no-claim-against-facebook-based-on-presidents-social-media-executive-
order/ [https://perma.cc/K3DP-P6S4].
208. See S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
209. See Complaint, supra note 206, at ¶ 45.
210. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, 61 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1687, 1729–30 (2020) (“In Europe, free expression is safeguarded by Article 10 of the 
European Convention and Article 11 of the EU Charter. Like other European fundamental 
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Commerce Directive dictates the framework for intermediary lia-
bility. According to Article 14, intermediaries that host content are 
subject to a ‘notice-and-takedown’ regime that obligates them to
remove illegal content in order to avoid potential liability. 211 “This
knowledge-based safe haven protects intermediaries whose role is 
‘merely technical, automatic and passive,’ but does not shield in-
termediaries that play an active role in hosting the content.”212
The Directive does not prevent Member States from establishing 
specific requirements nor does it affect orders by national authori-
ties in accordance with national legislation.213 Member States can 
impose duties of care on intermediaries through national legisla-
tion, requiring them to undertake reasonable efforts to detect and 
prevent certain types of illegal activity.214 Thus, for example, in the 
fall of 2017, the German government drafted the Network En-
forcement Act (NetzDG) for targeting hate speech and fake 
news.215 The Act applies to criminally offensive speech as defined in 
the German Penal Code, including defamation.216 It stipulates a 
rights, these provisions are subject to proportionality analysis – where they conflict with an-
other fundamental right such as the right to privacy or to data protection, courts must bal-
ance the rights on an equal footing. By contrast, in the United States, the fundamental right 
of free expression protected by the First Amendment is not subject to proportionality analy-
sis . . . .”). See generally Pollicino & Bassini, supra note 182.
211. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, Art. 14(1) [hereinafter E-
Commerce Directive] (“Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure 
that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient 
of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circum-
stances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or  (b) the provider, upon 
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to 
the information.”). For expansion on the E-Commerce Directive, see Lavi, supra note 54, at 
870–71.
212. Lavi, supra note 53, at 46 (citing Joined Cases C-236 & C-238/08, Google France, 
S.A.R.L. & Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, I-2513 (“[T]o es-
tablish whether the liability of a referencing service provider may be limited under Article 
14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service 
provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, 
pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores.”); and Corey Omer, 
Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 313 
(2014)).
213. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 211, at Recital 47.
214. Id. at Recital 48.
215. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Oct. 1, 2017, 
at § 3(2)(4) (Ger.), translation at https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungs
verfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc
/PH7B-6FYQ].
216. Wolfgang Schulz, Regulating Intermediaries to Protect Privacy Online – the Case of the 
German NetzDG, in PERSONALITY AND DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS ON THE INTERNET (Marion 
Albers & Ingo Sarlet eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5) (citing GERMAN PENAL CODE, §§ 
185–189, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html
[https://perma.cc/MQ89-WSQA]).
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differential timeframe for intermediaries to remove harmful con-
tent.217 Intermediaries “have to make sure that they delete content 
that appears . . . evidently unlawful within 24 hours” of the filing of 
a complaint.218 “When content is not evidently unlawful,” interme-
diaries have to remove it within seven days.219 The “[r]eview period 
may exceed 7 days when more time is required for the decision-
making[, in order to minimize] ‘over-blocking.’”220 Failure to com-
ply with the law can lead to a fine of up to five million Euros.221
The Directive is somewhat obsolete in that its classification may 
no longer fit to each and every role intermediaries perform today.
Many intermediaries may not be classified as “hosts” since courts 
interpret Article 14 narrowly.222 Outside the scope of the E-
Commerce Directive intermediaries’ liability can be broad.223 The 
case of Delfi is one good example. In this case, “the Estonian Su-
preme Court found the popular Delfi news website liable for de-
famatory statements about a famous Estonian business execu-
tive.”224 Although Delfi followed a proper “notice-and-takedown”
regime and complied with the Directive,225 the Directive’s safe ha-
ven was not applied because “by allowing comments from unregis-
tered and anonymous users, the site is liable as a publisher.”226
Thus, it was not considered a “host.”
Delfi then appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 




220. Id.; see also NetzDG, supra note 215, at § 3(2)(3). For further information and criti-
cism, see BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 362–63; and Schulz, supra note 216.
221. Schulz, supra note 216, at 6.
222. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 871; Ronen Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anony-
mous Speech: Comparative and Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205 (2014); Peggy Valcke & 
Marieke Lenaerts, Who’s Author, Editor and Publisher in UGC Content? Applying Traditional Me-
dia Concepts to UGC Providers, 24 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 119, 126 (2010).
223. Lavi, supra note 54, at 871–74.
224. Id. at 871–72; see also Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 344 (June 16, 
2015).
225. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 222, at 221.
226. Lavi, supra note 54, at 872; see also Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, ¶28 (Oct. 
10, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-126635%22]} (noting 
that, in reviewing the decision of the Estonian Court, “the Supreme Court considered that 
in the present case both the applicant company and the authors of the comments were to be 
considered publishers of the comments”).
227. The ECHR “is charged with supervising the enforcement of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights . . . drawn up by the Council of Europe. . . . Indi-
viduals who believe their human rights have been violated and who are unable to remedy 
their claim through their national legal system may petition the ECHR to hear the case and 
render a verdict.” John G. Merrills, European Court of Human Rights, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Court-of-Human-Rights.
228. Delfi, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 327 (“The applicant company alleged that its freedom 
of expression had been violated.”).
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First Section of the ECHR did not accept Delfi’s claim.229 It upheld 
the Estonian Court’s ruling, finding that the ruling was in line with 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,230 as a
proportional interference with the freedom of expression. The 
Grand Chamber confirmed the decision.231 That decision has cre-
ated confusion regarding what distinguishes online “publishers”
from mere intermediaries.232
A narrow interpretation of the E-Commerce Directive was also 
recently applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).233 In Glaw-
ischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., a member of the National 
Council of Austria sued Facebook Ireland in the Austrian courts, 
seeking an order for Facebook to remove an allegedly defamatory 
comment about her and equivalent comments.234 Although the E-
Commerce Directive does not stipulate a general monitoring obli-
gation, the ECJ held that intermediaries such as Facebook are not 
protected by EU Law from an order to remove content that is iden-
tical, and even potentially similar to, content previously declared 
unlawful.235
At present, the extent of the “notice-and-takedown” provisions is 
unclear and it appears that the E-commerce Directive’s safe haven 
is eroding.236 A narrow interpretation of “hosting” enables courts to 
hold intermediaries accountable for negligence in preventing 
third-party harm, despite removing defamatory content from their 
platforms upon knowledge.237 In addition, requiring the removal of 
similar or equivalent content when that content has already been 
229. Delfi, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319.
230. Id. at 359, 366–67; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889. The Court applied a nar-
row interpretation of intermediary technical functions. For further information, see Martin 
Husovec, ECtHR Rules on Liability of ISPs as a Restriction of Freedom of Speech, 9 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. & PRAC. 108, 109 (2014)1
231. Delfi, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 388; see also Lavi, supra note 54, at 872–73.
232. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 222, at 222; Lavi, supra note 54, at 872–73; Lavi, supra 
note 53, at 48.
233. See generally Court of Justice in the European Union, EUROPA.EU, https://europa.eu
/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en [https://perma.cc/S77K-
GE66] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
234. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct. 
3, 2019) (reviewing the decision of the Vienna Commercial Court).
235. Lavi, supra note 141, at 508; see also Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821. It 
should be noted that the obligation is to block access to the information worldwide and not 
only from within the EU domains of Facebook. For criticism that the obligation to remove 
similar and equivalent content can lead to over-blocking and have a chilling effect on free 
speech, see DAPHNE KELLER, STANFORD CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, DOLPHINS IN 
THE NET: INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK 
V. FACEBOOK IRELAND OPINION 18–19 (2019) (comparing false positives to dolphins in the 
net).
236. Lavi, supra note 54, at 871.
237. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 365–66 (June 16, 2015).
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deemed unlawful imposes an obligation on intermediaries to use 
the technology available to them to monitor the platform.238 This 
obligation is beyond the traditional knowledge-based safe haven 
outlined in the E-Commerce Directive.239
The interpretation of the European Data Protection Directive 
on the “right to be forgotten” also reflects an expansion of inter-
mediary liability.240 In Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos,241 the ECJ supported what is known as the 
“right to be forgotten.”242 Specifically, the ECJ held that search en-
gines, like Google, must remove search results that link to personal 
information, including defamatory content found on third party
websites upon user request.243
“The ECJ reached this conclusion by broadly interpreting the 
term ‘controller’ in Article 2(d) of the Data Protection Di-
rective,”244 affirming that indexing personal data published on web-
sites makes search engines data processors and controllers.245 By
classifying search engines as controllers, the court implies that 
“they are not neutral and passive enough to be eligible for the safe 
harbors’ protection.”246 In a recent decision, the ECJ held that “the 
right to be forgotten” should apply to “search engine versions ac-
238. KELLER, supra note 235, at 11–12.
239. See generally E-Commerce Directive, supra note 212, at art. 14(1).
240. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Data Protec-
tion Directive].
241. Case C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
242. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 873 n.82 (“This right, now branded as the ‘right to eras-
ure,’ was represented as one of the ‘four pillars’ of the new Regulation in the European Un-
ion. In October 2013, the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and 
Home Affairs considered and consolidated nearly four thousand proposed amendments to 
the Commission Proposal into a new proposal that was adopted by the Committee.”). For an 
in-depth discussion, see Cooper Mitchell-Rekurt, Search Engine Liability Under the Libe Data 
Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by Google Spain, 45 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 861 (2014); Abraham L. Newman, What the “Right to be Forgotten” Means for Privacy in 
a Digital Age, SCI. MAG., Jan. 30, 2015, at 507; and NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY–
RETHINKING DIGITAL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 91 (2015).
243. Lavi, supra note 25, at 173; see also Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right To 
Be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 507, 549 (2016) (explaining that this ruling is con-
fined to searches made using the name of an individual and asserts a right to delist the 
link—as opposed to a right to remove the information from the search engine’s index alto-
gether); Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 541 (2015) (“To 
comply with the judgment, Google offered EU citizens the ability to file data removal re-
quests. Within 24 hours, the search engine received right to be forgotten requests from at 
least 24,000 individuals.”); MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 10, 41,
46 (2016).
244. Data Protection Directive, supra note 240, at art. 2(d) (“Article 2(d) ‘controller’ 
shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of per-
sonal data.”).
245. Lavi, supra note 54, at 874; see also Google Spain, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 at ¶ 41; Lavi, 
supra note 32, at 2632.
246. Lavi, supra note 25, at 173; see also Peguera, supra note 243, at 544.
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cessible in EU Member States, as opposed to all versions of its 
search engine worldwide.”247
It should be noted that the Data Protection Directive was re-
placed by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 
2018.248 The GDPR includes a specific provision titled “Right to 
erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”249 that imposes data controller ob-
ligations to erase data.250 In general, the GDPR imposes more spe-
cific obligations regarding information processing,251 and the ECJ 
interprets intermediaries’ obligations in this regard broadly.252
Other countries outside Europe outline different intermediary 
liability regimes.253 Some jurisdictions have even passed anti-fake 
news laws that are beyond private law, addressing infringement of 
public interest.254 For example, a new law in Singapore allows the 
government to order intermediaries to remove false statements.255
247. Harlan Grant Cohen & Monika Zalnieriute, Google LLC v. Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 261 (2020); see also Case C-507/17, 
Google LLC v. Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
248. The GDPR subjects “controllers” to a broader right to erasure. Regulation 2016
/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of 
Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L119) 33 [hereinafter 
GDPR]; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & Frederick Zuiderveen Bogesius, 
The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. &
COMM. TECH. L. 65, 90 (2019) (“Roughly summarized, a data subject has a right to erasure 
when he or she successfully exercises the right to object, when the personal data were un-
lawfully processed, should be erased because of a legal obligation, or are no longer neces-
sary in relation to the processing purposes.”); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the 
Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 68–69 (2017).
249. GDPR art. 17; Lavi, supra note 32, at 2634.
250. GDPR art. 17; see also Lavi, supra note 32, at 2634; JONES, supra note 243, at 10 (ex-
plaining that Article 17 to the GDPR, titled “Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten,’)” can 
impose obligations on controllers to delete information from the internet altogether).
251. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard,
71 FLA. L. REV. 365 (2019).
252. E.g., C-136/17, GC v. Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 
(CNIL), ECLI:EU:C: 2019:773 (Sept. 24, 2019).
253. For further information, see Lavi, supra note 25, at 174, which expands on interme-
diary liability in Canada.
254. See The Rise of “Fake News” Laws Across South East Asia, PUB. MEDIA ALLIANCE (Dec. 6, 
2019), https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/the-rise-of-fake-news-laws-across-south-east-asia
/ (overviewing Fake News Laws across South East Asia particularly on media freedom).
255. Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill, Parl. Bill No 10/2019, 
§ 4 (2019), https://www.parliament.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library
/protection-from-online-falsehoods-and-manipulation-bill10-2019.pdf (section four of the 
law refers to directions to internet intermediaries and providers of mass media services); see 
also Jason Luger, Planetary Illiberalism and the Cybercity-state: In and Beyond Territory, 8 
TERRITORY, POL., GOVERNANCE 1 (2019); Niharika Mandhana & Phred Dvorak, Ordered by 
Singapore, Facebook Posts a Correction, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/facebook-complies-with-order-under-singapore-fake-news-law-11575116149. Such 
laws were aimed at preserving political security, but governments can use them to prevent 
damage to the public’s health that can occur as a result of believing fake news on Covid-19. 
See Ellie Bothwell, Fake News Laws May ‘Catch On’ During Coronavirus, TIMES HIGHER ED.
WINTER 2021] Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat 481
Yet, this regime poses a threat to free speech since it subjects the 
intermediary directly to the government.256 Moreover, the absence 
of any definition of the term “false statement of fact” provides the 
government overly broad discretion.257
C. Liability Regimes: A Critical View
“Intermediary liability rests on the junction of a few areas of law. 
It balances constitutional rights and tort considerations,”258 aiming 
to find the right balance between values. On the one hand, the dig-
ital ecosystem allows anyone to publish harmful statements and po-
tentially infringe upon the victim’s right to reputation and free 
speech. On the other hand, liability can lead to collateral censor-
ship “when a (private) intermediary suppresses the speech of oth-
ers in order to avoid liability” for such speech.259 Imposing liability 
on the intermediary for false rumors may also constitute an in-
fringement on the freedom to conduct a business.260 In the United 
States, “an individual’s right to conduct a business or pursue an 
occupation is a property right.”261 Yet, freedom to conduct a busi-
ness is not absolute. Companies are subject to certain basic re-
quirements and remain accountable for decisions that might in-
fringe on individual rights.262
In addition to constitutional balances, “the technological con-
text of intermediary liability involves considering the influence of 
liability on the path of innovation” and its repercussions on welfare 
maximization.263 Courts should, therefore, not solely consider the 
harm to victims but also the benefits of an activity to third par-
(Apr. 6, 2020), www.timeshighereducation.com/news/fake-news-laws-may-catch-during-
coronavirus.
256. See Tessa Wong, Singapore Fake News Law Polices Chats and Online Platforms, BBC NEWS
(May 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48196985.
257. On the flaws of specific legal liability frameworks for “fake news” and the difficulty 
of defining “fake news,” see MINA, supra note 99, at 126.
258. Lavi, supra note 53, at 49.
259. Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 293, 295–96 (2011).
260. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364) art. 16 (expressing that the EU was founded on the universal values of dignity, soli-
darity, freedom, and equality).
261. Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 438 S.E.2d 6, 7 (W. Va. 1993); see 
also United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Arena, 180 
F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999).
262. HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 121 (“Companies should generally have the freedom 
to design technologies how they please, so long as they stay within particular thresholds, sat-
isfy certain basic requirements like security and accuracy, and remain accountable for de-
ceptive, abusive, and dangerous design decisions.”).
263. Lavi, supra note 53, at 49.
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ties.264 Their balance should include the overall costs and benefits 
to society as a whole.265 Finding the right balance between these in-
terests is the key to formulating a proper intermediary liability re-
gime. It should be noted that the balance between values is subjec-
tive and differs between legal systems.
Different countries apply different policy models for intermedi-
ary liability, such as: overall immunity,266 a safe haven provision 
(“notice-and-takedown”),267 and negligence liability for failing to 
take reasonable precaution to prevent third-party harm.268 These 
policy models are either over- or under-inclusive. This section ana-
lyzes the shortcomings of common liability regimes governing sec-
ondary intermediary liability and argues that such regimes fail to 
accommodate the challenges of dissemination of false rumors.
In a previous Article, I reached the conclusion that a “notice-
and-takedown” safe haven regime is preferable to other regimes 
for regulating secondary liability of intermediaries on social net-
work platforms.269 This type of regime is a compromise.270 Under 
such a regime, intermediaries are not required to block or filter 
content and they do not bear liability for harmful content they 
were not informed about.271 Only intermediaries that fail to remove 
harmful content upon notice expose themselves to liability.272 In 
light of the extensive harm false rumors and defamation may cause 
in social networks, this outcome is appropriate in comparison to an
immunity regime.273
This analysis applies to liability for original speech. The vast 
multitude of possibilities to quickly share content on social net-
works undermines the efficiency of a “notice-and-takedown” re-
gime, since false rumors and defamatory content are speedily rep-
licated. A victim aspiring to remove defamatory remarks would 
need to send a complaint and indicate each and every virtual loca-
264. Id. at 56.
265. Lavi, supra note 141, at 536.
266. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (U.S. model).
267. See 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13 (EU model).
268. See Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, 344 (June 16, 2015) (Estonian 
Model).
269. See Lavi, supra note 52, at 930–31.
270. See Celia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. 
America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 604–07 (2008) 
(explaining that “notice-and-takedown” regimes can essentially lead to the removal of any 
content in response to any complaint).
271. Lavi, supra note 54, at 887.
272. Id.; see COHEN, supra note 73, at 122 (this type of regime is supported by theories of 
efficiency).
273. See Lavi, supra note 54, at 931 (outlining different liability regimes for different 
types of social network platforms and arguing that adopting a “notice-and-takedown” safe 
haven regime provides a proper balance between constitutional rights and welfare consider-
ations).
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tion where the offending remarks appear. Due to the pace at 
which content is disseminated on social networks, this could prove 
to be an impossible mission.274 Moreover, between the time the 
complaint is registered and the actual removal of content, the rele-
vant content may continue to spread.
Applying “notice-and-takedown” or “right to be forgotten” re-
gimes on search engines cannot confront the challenges of replica-
tion. Under these regimes, if the information was replicated to sev-
eral websites and a search engine links to each and every one of 
them separately, the victim may have to contact each search engine 
about every single replication.275 Moreover, removing a link to of-
fensive content from search results may not stop the circulation of 
the content on various platforms.276 This process disproportionately 
places the burden on victims without sufficiently mitigating harm.
Allowing complete immunity for intermediaries is even more
under-inclusive. Under such a regime, the intermediary does not 
have a duty to remove defamation upon knowledge. Thus, even if 
the victim contacts the intermediary immediately after publication, 
the intermediary may still leave it on its platform. Consequently, 
the content may continue to spread and inflict harm.277
On the other hand, negligence liability is over-inclusive since 
negligence standards are generally open-ended. “Interpreting 
[negligence standards] involves cumbersome litigation and high 
administrative costs.”278 Difficulties experienced by courts in con-
ducting cost-benefit analysis may result in inconsistency and uncer-
tainty.279 Negligence liability may also lead to “hindsight bias” and 
“outcome bias” because reasonable action is normally determined 
after the harm has already been inflicted.280 “Consequently, courts 
274. See RONSON, supra note 159, at 195–96.
275. The GDPR, supra note 248, art. 17.2, stipulates that “[w]here the controller has 
made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal 
data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, 
shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are 
processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by controllers 
of any links to, or copy or replication of, those data.” It is unclear what constitutes “reasona-
ble steps” to erase replications. However, it is definitely clear that not erasing a replication 
after receiving a particular notice regarding it is unreasonable.
276. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2654 (explaining that removing links from a search en-
gine results only obscure the information and does not delete it altogether).
277. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 221, 222 (2006); SOLOVE, supra note 161, at 157–59.
278. Lavi, supra note 54, at 886.
279. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschof, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1076 (1972).
280. Lavi, supra note 54, at 886; see also Yoed Halbersberg & Ehud Guttel, Behavioral Eco-
nomics and Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS & LAW 405, 
411–12 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (“Hindsight bias . . . distorts people’s ex
post assessments of the ex-ante probability and predictability of an event, given that this 
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may conclude that the [intermediary was] negligent even if he 
could not predict the harm ex ante and acted reasonably” at the 
time.281 In the absence of a “safe haven,” negligence liability may 
cast a heavy burden on the intermediary, resulting in a serious 
chilling effect on free speech.282 Intermediaries can employ auto-
matic algorithmic enforcement,283 including Artificial Intelligence 
algorithms that are not sensitive enough to context,284 to remove 
controversial content even before receiving a complaint285 and still 
remain exposed to liability.286 Moreover, algorithmic enforcement 
can impose costs on free speech; it can distort the public discourse 
by prioritizing certain types of content and erode democracy.287 A
negligence liability regime may also disincentivize innovations, 
event has already happened . . . . The outcome bias is the tendency to perceive conduct that 
resulted in a bad outcome as more careless than the same conduct in cases where the bad 
outcome did not occur.”); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of 
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
281. Lavi, supra note 54, at 886.
282. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND:
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 242 (MIT Press ed., 
2015) (explaining that vagueness in regulatory standards leads companies to implement 
higher standards of regulation); Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech and Compelled Con-
formity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035–36 (2018) (in a related context of intermediary liability 
for incitement to terror, even planned legislation regarding intermediary liability caused the 
intermediary to overdo the removal of content by using digital tools in order to avoid poten-
tial liability).
283. See, e.g., Federico Guerrini, Facebook Will Flag and Filter Fake News In Germany, FORBES
(Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/2017/01/16/face
book-will-flag-and-filter-fake-news-in-germany/ (describing a new technological screening 
tool that Facebook implemented due to the new German legislation that is expected to im-
pose fines on the intermediary for fake news). For criticism on models of algorithmic en-
forcement, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright En-
forcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016), which expounds on the growing use of 
algorithms by online intermediaries and the challenges of such cooperation enforcement. 
See also Benjamin Boroughf, The Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, 
and Fair Compensation, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 95, 107 (2015).
284. See Natasha Duarte, Emma Llansó & Anna Loup, Mixed Messages? The Limits of Auto-
mated Social Media Content Analysis 1, 3 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. PAPER (2017), https:
//cdt.org/files/2017/12/FAT-conference-draft-2018.pdf (“Today’s tools for analyzing social 
media text have limited ability to parse the meaning of human communication or detect the 
intent of the speaker.”); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for 
Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1362 (2018).
285. Intermediaries may voluntarily apply best practices in order to be exempt from lia-
bility. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Taking Users’ Rights to the Next Level: A 
Pragmatist Approach, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 36 (2015).
286. TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, supra note 33, at 181 (explaining that dissemina-
tors of harmful speech find ways to bypass algorithmic enforcement for example by dissemi-
nating a print screen picture file that algorithms might find difficult to detect. Indeed, algo-
rithms are improving, but disseminators of harmful expressions are likely to find ways to 
bypass algorithmic enforcement.).
287. For example, one of Facebook’s strategies for combating fake news is using algo-
rithms to prioritize content. On the use of algorithms for degrading and decreasing the visi-
bility of fake news, see Daisuke Wakabayashi & Mike Issac, In Race Against Fake News, Google 
and Facebook Stroll to the Starting Line, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/35mUMoX.
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such as mechanisms for sharing content, and thus reduce im-
portant advantages of digital markets, technological innovation,
and the intermediary’s freedom to conduct a business.288 As a re-
sult, the positive externalities of sharing content are likely to de-
crease.
The above examination of overall immunity, “notice-and-
takedown,” and negligence liability regimes for regulating second-
ary intermediary liability reveals that they are either over- or under-
inclusive. These regimes may, in fact, cause disproportionate 
chilling effects or allow extensive reputational harm and infringe-
ment of public interest. Moreover, common liability regimes alone 
are insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the prevalent dis-
semination of false rumors and defamation on social networks and 
decentralized private platforms.289 While “notice-and-takedown” is 
preferable to other regimes for regulating intermediary liability on 
social network platforms, complementary mechanisms must also be 
incorporated in order to be effective. It should be noted that the 
harm of negative false rumors extends beyond the private individ-
ual’s reputation and also falls into the public interest.290 Therefore, 
policy makers should develop more tools to protect the public in-
terest.
The following Section will describe the changing role of inter-
mediaries in a brave new technological world. It will argue that the 
change in the intermediary’s role requires a new concept of their 
accountability. As a first step, the Article will propose that the law 
should adapt the safe haven regime to the new technological reali-
ty of sharing. It proposes a new framework for content regulation. 
This framework is intended to mitigate the damage caused by dis-
semination of false rumors, defamation, and fake news, while pre-
serving the benefits of dissemination and balancing the values at 
the base of intermediary liability.
288. The ambiguity regarding liability in Europe, reviewed in Section I.3.B above, has
probably led many intermediaries to switch off readers’ comments. See Paul McNally, Guard-
ian Digital Chief: Killing off Comments ‘a Monumental Mistake’, NEWS REWIRED (Mar. 2, 2015), 
https://www.newsrewired.com/2015/02/03/guardian-digital-chief-killing-off-comments-a-
monumental-mistake. A negligence regime might also lead some intermediaries to avoid 
mechanisms that enable sharing at the click of a button. See id.
289. See MINA, supra note 99, at 126.
290. See Ben Shahar, supra note 11 (labeling this as “data pollution content” and propos-
ing to use administrative and criminal law tools modeled on environmental law regulation). 
This Article will propose different solutions that focus on design.
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D. Reevaluating the Role and Obligations of Intermediaries in Light of 
Technological Developments
People once thought of the internet as a sovereign-free medium 
controlled from the “bottom-up” by users without intermediation
where anyone could publish anything without prior editing.291 In-
stead, the internet simply shifted intermediation by creating new 
media gatekeepers.292 These intermediaries are not mere conduits, 
as they control the flow of information.293 While it seems as if eve-
ryone “can publish freely and instantly online,” many intermediar-
ies in fact “actively curate the content” that their users post on 
their platforms.294 Intermediaries can organize the flow of infor-
mation, promote or withhold ideas, and influence social dynam-
ics.295 “They act as centers for disseminating information and pos-
sess an essential role in directing the attention of users.”296 For 
example, intermediaries moderate user-generated content297 by us-
ing various strategies that are hidden from public view,298 with in-
sufficient transparency.299 Different intermediaries have different 
291. Lavi, supra note 53, at 11–12 (citing Barlow, supra note 20). Barlow started the spirit 
of wide-eyed techno-utopianism.
292. See David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1201 (2012) (explaining that platforms often develop govern-
ment mechanisms through which they monitor and manage “bad” behavior, thereby acting 
as gatekeepers); MARANTZ, supra note 39, at 70. See generally COHEN, supra note 73, at 37–38, 
75 (explaining that some aspects the conception of “technologies of freedom” changed be-
yond recognition and today’s networked digital information infrastructure have different 
and more complicated affordances).
293. Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 220 (2018) (ex-
plaining that because YouTube structures, sorts and sometimes sells users’ data, it is not a 
passive conduit); see also Balkin, supra note 183, at 2297–98 (2014); Derek E. Bambauer, 
Middlemen, 64 FLA. L. REV. 64, 65 (2013).
294. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1599 (2018); see also SARAH T ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN:
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 93–161 (2019) (describing how 
different types of low-wage human contractors moderate content); Rory Van Loo, Federal 
Rules of Platform Procedure, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (on file 
with the author) (describing how Facebook cut off vital avenues for speech and sharing in-
formation, account termination and even deprives a user of valuable property without ade-
quate transparency).
295. Michal Lavi, Online Intermediaries: With Power Comes Responsibility, JOLT DIG.
(May 11, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/online-intermediaries-with-power-
comes-responsibility.
296. Id.
297. See TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT 
MODERATION AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 5–6 (2018); Kate 
Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free
Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2427 (2020) (“Content moderation is the industry term for a 
platform’s review of user-generated content posted on its site and the corresponding deci-
sion to keep it up or take it down.”).
298. Klonick, supra note 297, at 2427.
299. See id. at 2418 (describing how Facebook built institutions for oversight and explain-
ing that only after facing outside pressure from media, government, and the civil society did 
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attitudes towards moderation and different rules of community.300
Intermediaries can structure user participation on their platforms 
and push users to disclose and share information.301 Twitter for ex-
ample, uses their algorithms to “influence what is viewed, what is 
valued, and what is disseminated and re-disseminated by users.”302
They collect information on users, personalize content,303 and in-
fluence users’ behavior, decision-making processes, social dynam-
ics, the content they create,304 and even how they participate in 
democracy.305 For that reason, intermediaries have been dubbed 
the “New Governors of online speech.”306
As technologies advance and the role of the intermediary as 
moderator of the flow of information becomes a fundamental as-
pect of any platform, the duties of intermediaries should be recon-
sidered.307 Reevaluating intermediaries’ roles and duties is of par-
Facebook insert more transparency into its moderation practices and dedicate more re-
sources to enforcement). These measures however are insufficient. Moreover, other media 
giants might be even less transparent regarding their moderation practices.
300. See Shannon Bond, Critics Slam Facebook but Zuckerberg Resists Blocking Trump’s Posts,
NPR (June 11, 2020), https://n.pr/37mIoqm (“When Trump tweeted an identical message, 
Twitter took the novel step of hiding the tweet behind a warning label, saying it broke its 
rules against glorifying violence. Zuckerberg saw it differently. Even though he was personal-
ly disgusted by the president’s inflammatory rhetoric, he said, the post did not break Face-
book’s rules against inciting violence.”); Douek, supra note 182, at 5 (explaining that major 
platforms, are crafted around two different precepts: proportionality and probability).
301. See supra Section I.D.
302. Lavi, supra note 295; see also Alex Hern, Twitter Hides Donald Trump Tweet for ‘Glorify-
ing Violence,’ THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2020/may/29/twitter-hides-donald-trump-tweet-glorifying-violence.
303. See ZUBOFF, supra note 115, at 466 (describing the rise of surveillance capitalism);
FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 130, at 117–18 (describing the emotional cognition 
experiment that shows that intermediaries can control what is seen and what is disseminat-
ed). In another related context, Facebook allowed advertisers to target advertisements on 
specific topics to hate groups. See Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner & Ariana Tobin, 
Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters’, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters; Kerri 
A. Thompson, Commercial Clicks: Advertising Algorithms as Commercial Speech, 21 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 1019 (2019).
304. See GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 23 (“Platforms may not shape the public discourse 
by themselves, but they do shape the shape of the public discourse. And they know it.”).
305. See Jonathan Zittrain, supra note 55, at 335; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 131, at 87–
89 (describing how personalized content affected the 2016 election); Carole Cadwalladr & 
Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica 
in Major Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news
/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election.
306. Klonick, supra note 294, at 1603.
307. See Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manu-
script at 2–3) (“[F]ollowing years of laissez-faire attitudes in legislatures, lawmakers are look-
ing for ways to regulate the technology companies that exert so much influence over our 
lives.”). Recently, even Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has conceded that the internet 
needs new rules. Mark Zuckerberg, Opinion, The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These 
Four Areas, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-
zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f05
04-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html.
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ticular importance, especially in light of the recent attack on 
§ 230.308
As I have proposed elsewhere, intermediaries that influence us-
ers to publish and share false rumors and defamation, in particu-
lar, can be held liable under a contributory liability regime.309 In-
termediaries that publish defamation themselves, or mix their own 
content with users’ defamatory content, might bear direct liability 
for defamation.310 But what about the liability of intermediaries 
that make no particular effort to promote or publish harmful con-
tent? Should the law impose an obligation on intermediaries just 
because they sway influence on users to publish more content, 
even if they have not promoted or repeated offensive content in 
particular?
The power of intermediaries to shape the flow of information 
has inspired debate in legal scholarship. “Recent scholarship 
acknowledges that twenty-first century intermediaries . . . cannot be 
treated as mere passive conduits and that their role and duties 
should be reconceptualized.”311 Thus, new concepts of the inter-
mediary’s role are being developed. Different scholars have ob-
served the influences of intermediaries in different ways and have 
proposed different types of legal obligations.
Even though intermediaries are private entities, some scholars 
have proposed that since they control the information infrastruc-
tures that serve the public, they should be treated as public forums,
or at least hybrid bodies.312 These scholars argue that intermediar-
ies should be treated as state actors and therefore subjected to the 
First Amendment and other basic public law standards.313 This per-
308. See Exec. Order, supra note 196, and the new bills, supra note 208, that propose to 
amend § 230.
309. See Lavi, supra note 53; Lavi, supra note 141, at 478.
310. Lavi, supra note 25.
311. Lavi, supra note 141, at 544; see also, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content 
Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1373 (2018).
312. Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. MASON  L. REV. 341, 
380–81 (2018) (proposing that nonstate regulators such as online platforms can be per-
ceived as state agencies); K. Sabeel Rahman, Private Power, Public Values: Regulating Social In-
frastructure in a Changing Economy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668 (2018) (proposing to ap-
ply public utilities concept on online platforms); Orit Fischman-Afori, Online Rulers as Hybrid 
Bodies: The Case of Infringing Content Monitoring, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2020) 
(proposing that online platforms should be treated as hybrid bodies and subject them to 
public law standards).
313. Rahman, supra note 312, at 1687. It should be noted that profiles of government 
entities and government representatives are already treated as public forums. See, e.g., Da-
vison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). For example, the court ruled that then-
President Donald Trump could not block Twitter followers due to their dissenting views be-
cause to do so is a violation of their First Amendment right to participate in a “designated 
public forum.” See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
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ception of intermediaries was rejected by the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion in Prager University v. Google LLC; the court concluded that 
YouTube is not a public forum.314 Such a perception, however, is 
somewhat reflected in the recent executive order that declared: “It 
is the policy of the United States that large online platforms, such 
as Twitter and Facebook, as the critical means of promoting the 
free flow of speech and ideas today, should not restrict protected 
speech.”315
As Professor Balkin has explained, ultimately, imposing the full 
spectrum of public forum obligations on intermediaries is undesir-
able and would actually make things worse.316
It would do nothing to prevent third parties from using so-
cial media to manipulate end users, stoke hatred, fear, and 
prejudice, or spread fake news. And because social media 
would be required to serve as [a] neutral public forum
[and obligated to equality], they could do little to stop 
this.317
Even if social media platforms desist from curating feeds, they 
would still collect and harvest data on their end-users, either di-
rectly or by using third parties, such as mobile apps, as recently 
leaked documents from Facebook demonstrate.318 This data, in 
314. 951 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2020). Prager University claimed that, by classifying 
some of their videos as “Restricted Content,” YouTube attempted to silence “conservative 
viewpoints and perspectives on public issues,” censored their content, and violated their 
First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the case concluding that: 
“Despite YouTube’s ubiquity and its role as a public-facing forum, it remains a private fo-
rum, not a public forum subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.” Id.
315. Exec. Order, supra note 196, at 34,081. A prior version of this sentence referenced 
the public forum doctrine. See Goldman, supra note 205.
316. Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain (Hoover Working Group on Nat’l 
Sec., Tech. & L., Aegis Series Paper No. 1814) (“Treating social media companies as public 
forums or public utilities is not the proper cure. It may actually make things worse.”) [here-
inafter Balkin, Grand Bargain]; Balkin, supra note 170 (“Converting all large social media 
companies into public utilities does not solve the problems I mentioned above, because it 
does not provide diverse affordances, value systems, and innovations.”).
317. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 6; see also Langvardt, supra note 311, at 
1367 (“[T]he more significant difficulty with applying the state action doctrine to the plat-
forms lies in the fact that internet platforms can “evict” unwanted speakers without involving 
the courts.”); Citron & Franks, supra note 194, at 62–63.
318. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 6; Sebastian Klovig Skelton & Bill Good-
win, Lawmakers Study Leaked Facebook Documents Made Public Today, COMPUT. WKLY. (Nov. 6, 
2019), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252473540/Lawmakers-study-leaked-Face
book-documents-made-public-today; Facebook Sold a Rival-Squashing Move as Privacy Policy, 
Documents Reveal, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2019/nov/06/facebook-privacy-switcharoo-plan-emails.
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turn, could be sold to third parties, who could use it on their sites 
or elsewhere and influence the flow of information.319
A second proposal is to view intermediaries as a hybrid between 
a conduit and a media company.320 Intermediaries not only host 
content but they also connect users, organize content, make con-
tent searchable, and recommend relevant content to users through 
algorithms. Their algorithms select certain content and gives it 
preference over other content based on judgments of relevance 
and considerations of keeping users on the site.321 Intermediaries
create an ecosystem of networked journalism through personalized 
recommendations and contribute to how news is made.322 They are 
a key pathway to news, even surpassing print newspapers as a news 
source.323 Arguably, as the similarities between intermediaries and 
media companies grow, intermediaries should be subjected to 
some of the professional norms and standards that apply to tradi-
tional media.324 Indeed, some intermediaries already apply profes-
sional standards and restrict specific types of content on their plat-
forms in their terms of service and community standards.325 Yet, the 
law still has a role in shaping the framework.326
A third proposal is the concept of information fiduciaries. This 
approach likens the obligation of intermediaries towards user in-
formation to the fiduciary duties of doctors and lawyers towards 
patients and clients. “Just as the law imposes special duties of care, 
319. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 6 (“[T]reating social media as public fo-
rums would only affect the ability of social media themselves to manipulate end users. It 
would do nothing to prevent third parties from using social media to manipulate end users, 
stoke hatred, fear, and prejudice, or spread fake news.”).
320. See generally Mary Louise Kelly, Media or Tech Company? Facebook’s Profile Is Blurry,
NPR (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601560213/media-or-tech-comp
any-facebooks-profile-is-blurry (explaining that lawmakers and regulators have a hard time 
determining whether Facebook is a media or tech company).
321. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 43 (“As soon as Facebook changed from deliv-
ering a reverse chronological list of materials that users posted on their walls to curating an 
algorithmically selected subset of those posts in order to generate a News Feed, it moved 
from delivering information to producing a media commodity out of it.”).
322. Erin C. Carrol, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking Beyond the First 
Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV. 529, 531–32 (2020).
323. Katherine Schaeffer, U.S. Has Changed in Key Ways in The Past Decade, from Tech Use to 
Demographics, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019
/12/20/key-ways-us-changed-in-past-decade/ (“Social media is now a key pathway to news 
for Americans. In 2018, for the first time, social media sites surpassed print newspapers as a 
news source for Americans.”).
324. See GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 43; Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 8 (giv-
ing examples of professional standards that social media should live up to, such as adhering 
to professional standards of journalistic ethics).
325. See, e.g., Community Standards: Bullying and Harassment, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/communitystandards/bullying (last visited May 11, 2020) (“[Facebook will] re-
move content that’s meant to degrade or shame, including, for example, claims about 
someone’s sexual activity.”).
326. See Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316.
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confidentiality, and loyalty on doctors [and] lawyers [with regard 
to] their patients and clients, . . . it [should] impose special duties 
on [intermediaries] such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter [to-
wards] their users.”327 Intermediaries resemble fiduciaries because,
much like lawyers and doctors, they receive—and even actively col-
lect—personal information and are trusted to treat it with care. In-
termediaries obtain information that their users knowingly dissem-
inate on their platforms and actively collect incidental information 
on their users’ engagement on the platform that leaves digital 
traces.328 Therefore, some have argued that the law should impose 
duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty on intermediaries and 
limit how they can profit from their users and beneficiaries.329 The 
nature of fiduciary obligations should depend on the nature of the 
relationship and the potential risk for abuse in using the infor-
mation by the more powerful party to the relationship.330 In our 
context, “[i]ntermediaries should neither breach user trust nor 
take actions that users would reasonably consider unexpected or 
abusive.”331 As information fiduciaries, intermediaries should have 
a duty not to utilize user data to influence or even manipulate 
them.332 This view strives to impose on intermediaries duties to op-
erate their platforms with good faith, respect for users, and non-
manipulation.333 “It should be noted that the information fiduciary 
[approach] raises challenges regarding its feasibility, enforceability 
and scope.”334
327. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 (2019); see also Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 12.
328. See Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden 
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 25–26 (2019) (“[B]oth the information 
we knowingly disseminate about ourselves when we visit websites, make online purchases, 
and post photographs and videos on social media, and the information we unwittingly pro-
vide (e.g., when those websites record data about how long we spend reading them, where 
we are when we access them, and which advertisements we click on) reveals a great deal 
about who we are, what interests us, and what we find amusing, tempting, and off-putting.”); 
TUROW, supra note 116, at 34 (explaining that intermediaries can collect data on consumers 
online by tracking browsing activities, clicks, cookies and actual purchases); ZUBOFF, supra 
note 115, at 80 (“[T]hese include websites visited, psychographics, browsing activity and in-
formation about previous advertisements that the users have been shown, selected and/or 
made purchases after viewing.”).
329. E.g., Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 12.
330. Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11,15 (2020).
331. Lavi, supra note 53, at 68; see also Balkin, supra note 330, at 13; Jack M. Balkin, The 
First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 1006–08 (2018); Jack M. Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1229 (2016).
332. Lavi, supra note 53, at 68 (citing Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, COLUM. L.
REV. 2011, 2049 (2018)); Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 14.
333. Lavi, supra note 141, at 545 n.458 (citing Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A
Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https:
//www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/).
334. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2641 n.186. For a critique of the theory of information fidu-
ciaries, see Khan & Pozen, supra note 327.
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Unlike the EU GDPR data protection obligations,335 the concept 
of information fiduciaries does not rely on structuring privacy by 
obtaining user consent for individual transactions.336 “Rather, the 
fiduciary approach holds digital fiduciaries to obligations of good 
faith and non-manipulation regardless of” their particular privacy 
policies.337 Defining the appropriate concept for the intermediary 
is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the dissemina-
tion of false rumors. Be that as it may, the growing influence of in-
termediaries on the flow of information may justify the imposition 
of obligations on intermediaries that go beyond traditional liability 
regimes. Designing the appropriate legal governance that should 
apply to online intermediaries is one of the most urgent legal chal-
lenges at this time. Many scholars believe it is high time to change 
the overall immunity regime applied to intermediaries and adapt it 
to the high degree of influence they exert over users.338 In the con-
text of intermediary accountability for harmful false rumors, this 
Article proposes imposing concrete obligations upon intermediar-
ies to mitigate the harm of dissemination of false rumors. In con-
trast to the executive order of Donald Trump,339 the 45th President
of the United States, the proposal does not undermine intermedi-
aries’ practices of moderation and preserves freedom of expres-
sion.
III. MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF SPREADING FALSEHOODS ON 
SOCIAL NETWORKS
Intermediaries use different strategies to facilitate dissemination 
of content in their attempts to increase profits.340 As previously ex-
plained, content dissemination provides multiple benefits.341 The 
challenge becomes how to allow the free flow of information while 
simultaneously preventing the dissemination of harmful content. 
To meet this challenge, I will focus on the design stage of a plat-
335. GDPR, supra note 248. See generally infra Part I.
336. Balkin, Grand Bargain, supra note 316, at 14 (“[C]ontractual models will prove in-
sufficient if end users are unable to assess the cumulative risk of granting permission and 
therefore must depend on the good will of data processors. The fiduciary approach to obli-
gation does not turn on consent to particular transactions. . . .”).
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 293, at 258 (2018); Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs 
on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. COLUM. U. (2018), https://knightcolumbia.
org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data (“[T]hese developments undermine any no-
tion that online intermediaries deserve immunity because they are mere conduits for, or 
passive publishers of, their users’ expression.”).
339. See Exec. Order, supra note 196.
340. See id.
341. See id.
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form’s lifecycle. One solution focuses on reducing irresponsible 
dissemination ex ante at the stage of the user’s decision to share 
content. The second solution strives to mitigate harm ex post facto.
A. Protecting the Right to Reputation and Public Interest by Design
In the book Code Version 2.0, Lawrence Lessig identified four key 
forces that regulate the online environment.342 First, laws regulate 
and constrain activities and can impose sanctions when activity vio-
lates them. For example,”[c]opyright law, defamation law, and ob-
scenity laws all continue to threaten ex post sanction for the viola-
tion of legal rights” online.343 Second, norms restrict activities by 
stigmatizing violations. For example, “talk about Democratic poli-
tics in the alt.knitting newsgroup, and you open yourself to flam-
ing.”344 In other words, violation of the norms in a newsgroup in-
creases the likelihood of encountering insults and hostile 
aggressive interactions.345 Third, the market limits activities by 
price-setting, thus high prices can constrain access of individuals to 
goods and services.346 Fourth, technologies can constrain by “code,”
meaning that the software and hardware design can define free-
doms online, affect user choices, and regulate their interactions.
For example, some websites require a person to enter a password 
and identify himself before gaining access; on other sites, a person 
can enter whether identified or not.347 These four governance sys-
tems all interact simultaneously.348
In recent years, there has been an increasing use of technology-
based solutions to prevent harm inflicted by the free flow of infor-
mation. Architecture of online platforms, namely the way they are 
designed, can involve the creation of structures to prevent harm 
from arising and shape attitudes towards violations of law and 
342. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 121–125 (2006).
343. Id. at 124.
344. See, e.g., id. at 124–26.
345. See id. at 124 (“[T]alk too much in a discussion list, and you are likely to be placed 
on a common bozo filter. In each case, a set of understandings constrain behavior, again 
through the threat of ex post sanctions imposed by a community.”). For expansion on flam-
ing, see generally Patrick B. O’ Sullivan & Andrew J. Flanagin, Reconceptualizing ‘Flaming’ and 
other Problematic Messages, 5 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 69 (2003).
346. Id.
347. See id. at 125; Tal Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of Social Media,
35 PACE L. REV. 138, 139 (2015) (adjusting the model to social media).
348. See COURTNEY BOWMAN, ARI GESHER, JOHN K. GRANT, DANIEL SLATE & ELISSA 
LERNER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF PRIVACY: ON ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES THAT CAN 
DELIVER TRUSTWORTHY SAFEGUARDS 13 (2015) (referring to the interaction of code and law 
as “East Coast” code and “West Coast” code).
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norms ex ante,349 as well as promote values.350 Studies have empha-
sized the power of architecture to account for human values and 
technology user rights “in a principled and comprehensive manner 
throughout the design process.”351 Other studies have focused on 
strategies of influence, starting with behavioral influences of the 
design on decision-making and continuing with the role of code in 
outlining possibilities by altering the platform’s design to “make 
certain conduct more difficult or costly.”352
Decisions made by engineers can unleash new technology not 
previously foreseen by the legislator, which may affect fundamental 
rights.353 Scholarly work has already explored the influence of 
technological governance systems and their potential to protect 
privacy. This concept of privacy by design was developed into a phi-
losophy that focuses on regulation of the technological design ex
ante instead of providing ex post remedies to victims of dissemina-
tion of harmful information.354 Researchers have described how to 
make privacy-protective features a core part of functionality and 
accommodate threats to privacy.355 Scholars have also noted that 
the primary challenges of privacy by design are enhancing the 
specification and incentivizing firms to adopt this approach.356
349. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 100 (2004).
350. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 110, at 701, 708–09. (“Designing technology to 
“bake in” values offers a seductively elegant and effective means of control.”).
351. Deirdre K Mulligan & Jenifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 1019 (2012) (quoting Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., & Alan Born-
ing, DEP’T OF COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G, UNIV. OF WASH., CSE TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 02-12-01,
VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN: THEORY AND METHODS (2002)). For instance, “ ‘Value-Sensitive 
Design’ is an approach that advocates identifying human needs and values and taking them 
into account in the design process.” Lavi, supra note 141, at 553 n.504 (citing Noemi Man-
ders-Huits & Jeroen van den Hove, The Need for Value-Sensitive Design of Communication Infra-
structures, in EVALUATING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51, 54–55 (Paul Sollie & Marcus Düwell eds., 
2009); Mulligan & King, supra).
352. Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 775, 778 (2014) (noting that 
these strategies are blended and recombined); see also TUFECKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS, su-
pra note 33, at 264–65 (addressing the power of technology to target content and facilitate 
viral spread).
353. Lavi, supra note 141, at 553.
354. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW & POLICY 190–
91 (2016); see also, e.g., KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE 
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 32, 178 (2015); 
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 348; ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1, 2 (2009).
355. See, e.g., BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 348; Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by De-
sign, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1420–21 (2011); Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog,
Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385, 395, 402–417 (2013) (referring to a narrow ap-
proach to privacy (obscurity of data) and overview strategies to protect privacy by design); 
Serge Egelman, Janice Tsai, Lorrie Cranor & Alessandro Acquisti, Timing Is Everything? The 
Effects of Timing and Placement of Online Privacy Indicators, PROC. A.C.M. S.I.G.C.H.I. CONF. ON 
HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUT. SYS. 319 (2009).
356. See Rubinstein, supra note 355, at 1416; Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 355, at 392.
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Regulators around the world have discovered the benefits of pri-
vacy by design. They have set forth guidelines and promoted legal 
regulation that includes privacy by design, alongside efforts to in-
centivize stakeholders to adopt this approach as part of their busi-
ness models.357 A central example is Article 25 of the GDPR that 
addresses “data protection by design and default,”358 building pri-
vacy-friendly systems starting at the beginning of the design pro-
cess.359 Accordingly, at the stage of the system development, and at 
the time of processing, controllers must “implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures” in order to “protect the 
rights of data subjects.”360 “Data protection by default” is required
to assure that data that is unnecessary for processing is not gath-
ered.361 Examples of data protection by design are “anonymisation 
and pseudonymisation of personal data, a data minimisation ap-
proach during processing and storing data, storage limitation, 
transparency regarding processing and limited access to personal 
data.”362
“The GDPR protects data of EU citizens, but it [also] applies to 
non-EU companies that offer goods or services to EU consum-
ers.”363 Thus, the GDPR can also affect data protection in the Unit-
ed States and throughout the world. Furthermore, the GDPR con-
tains a “threshold test for international transfers of personal data 
to [non-member states] and a legal basis for blocking data exports 
to [states] that do not meet this standard.”364 The threshold for ex-
traterritorial transmissions is the “adequacy” of data protection in 
the foreign jurisdiction.365 With regard to transmissions to the 
United States, instead of an adequacy determination, the Europe-
357. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03
/120326privacyreport.pdf; HOOFNAGLE, supra note 354, at 191 (“[T]he FTC is embracing 
privacy by design.”); see also A Comprehensive Approach On Personal Data Protection in the 
European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 609) 12 (2010); Edwards & Veale, supra note 248, 
at 77.
358. GDPR, supra note 248, at art. 25.
359. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 248, at 77 (explaining that by doing so, it recogniz-
es that “a regulator cannot do everything by top-down control, but . . . controllers must 
themselves be involved in the design” of systems that minimize invasion of privacy).
360. GDPR, supra note 248, at art. 25.
361. Edwards & Veale, supra note 248, at 77 (quoting GDPR, supra note 248, art. 25).
362. Oliver Vettermann, Self-Made Data Protection—Is It Enough? Prevention and After-care of 
Identity Theft, 10 Eur. J.L. & Tech. § 4.2 (2019).
363. Lavi, supra note 141, at 563 n.559.
364. Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 784 
(2019).
365. Id. (“In Article 45, the GDPR requires that the Commission consider a long list of 
factors in assessing the adequacy of protection, including ‘the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, both general and sector, . . . as well as 
the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security 
measures.’ ” (quoting GDPR, supra note 248, at art. 45(2)(a)).
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an Union and the United States have reached an arrangement 
called “Privacy Shield,” a voluntary private sector compliance pro-
gram.366 This bilateral agreement “present[s] a list of substantive 
EU principles for American companies to follow voluntarily.”367 Re-
cently, however, the ECJ in Luxembourg struck down the Privacy 
Shield in the case of Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland
Ltd.,368 determining that the Privacy Shield agreement did not limit 
the U.S. authorities’ access to data “in a way that satisfies require-
ments that are essentially equivalent to those required . . . under 
EU law.” The impact of the ruling is not yet clear. The GDPR, thus,
has global impact today, more than ever, and the principles of pri-
vacy by design can influence the engineering of privacy outside of 
Europe.369
As mentioned, most discussions on behavioral influences of de-
sign and the technological constraints of code have focused on pri-
vacy protection. This Article proposes to adopt this strategy for 
preventing impulsive dissemination of false rumors, defamation,
and fake news, and suggests incentives that would lead intermedi-
aries to adopt these proposals. Platform design and code have 
promising potential to protect personal reputation from harm. In 
fact, the same technologies, strategies, and principles used by in-
termediaries to promote dissemination of content can be utilized 
to mitigate harm inflicted by the dissemination of falsehoods. Due 
to the potential of these strategies for the protection of reputations
and the public interest in general, engineers, managers, and policy
makers should develop a concept of “Reputation and Public Inter-
est-by-Design.” The importance of design for the protection of 
reputations is reinforced by the insufficiency of current law to ac-
commodate the challenge of fast-spreading falsehoods.370 This con-
cept not only protects the private interests of victims of falsehoods, 
but it also has a role in promoting the public interest in truthful 
information.
366. It should be noted that in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, the ECJ declared 
that this safe harbor was invalid. Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015 ¶ 98 (Oct. 6, 2015). Fol-
lowing the decision in that case, the United States and the European Union came to an 
agreement on the Privacy Shield. See Commission Implementing Decision of July 12, 2016 
Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Ad-
equacy of the Protection by the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:207:TOC.
367. See Schwartz, supra note 364, at 802.
368. Case C-311/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 ¶ 185 (July 16, 2020).
369. Beata A. Safari, Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe’s GDPR Will Set a New Global 
Standard For Personal Data Protection, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 809, 816–20 (2017); Schwartz, 
supra note 364, at 777 (“[P]rinciples found in the GDPR, such as data portability and the 
‘right to be forgotten,’ are already influencing laws outside Europe.”); see also, e.g., Rustad & 
Koenig, supra note 251, at 420.
370. See supra Part II.
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B. From Nudges to Accountable Dissemination of Information
In their seminal book Nudge, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein 
show that policy makers can arrange decision-making contexts and
thus nudge individuals to change their behavior.371 A nudge is “any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives.”372 Under this idea of ‘libertar-
ian paternalism,’373 the individual who designs the environment for 
people’s decision making—the “choice architect”374—may antici-
pate their behavior, respond to this prediction, and direct them to 
act in a certain way.375 This concept is also applicable to preventing 
third-party harm; for example, nudges can be used to reduce “tex-
ting and driving” and, therefore, reduce accidents that would 
cause harm to third parties.376 “Advocates of the nudge approach 
believe that choice-preserving alternatives are preferable to man-
dates.”377 The nudge concept has attracted controversy, objections 
and ethical concerns; yet, it has also achieved widespread recogni-
tion among policy makers and has even led to reforms.378
Sunstein and Thaler reviewed many examples of nudges.379 For 
example, a charity debit card that keeps a record of an individual’s
donations and ensures that their bank adds their donations to 
their end-of-year IRS statement makes donating more attractive 
and incentivizes individuals to donate more.380 A nudge commit-
371. Lavi, supra note 53, at 4 (citing THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2014) (delving deeper 
into the debate about the rationales and objections of nudges).
372. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 6.
373. SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 358–59 (emphasizing the idea of continuum and rec-
ognizing that approaches that impose high psychological costs are not as soft as approaches 
that impose low material costs).
374. See Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, in THE 
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 428 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012).
375. Lavi, supra note 53, at 4.
376. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371 at 9, 44; Christopher McCrudden & Jeff King, The Dark 
Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, in CHOICE 
ARCHITECTURE IN DEMOCRACIES, EXPLORING THE LEGITIMACY OF NUDGING 67, 93 (Alexandra 
Kemmerer, Christoph Möllers, Maximilian Steinbeis & Gerhard Wagner eds., 2016) (argu-
ing that by referring to  “texting while driving” and “fuel standards” as areas where nudging 
is appropriate, harm can be prevented).
377. Lavi, supra note 53, at 8; see also Calo, supra note 352, at 783; Cass R. Sunstein, Nudg-
es vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210 (2014).
378. Lavi, supra note 53, at 9; see also Thaler, supra note 373, at 331; Cass R. Sunstein, Do 
People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177 (2016).
379. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237.
380. See Yang Wang, Pedro Giovanni Leon, Xiaoxuan Chen, Saranga Komanduri, Grego-
ry Norcie, Kevin Scott, Alessandro Acquisti, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman Sadeh, From Fa-
cebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO STATE L.J. 1307, 1319–23, 1331 (2013) (ar-
guing that designing mechanisms that nudge users to consider the content and context of 
their online disclosures are efficient in helping individuals avoid regrettable online disclo-
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ting people to a specific action, such as exercising more frequently,
can help them achieve their goals.381 By emailing announcements 
about failures or successes to family and friends, or monitoring a 
person’s goals via a group blog, peer pressure “nudges” people to 
fulfil their goals.382 A red warning light on a water filter or an air 
conditioner “nudges” individuals to replace the filter.383 Devices 
and apps such as GPS and Waze can “nudge” users by showing 
them the most efficient route of driving.384 Organizing the default
settings on websites and the order of choices in online menus can 
also serve as a type of nudge.385
A central example of a nudge that is relevant to our context is a 
“civility check” on a message that a person intends to send. Each 
and every hour, people send out angry emails that they soon re-
gret.386 A “civility check” nudges individuals to file the message and 
wait a day before deciding whether to send it;387 meanwhile, the in-
dividual might calm down and reconsider. Technology can facili-
tate this civility check by detecting whether an email is angry, cau-
tioning him that it appears to be uncivil, and asking whether he 
really wants to send it. A stronger version might delay dissemina-
tion of uncivil emails by default and force individuals to invest ex-
tra efforts in order to bypass the delay, such as requiring the enter-
ing a social security number.388 This nudge would lead individuals 
to reflect upon whether they truly wish to send the email.
Nudge-based strategies can be smoothly transplanted to social 
media because technology makes it easy to arrange decision-
making contexts, compared to a brick-and-mortar environment,389
and such strategies are becoming more powerful in platform-
sures and, thus, enhance their privacy); Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loe-
wenstein, Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J. 
CONSUMER RSCH. 858 (2011).
381. Thus, whenever a user tweets, the intermediary informs him that his tweets will ap-
pear in the timelines of his followers. However, this message appears only after dissemina-
tion and the “status-quo-bias” reduces the likelihood of ex post facto deletion by the user. See
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 34 (explaining that people have a general tendency to 
stick with the current situation, this phenomenon is dubbed the “status-quo-bias”).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 237.
384. Id. at 242.
385. Id. at 8.
386. Id. at 237.
387. Id. at 237.
388. Id. at 237–38.
389. Programming platforms is easier than designing brick-and-mortar architecture. See
Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 (1) DAEDELUS 18, 19 (2016) (ad-
dressing the ability of online players to predict user behavior and influence it by nudges);
RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 341–42 (2015) 
(addressing how the possibility to shape nudges easily influences their efficiency).
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based, massively intermediated environments.390 By understanding 
users’ cognitive biases, technology can influence their behavior 
and social dynamics. In practice, intermediaries use nudges to di-
rect user behavior and to influence these users to share more con-
tent with a wider audience.391
Framing relationships as friendships, selective algorithmic social 
mirroring of content on user newsfeeds, and explicit and implicit 
feedbacks constitute nudges. Intermediaries, thus, organize the 
context in which users make decisions to disseminate information. 
These influences extend beyond the individual as they generate 
the social dynamics of dissemination at the macro level of the so-
cial network.392 Yet, every user can choose to disseminate infor-
mation or avoid dissemination.
Dissemination of content is neither good nor bad in and of it-
self. While dissemination has many benefits, it can inflict severe 
harm.393 The challenge is to diminish dissemination of offensive
content without chilling information flows in general. Intermediar-
ies should harness the same nudge-based strategies to promote ac-
countability in dissemination and discourage impulsiveness.
Whenever a user of social networks clicks the “publish,” “for-
ward,” “share,” or “re-tweet” buttons, the intermediary should alert 
him of the risks and consequences of spreading content. The in-
termediary might turn to users as social actors and raise the follow-
ing questions: “Are you sure you won’t regret sharing this?” or 
“Could this content cause harm to a third party?” Dissemination 
could be delayed until the user confirms that he can mindfully 
share the content. Similarly, intermediaries might inform users of 
the implications of publishing and sharing content and the infor-
mation’s potential to spread. For example, they might raise ques-
tions such as “Do you know that clicking this button exposes the 
post to your 1,000 friends?” As studies in a related context show, 
this strategy is likely to cause users to internalize the fact that dis-
seminating content can inflict harm, and thereby promote civility394
390. See COHEN, supra note 73, at 180 (explaining that platform-based environments in-
corporate “choice architecture favoring the decisions that the platform or the application 
designers want their users to make”).
391. For example, framing relationships in social networks as “friendships,” feedback 
mechanisms, and features for sharing content all increase the likelihood an individual will 
reaching his threshold for disseminating content.
392. See supra Section I.D.
393. See supra Section I.D (discussing the severe harm of dissemination).
394. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237 (proposing a similar nudge for civili-
ty—a “civility check”).
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and help them to avoid engaging in regrettable online dissemina-
tion.395
Some intermediaries already inform users of the potential con-
sequences of sharing content, but this is done only after the fact.396
A better policy would be to address users before dissemination oc-
curs, in order to prevent automatic intuitive sharing from the 
start. 397F397 The idea of using nudges to promote reflective thinking 
and accountable sharing is starting to gain momentum. For exam-
ple, Twitter recently began asking people if they are sure that they
want to re-tweet a link if they have not accessed the link them-
selves.398F398 Such a nudge can promote reflective thinking before dis-
semination.
Nudges, therefore, have great potential to mitigate online 
harm.399 As technology advances, intermediaries can use these ad-
vances to improve nudges. For example, intermediaries can use ar-
tificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to conform 
the nudge to the content that the user is about to disseminate by 
identifying specific words in the content.400 The intermediary can 
also function as a social actor, instead of simply sending automatic 
messages, by enhancing user awareness of messages and their pos-
sible repercussions.401
395. See Wang et al., supra note 380, at 1318–23, 1331 (arguing that designing mecha-
nisms that nudge users to consider the content and context of their online disclosures are 
efficient in helping individuals avoid regrettable online disclosures and, thus, enhance their 
privacy); John et al., supra note 380.
396. For example, whenever a user tweets, the intermediary informs him that his tweets 
will appear in the timelines of his followers. However, this message appears only after dis-
semination and the “status-quo-bias” reduces the likelihood of ex post facto deletion by the 
user. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 34 (explaining that people have a general 
tendency to stick with the current situation, this phenomenon is dubbed the “status-quo-
bias”).
397. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 139, at 19–24 (2011); THALER, supra note 373, at 
99 (referring to “the planner” who thinks in the long run versus the “doer” who acts instinc-
tively. Nudging accountability in disseminating content may prevent bypassing deliberation 
and reduce cognitive biases).
398. See Alex Hern, Twitter Aims to Limit People Sharing Articles They Have Not Read, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/11
/twitter-aims-to-limit-people-sharing-articles-they-have-not-read.
399. See HARTZOG, supra note 120.
400. The same strategy intermediaries use to match advertisements to user content also 
allows intermediaries to use information on user content and interests, in order to tailor 
nudges to users. On intermediary usage of information to match content and advertise-
ments to users, see Julie E. Cohen, The Emergent Limbic Media System, in LIFE AND THE LAW IN 
THE ERA OF DATA-DRIVEN AGENCY 60 (2019) (Mireille Hildebrandt & Kieron O’Hara eds., 
2020).
401. WALDMAN, supra note 116, at 141 (expounding on social communication of bots 
that motivate users to release privacy protections, by technological design).
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Indeed, social network platforms are starting to use nudges. Fa-
cebook cooperates with fact-checking organizations402 and informs 
individuals before they share fake news that independent websites 
and fact checkers have found the information to be false, or at 
least controversial.403 Instagram also labels fake news to reduce its 
dissemination.404 Twitter followed and added new fact-checking la-
bels to hundreds of tweets. Twitter even used such a label to flag a
post by President Donald Trump, rebutting its accuracy, before, 
during and even after the 2020 election cycle.405 In another con-
text, Twitter has also started applying warning messages to tweets 
that contain misleading information about COVID-19.406 Yet, using 
this strategy to try to refute false rumors that have already been 
published and disseminated can backfire. Repeating a falsehood 
and adding information in order to refute it, or tagging infor-
mation as false, only exacerbates the information’s visibility and in-
creases the likelihood that users will believe it.407 Tagging false-
hoods as such might even lead users to assume that content that 
was not tagged as false is true, even though it could be completely 
false.408
Moreover, even if exposure to information refuting a falsehood 
could mitigate its harm, this strategy can be used only regarding 
content that fact checkers have already deemed false or controver-
sial. This usually happens after content has already spread to a 
402. See Levi, supra note 36; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287 (explaining that the 
solution of fact checking organizations did not mitigate the problem); see also Van Loo, su-
pra note 294.
403. Nikhil Sonnad, This Is Now What Happens When You Try to Post Fake News on Facebook,
QUARTZ (Mar. 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/2LAuOXw.
404. Stephanie Milot, Instagram Automatically Labels, Hides Fake News, GEEK.COM (Dec. 17, 
2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20191217184642/https://www.geek.com/tech
/instagram-automatically-labels-hides-fake-news-1813964/.
405. Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Defying Trump, Twitter Doubles Down on Labeling Tweets,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/technology/trump-
twitter-fact-check.html; see also Kim Lyons, Twitter Flags President Trump’s Tweets About Ballot-
Counting, THE VERGE (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/7/21554013
/twitter-flags-president-trumps-tweets-votes-counted-election-pennsylvania; Trump Falsely 
Claims Victory on Twitter Just Ahead of Biden Win, THE QUINT (Nov. 7, 2020), www.the
quint.com/news/world/won-by-a-lot-president-trump-falsely-declares-victory-on-twitter-again
(referring to Trump’s misleading tweet: “I won this election by a lot”).
406. See Coronavirus: Twitter Will Label Covid-19 Fake News, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2020), 
www.bbc.com/news/technology-52632909.
407. See generally DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 47, at 225 (2007); Pennycook et al., su-
pra note 16.
408. See David M.J. Lazer, Matthew A. Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J. Berinsky, Kelly M. 
Greenhill, Filippo Menczer, Miriam J. Metzger, Brendan Nyhan, Gordon Pennycook, David 
Rothschild, Michael Schudson, Steven A. Sloman, Cass R. Sunstein, Emily A. Thorson, Dun-
can J. Watts & Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Science of Fake News, 359 SCI. MAG. 1094–96 (2018);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 125 (explaining that trying to refute a falsehood after it has al-
ready been published often failed and even exacerbated user commitment to the content of 
the rumor).
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wide audience and caused tremendous harm. Furthermore, initia-
tives by fact checkers to refute false rumors, defamation, and fake 
news usually focus on falsehoods about public figures or politicians 
and neglects to address statements about “ordinary people.” In 
contrast, intermediary nudges for reflective thinking prior to dis-
semination would apply to all types of false rumors, including ru-
mors about “ordinary people.” This type of nudge does not repeat 
the false rumor or exacerbate its visibility or credibility. Such 
nudges are neutral to the content that users publish or disseminate 
and are expected to mitigate the harm of all types of false rumors. 
Thus, this proposed solution is preferable to current policy.
Companies and policy makers are discovering the potential ben-
efits of nudges.409 In the related context of privacy and data protec-
tion, literature has proposed that choice architects design systems 
that would generate nudges to enhance informed choices about 
sharing information and reflective thinking about the privacy im-
plications of sharing.410 For example, using nudges to encourage 
users to change the privacy setting of their date of birth on their 
personal profile and share it with fewer people,411 or using nudges 
to reduce the sharing of other private information.412 Empirical 
studies have confirmed the efficiency of nudges in privacy protec-
tion. For example, researchers found that placing details about the 
privacy policy of platforms for commerce on search engines pushes 
users to prefer platforms that maintain higher standards of priva-
cy.413 Scholars recently discovered the potential of this strategy to 
combat false rumors, defamation, and fake news.414 Yet, literature 
has not held a comprehensive discussion on this related context.
Due to the potential of nudge-based strategies to slow the dis-
semination of such content, intermediaries should apply this solu-
tion to mitigate irresponsible dissemination of falsehoods. At this 
junction, the question is how to incentivize intermediaries to in-
corporate nudges for accountability in dissemination. More broad-
409. SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 97, at 107, 114 (referring to the strategy of asking 
simple questions to promote critical thinking, change perspectives and avoid information 
and reputation cascades).
410. HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 215–26; Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & 
George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. MAG. 509,
511 (2015).
411. See Egelman et al., supra note 355.
412. Wang et al., supra note 380, at 1334 (found that “privacy nudges can potentially be a 
powerful mechanism to help some people avoid unintended disclosures”).
413. See, e.g., Acquisiti et al., supra note 410.
414. See Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, UTAH L. REV. 993, 
1014 (2009); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Increasing the Transaction Costs of
Harassment, B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 47 (2015).
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ly, should intermediaries adopt this solution voluntarily, or should 
the law obligate them to nudge?
At first glance, it would appear that intermediaries are not likely 
to adopt solutions that aspire to reduce dissemination because they 
currently profit from it and even use nudges to promote dissemi-
nation.415 Arguably, legal regulation is preferable to incentives for 
voluntary adoption of nudges, meaning the government should 
force intermediaries to nudge. A closer look, however, reveals that 
this is not always the case. Here, it is important to differentiate be-
tween the dissemination of content in general and the spreading
of falsehoods. Indeed, in most cases, intermediaries have no incen-
tive to self-regulate dissemination because they profit from it. With 
respect to falsehoods, though, the situation is different. Many in-
termediaries are concerned by “the potential business, moral, and 
instrumental costs” of falsehoods and see these falsehoods “as a po-
tential threat to [their] profit[s].”416 Other intermediaries self-
regulate falsehoods due to a sense of corporate responsibility,417 to 
enhance their social standing,418 or as a preventive measure to shy 
away from murky legal areas and diminish the likelihood of claims 
against them. Due to the potential benefits, many intermediaries 
already self-regulate dissemination of falsehoods.419 Nudges for ac-
countability focus on offensive content and do not purport to re-
duce dissemination generally. Therefore, intermediaries might 
have an intrinsic motivation to adopt this solution.420
In addition, other incentives can be created. For instance, fidu-
ciary intermediaries could grant a stamp of approval (such as a 
trust mark) to intermediaries that promote user accountability.421
415. See supra Section I.C and accompanying notes (describing strategies that intermedi-
aries utilize to enhance social sharing).
416. Lavi, supra note 54, at 937; see also Thomas E. Kadri, Networks of Empathy, 4 UTAH L.
REV. 1088 (2020) (“[P]erhaps because the design will create goodwill and help to retain a 
company’s customers or because it will entice more people (including victims) to start using 
their products.”).
417. See Klonick, supra note 294, at 1627; Citron & Norton, supra note 108, at 1455–56 
(noting that voluntary regulation can be justified by doctrines of corporate law, which allow 
managers to consider public interests).
418. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN; supra note 354, at 35 (referring to a “social license to 
operate”).
419. See Citron & Norton, supra note 108, at 1454 (discussing MySpace as an example of 
voluntary regulation by a mediator due to economic considerations and voluntarily removal 
of offensive content in order to attract children). Yet, in most cases, self-regulation focuses 
on content moderation and ex ante measurement and does not fulfil the promise of ex ante
regulation by design.
420. See Klonick, supra note 294, at 1606–07, 1626–30 (explaining that despite immunity 
of intermediaries from liability in the United States, intermediaries voluntarily self-regulate 
due to corporate responsibility and to create a more pleasant environment for users that 
would make their platform more attractive and enhance profits).
421. In our context, ISOC (Internet Society) can function as a fiduciary intermediary. See 
Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET SOCIETY (May 2019), http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general.
504 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:2
This might improve their image, attract more users, and therefore 
enhance advertising profits and contribute to the intrinsic motiva-
tion to prevent dissemination of offensive content. Of course, illicit 
intermediaries exist. Such intermediaries encourage distribution of 
offensive content and profit particularly from its publication and 
dissemination.422 These intermediaries lack any economic or moral 
incentive to adopt the proposed solution. In such cases, legal regu-
lation is also not an efficient solution. As studies in related contexts 
prove, when a party opposes the policy behind the nudge, obligat-
ing it to adopt the policy is inefficient and the party is likely to 
nudge unconvincingly, by steering users away from it, using dark 
patterns, and manipulating nudge-forcing rules.423 Thus, mandates
impose expensive costs without reaping any benefits.
In summary, nudging to promote reflective thinking is not a 
perfect solution. It can, however, reduce impulsive dissemination 
by neutrals and skeptics, discourage impulsive postings, and slow 
down the dissemination of falsehoods. It improves upon current 
policy, which does not disincentivize these types of propagators. 
Incentivizing intermediaries to adopt this solution voluntarily is 
superior to legal regulation, since legal regulation is less flexible 
and might infringe on the intermediary’s freedom to conduct their
business. The lack of flexibility would also likely have negative con-
sequences for efficiency and innovation. When the intermediary 
Trust marks are defined as “[e]lectronic labels or visual representations indicating that an e-
merchant has demonstrated its conformity to standards regarding security, privacy, and 
business practice.” See EUROPEAN CONSUMER CTRS.’S NETWORK, TRUST MARKS REPORT 2013:
“CAN I TRUST THE TRUST MARK?” (2013), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files
/trust_mark_report_2013_en.pdf (discussing how trust marks can be used to protect con-
sumers).
422. The business models of these intermediaries are based on dissemination of sensa-
tional rumors, which may in turn draw more users. See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). In addition, some intermediaries encourage 
users to share negative reviews and directly profit from defamation through Corporate Ad-
vocacy Programs, which purport to assist in resolving the posted complaints. They charge 
victims money for removing the offensive content. See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbu-
reau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005); Vo Group v. Opinion Corp., 
No. 8758/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 22, 2012); see also Lavi, supra note 53; Kim, supra note 414, at 
1045; Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment, 
32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 384 (2009).
423. For example, the intermediary can use small letters or cumbersome language. See 
Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1200–01 (2013) 
(discussing instances in which a party stands to lose revenue due to a nudge—such as a bank 
and automatic enrollment in anti-overdraft programs—and thus makes an effort to steer 
users away from its influence). On dark patterns in a related context, see Ari Ezra Waldman,
Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 619–20 (2019); Ari 
Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox,” CURRENT ISSUES 
PSYCH. (forthcoming 2020); Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark 
Patterns, 12 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2020) (expanding on dark patterns in the con-
text of privacy and data protection).
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lacks intrinsic motivation to adopt this solution, it will likely bypass 
regulation. Therefore, a voluntary solution is preferred.
C. Nudges for Accountable Dissemination of Information: 
Addressing Limitations and Objections
The solution of nudges for accountable dissemination is promis-
ing; however, there are certainly several potential objections to this 
framework that must be addressed. First, general scholarly criticism 
of nudges should be addressed. Nudges have raised many contro-
versies, objections, and ethical concerns in scholarly work.424 It has 
been argued that nudges are not libertarian paternalism but actual 
paternalism in disguise;425 they manipulate choices and should be
constrained.426 In light of this criticism, one could argue that it is 
inappropriate to adopt such a controversial nudge-based solution.
The general controversy regarding nudges is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Indeed, some nudges can be manipulative and un-
ethical.427 However, as far as the proposed nudges are concerned, 
most objections are marginal because, in this context, nudges are 
not manipulative and can even promote individual autonomy. 
Thus, those who object to nudges in general may agree that the 
nudges proposed here should not be constrained. Intermediaries 
will influence decisions to share content by raising questions that 
provoke users’ reflective thinking and, in turn, prevent impulsive 
dissemination. As empirical studies have shown, individuals sup-
424. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging (Harv. L. Sch. Discussion Paper, No. 806, 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526341 (weighing arguments 
for and against nudge-based strategies).
425. See Thaler et al., supra note 374 (arguing that the idea of libertarian paternalism is 
both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions); see also Henry Farrell & 
Cosma Shalizi, ‘Nudge’ Policies Are Another Name for Coercion, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 2, 2011),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228376-500-nudge-policies-are-another-name-
for-coercion (arguing that nudges are paternalistic coercion).
426. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237 (referring to objections against 
nudge-based strategies and emphasizing that there is no completely “neutral” design). How-
ever, other scholars differentiate between “a given context that accidentally influences behav-
ior and a choice architect who intentionally tries to alter behavior by fiddling with contexts.”
See, e.g., Guldborg Hansen & Andreas Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice: A 
Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behavior Change in Public Policy, EUR. J.
RISK REG. 3, 10(2013); T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341 
(2013).
427. There are nudges that apply to intuitive thinking and might be manipulative and 
objectionable. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 17, 82; Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen 
Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 
19 (2019) (discussing the relationship between nudges and manipulation in an online con-
text). Yet, nudges can be transparent and promote reflective thinking. See SUNSTEIN, supra
note 375, at 17.
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port this type of nudge, which enhances their self-control428 and 
seeks to prevent impulsive dissemination.429 These nudges do not 
aim to affect subconscious or unconscious processing of infor-
mation. Therefore, they should not be considered manipulation or
an objectionable interference with autonomy.430
The proposed nudges may also counter the influence of choice 
architecture, which promotes dissemination in general, appeals to 
intuitive thinking, and leads individuals to regret sharing content 
after the fact.431 These nudges are transparent and help individuals 
correct mental shortcuts to achieve legitimate objectives. In fact, 
they promote autonomy and self-governance,432 and do not insult 
individual dignity.433 This type of nudge respects individual goals 
and promotes public welfare.434 Hence, the general criticism 
against nudges does not undermine the proposed solution.435
Second, it can be argued that the nudge solution is inefficient. 
Even if most intermediaries adopt the nudges for accountable dis-
semination, nudges will influence only some propagators and dis-
seminators. Indeed, nudges are expected to be useful in dissuading 
altruistic propagators, who believe the information they intend to 
publish is true, from publishing the information. Nudges are also 
likely to be useful in dissuading neutrals, who have no inclination 
in favor of or against the information and skeptics, who have high-
er thresholds for the dissemination of content, and have the po-
tential to break the “follow the herd” mentality. However, nudges 
will not stop malicious propagators who publish offensive content 
428. See generally Sunstein, supra note 378 at 184 (discussing how there is greater support 
for nudges that appeal to a person’s capacity for reflective and deliberate choice than for 
nudges that seem to affect the subconscious); Cass R. Sunstein, Lucia A. Reisch & Micha 
Kaiser, Trusting Nudges? Lessons from an International Survey, 26 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1417, 1421 
(2018).
429. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 139.
430. See Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 213, 217 (2016);
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE 53–54 (explaining that nudges that promote welfare, autonomy, dignity, and self-
governance are ethical).
431. For instance, identifying a relationship on Facebook as a “friendship” appeals to 
intuitive thinking and enhanced sharing. See supra Section I.C and accompanying notes;
Grimmelmann, supra note 87, at 1179–81. On the potential of defaults that are considered 
nudges to promote autonomy, see generally Cass Sunstein, Autonomy by Default, 11 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 1 (2016); and SUNSTEIN, supra note 430, which refers to educative nudges that 
lead individuals to make better choices for themselves.
432. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 430, at 72, 74–77; Susser et al., supra note 427, at 21 (ex-
plaining that lies are manipulative but that the proposed nudges aim to correct cognitive 
biases and mitigate the harm of lies and falsehoods, and thus they are not manipulative).
433. E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 430, at 60 (giving the example of the GPS that helps indi-
viduals navigate without insulting anyone’s dignity).
434. See id. at 53–54 (discussing how governments use nudges to increase welfare).
435. See id. at 53–77 (explaining that nudges that promote welfare, autonomy, and self-
governance are not manipulative).
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simply to inflict injury.436 They are not likely to dissuade narrowly 
self-interested propagators and have very little influence on gener-
ally self-interested propagators from publishing falsehoods. In ad-
dition, receptives, who have a low threshold for accepting and 
adopting information, may continue to spread false rumors, defa-
mation, and fake news despite nudges.437
Moreover, nudges have no influence on bots that disseminate 
rumors and operate by technological code. These Artificial Intelli-
gence entities are usually operated by narrowly self-interested indi-
viduals438 who program the code to publish and echo specific false-
hoods.439 In order to allow falsehoods to spread, the operators of 
bots are likely to program the algorithm to automatically signal 
that they “agree” to publish or share the content despite the in-
termediary’s alerts.440
Indeed, nudges are likely to influence only part of the network, 
and yet, this solution can still reduce and slow down dissemination 
of false rumors, defamation, and fake news within large parts of a
network. Thus, fewer informational cascades would be expected. 
As explained in Part I above, the more times a post is shared, the 
more individuals reach their threshold of belief and disseminate it 
further. Although nudges influence only part of the network, they 
can reduce the publishing and sharing of falsehoods and can slow 
down their dissemination, therefore, minimizing the gravity of the 
harm falsehoods inflict.
Truly, nudges cannot influence automatic algorithms and bots 
that disseminate and share falsehoods. Such algorithms pose chal-
lenges to the protection of reputations and the public interest,441
and it might be advisable to adopt additional mechanisms or spe-
436. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 13.
437. Due to the receptive’s prior disposition in favor of the rumor, they have a low-level 
threshold. Therefore, a nudge may not suffice to dissuade them from spreading it.
438. On the motivations to publish and spread rumors, see supra Section I.A.1.
439. Engineers who serve companies and stakeholders control the parameters at the 
base of the algorithms ex ante. See Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big 
Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2017) (“When we criticize algorithms, we are really criti-
cizing the programming, or the data, or their interaction. But equally important, we are also 
criticizing the use to which they are being put by the humans who programmed the algo-
rithms, collected the data, or employed the algorithms and the data to perform particular 
tasks.”).
440. Massive Networks of Fake Accounts Found on Twitter, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https:
//bbc.com/news/technology-38724082. For more information on Twitter bots during the 
2016 U.S. elections, see Philip N. Howard, Samuel Woolley & Ryan Calo, Algorithms, Bots, and 
Political Communication in the US 2016 Election: The Challenge of Automated Political Communica-
tion for Election Law and Administration, 15 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 81 (2018).
441. See Lazer et al., supra note 408, at 1095 (discussing how dissemination of fake news 
can erode individuals’ trust in reputable news outlets and make it harder for people to ob-
tain truthful information).
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cific regulations pertaining to bots.442 Many intermediaries have in-
trinsic incentives to narrow down the activity of bots on their plat-
forms because in many cases bots fail to comply with the platform’s
terms of service and distort the public discourse. For example, 
many intermediaries already act to reduce activities of fake bots by 
using algorithms.443 Moreover, bots are less likely to be involved in 
all types of dissemination of falsehoods. Rather, they focus on 
commercial entities, public figures, and public representatives.444
Dissemination of falsehoods about such entities has implications 
beyond the direct parties. In such cases, it is likely that local and 
state law enforcement will get involved and invest resources in 
identifying the parties that are directly responsible for the dissemi-
nation.445 Civil society organizations are also likely to be involved in 
detecting bots446 and to function as watchdogs who report bots to 
442. For example, one proposal is to impose a duty on paid influencers to carry a dis-
claimer informing users that they are paid, and the source of payment. See BENKLER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 371–75; Honest Ads Act, H.R. 4077, 115th Cong. § 1989 (2017) (advocating 
for disclosure obligations by those who are paid to advertise things to the public). The trig-
ger for the Honest Ads Act was Russian intervention in the U.S. 2016 elections and the need 
to ensure that electioneering communities are not funded by foreign nationals. Ellen P. 
Goodman & Lyndsey Wajert, The Honest Ads Act Won’t End Social Media Disinformation, but It’s 
a Start (Nov. 2, 2017), (unpublished manuscript), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3064451.
443. In the context of extremist content, Facebook is using artificial intelligence (AI) 
and machine learning to combat harmful content more efficiently. Platforms are expected 
to find better ways to combat fake news with the development of this technology. See, e.g.,
Julia Fioretti, Pressured in Europe, Facebook Details Removal of Terrorism Content, REUTERS (June 
15, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/pressured-in-europe-facebook-
details-removal-of-terrorism-content/. It should be noted that bots are becoming more so-
phisticated and are learning to obscure indication as automated entities, in an arms race 
with intermediaries, which are improving their strategies to detect them. For example, the 
intermediary can reduce the participation of nonhuman software by using CAPTCHA 
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) and some 
technologies allow intermediaries to detect and remove “likes” that are generated by “auto-
mated software programs, malware, and hacked accounts.” See Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Man 
Posting as Ordinary Consumer: The Essential Role of Self-Regulation and Industry Ethics on Decreas-
ing Deceptive Online Consumer Rating and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
462, 504 (2013); FINN BRUNTON, HELEN NISSENBAUM: OBFUSCATION – A USER’S GUIDE FOR 
PRIVACY AND PROTEST 40 (2015).
444. See Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 988, 995–
1002 (2019) (outlining a taxonomy of three main types of bots: commercial , political and 
creative). Arguably, a person is less likely to invest efforts and code algorithms to echo a 
negative falsehood on private ‘ordinary’ people. Rather, it seems more reasonable that bot 
operators focus on spreading information on commercial entities and public figures. It can 
be assumed that creative bots are less likely to spread defamation on private people, because 
they operate for creative purposes.
445. Law enforcers are already investigating the activity of bots that influence elections. 
See, e.g., Report: FBI Investigating Russian Operatives Using Bots to Spread Stories from Breitbart, RT, 
Info Wars, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.mediamatters.org/breitbart
-news/report-fbi-investigating-russian-operatives-using-bots-spread-stories-breitbart-rt.
446. See, e.g., Press Release, Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford Experts Launch New 
Online Tool to Help Fight Disinformation (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news
/releases/oxford-experts-launch-new-online-tool-to-help-fight-disinformation/ (“Research-
ers at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, have launched ‘The ComProp 
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social network operators and law enforcers.447 Thus, market forces 
and the law are likely to narrow the gap in self-regulation by nudg-
es and reduce dissemination of falsehoods by bots.
Third, the efficiency of nudges can decrease over time. Argua-
bly, users will get used to nudges, learn to ignore them, and click 
automatically on the button that allows them to publish and dis-
seminate information without paying any attention to the interme-
diary’s alerts.
This does not undermine the proposed strategy. The use of 
nudges can still slow down dissemination of falsehoods relative to 
dissemination on platforms without nudges.448 In addition, the 
costs of nudges in the digital ecosystem are lower than in a brick-
and-mortar infrastructure, allowing their benefits to outweigh their 
costs. Furthermore, technology advancements could preserve the 
efficiency of nudges.449 The intermediary could learn to identify 
users that consistently ignore nudges and immediately click and 
share and develop stronger nudges that are more likely to influ-
ence them.450 For example, the intermediary might increase the di-
versity of nudges, personalize them, and make them more relevant 
to the specific content that the user intends to publish or share. 
Thus, the intermediary might be able to preserve the efficiency of 
the nudge over time.
Fourth, nudges can result in a chilling effect and suppress the 
motivation to publish and disseminate legitimate expression, in 
particular among minorities that might avoid expressing ideas that 
are outside of the consensus. This argument is valid, yet the nudge 
strategy brings about a better balance between freedom of speech, 
dignity, and public interest in an era of vast digital dissemination. 
Although nudges have the potential to chill speech, they do not 
prohibit anyone from speaking and the choice to speak remains in 
the hands of every individual. Nudges might cause minorities and 
other disadvantaged groups in society to self-censor legitimate ex-
pressions that are outside of the consensus, but nudges can also
Navigator,’ a new online resource guide which aims to help civil society groups better un-
derstand and respond to the problem of disinformation.”).
447. See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 42.
448. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 237–38 (proposing the use of nudges 
to enhance civility among individuals online).
449. Cf. Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 157, 184 (2019) (suggesting that, in the context of intermediaries and advertis-
er influences, as consumers get used to strategies of influence and learn to ignore them, 
companies may develop new ways of influencing consumers).
450. See, e.g., Adrian L. Jessup Scheneider & T.C. Nicholas Graham, Pushing Without 
Breaking: Nudging Exergame Players While Maintaining Immersion, 2015 I.E.E.E. GAMES ENT.
MEDIA CONF., Oct. 14–16, 2015, at 1, 1–8 (2015) (discussing the use of progressively severe 
nudges in response to players who ignore nudges in the related context of exergames).
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mitigate potential harm to minorities and disadvantaged groups 
when falsehoods and defamation are disseminated against them. 
Minorities and disadvantaged groups suffer from harmful expres-
sion more than other sectors of the population.451 Thus, nudges 
can narrow social gaps and improve protection of the human 
rights of the disadvantaged as potential victims.
D. Efficient Removal Ex Post Facto
A common remedy for dissemination of falsehoods is ex post facto
removal. This remedy, however, does not solve the problem of dis-
seminating falsehoods. A victim whose name has been tainted 
would have to indicate each and every virtual setting of a falsehood 
or defamation in order to completely remove the content and en-
sure it would not be found and widely disseminated again. Civil so-
ciety organizations might also find it difficult to report on every lo-
cation of fake news and protect the public interest. Due to the vast 
dissemination of content within social networks, complete removal 
may be impossible.
This problem calls for a solution that enables the removal of 
falsehoods and defamatory remarks from all settings in which they 
reside. Unlike the previous solution, which focused on behavioral 
influences of architecture, this solution focuses on the code itself, 
the constraints it constitutes, and the possibilities it affords.452 One 
possibility is to design the code to allow the dissemination of a 
message to only a limited number of recipients, thereby slowing 
down the dissemination of falsehoods, and even preventing them 
from reaching the tipping point and going viral.453 Yet this solution 
could hinder the dissemination of useful, newsworthy information. 
A preferable solution would be efficient removal ex post facto.454 In-
termediaries that integrate features that allow for the sharing of 
content within their platforms should also allow the efficient re-
moval of harmful content from any profiles and locations to which 
the content was disseminated by the removal of the original 
451. See, e.g., Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media 
Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L REV. 592, 596–601 (2015).
452. See LESSIG, supra note 342, at 123–25.
453. See, e.g., Jacob Kastrenakes, WhatsApp Limits Message Forwarding in Fight Against Misin-
formation, THE VERGE (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/21/18191455
/whatsapp-forwarding-limit-five-messages-misinformation-battle (discussing WhatsApp’s lim-
it on the number of times a message can be forwarded).
454. For a previous article in which I discuss this solution, see Lavi, supra note 32.
WINTER 2021] Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat 511
post.455 Intermediaries can do so, by integrating in the code of their 
platforms features such as an “embedded link.”456
“Embedded links allow users to import external web content 
and present it in their profiles.”457 Removal of an original post with 
an embedded link would result in deletion of all replications dis-
seminated by the “share” button upon complaint from the victim, a 
judicial decision, or flagging practices. As every replication of the 
post that was created by the share button is connected to the origi-
nal publication, even reports on a replication are likely to lead to 
flagging the original post as inappropriate. Alternatively, interme-
diaries could use “technology that allows data tethering, which 
changes the shared content according to the source.”458 The inter-
mediary can integrate these features in the code, architecture, or 
protocol of their platforms at the stage of design. This technology 
is in fact used today;459 “however, choice architecture is value-laden
and reflects a particular set of preferences that should not be taken 
for granted.”460 The values behind technology can influence the 
way it is used.461 The design of the platform and code can make in-
formation more visible or more obscure.462 It can create an incen-
tive to upload and share more content almost automatically463 or,
by contrast, encourage reflective thinking before sharing posts.
Similarly, design can either make it easy to share content at the 
click of a button or do exactly the opposite by increasing the costs 
of dissemination. For example, intermediaries can make it difficult 
to share content by designing architecture that allows dissemina-
tion only by copying-and-pasting of content to every recipient. Al-
ternatively, intermediaries can limit the number of recipients with 
455. Id. at 2670.
456. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2670–71. For further discussion of the context of intellectual 
property, see Toby Headdon, An Epilogue to Svensson: The Same Old New Public and the Worms 
that Didn’t Turn, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 662 (2014).
457. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671.
458. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671 (citing JONES, supra note 243 at 187 (explaining that 
technology can allow every copied piece of data to be tethered to its master copy)).
459. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
460. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671.
461. See generally Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 110, at 701 (explaining that the de-
sign of technology is an effective mean of control); HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 44–45 (ex-
plaining that design is political; it can suppress the dissemination of personal information 
and promote privacy, or promote values of freedom of information).
462. For example, the design and architecture of the platform can make it difficult to 
find information on users as it can make information more obscure, to increase the costs of 
finding information on users and enhance privacy. In contrast, design can enhance access to 
information, reduce the costs of finding it, and infringe on user privacy. Design can also 
include dark patterns and obscure objectionable terms of service. See id. at 272.
463. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 130, at 11 (explaining that “[I]t’s rapidly 
becoming easier to design technologies that nudge us to go on auto-pilot and accept the 
cheap pleasure that comes from minimal thinking . . . .”).
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whom the user can share information with the click of a button or 
allow efficient removal of the content shared ex post. By designing 
efficient removal mechanisms, removal of the original content can 
lead to widespread removal from all profiles. Every intermediary 
designs its platform in a way that promotes its own objectives.464
Some intermediaries tune their sharing mechanisms so that users 
share a link to the original post. For instance, “a click on the 
‘share’ button on Facebook or the ‘re-tweet’ button on Twitter 
links to the original content and embeds the shared content into 
the profiles of the disseminator and his friends.”465 Yet, there are 
different business models and attitudes regarding content modera-
tion and removal of offensive content. Alongside intermediaries 
with an intrinsic motivation to moderate content out of a sense of 
social responsibility,466 or in order to enhance their social standing 
and attract a greater audience,467 there are platforms that profit 
from offensive sensational content, such as gossip websites or ex-
treme racist alt-right websites. Such websites have no intrinsic in-
centive to design technology for efficient removal of content.468
Moreover, even mainstream media giants do not share a uni-
form policy regarding removal of offensive content. For example, 
in the related context of incitement to terrorism, “Twitter used to 
take a laissez-faire approach to terrorist content and avoided re-
moving it even [when] it was made aware of the content,”469 while 
Facebook made efforts to remove the content upon knowledge.470
Twitter changed its policy only when regulation of extremist 
speech became a real possibility.471 Similarly, different intermediar-
464. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2671. Designs, for example, can promote privacy protec-
tion or infringe on it. Intermediaries use the design by including dark patterns and obscur-
ing objectionable terms of service. See HARTZOG, supra note 120, at 272; Nancy Kim, Website
Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS 383, 402–03 (2012).
465. Lavi, supra note 31, at 2671.
466. See Klonick, supra note 294.
467. Citron & Norton, supra note 107, at 1453–57 (discussing MySpace as an example of 
an intermediary’s voluntary regulation due to economic considerations and voluntarily re-
moval of offensive content in order to attract children).
468. See, e.g., Emma Grey Ellis, Gab, the Alt-Right’s Very Own Twitter, Is the Ultimate Filter 
Bubble, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/gab-alt-rights-twitter-
ultimate-filter-bubble/; MARANTZ, supra note 39, at 5–6; Lavi, supra note 78, at 15.
469. Lavi, supra note 138, at 498.
470. Nina I. Brown, Fight Terror, Not Twitter: Insulating Social Media from Material Support 
Claims, 37 LOY. LA. ENT. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016).
471. See Michelle Roter, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: Imposing a Duty to Take 
down Terrorist Incitement on Social Media, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1391–1392, 1399 (2017) 
(referring to an official statement from the White House encouraging social media plat-
forms to block more terrorists from using their services and discussing Twitter’s policy). For 
information on Twitter’s policy, see Combating Violent Extremism, TWITTERBLOG (Feb. 5, 
2015), blog.twitter.com/en_us/a/2016/combating-violent-extremism.html. See generally
Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE 
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ies have different attitudes towards moderation of posts that incite 
violence. For example, while Twitter hid President Trump’s May 
2020 tweet “glorifying violence,” Facebook avoided hiding or re-
moving it.472 Thus, legislative changes regarding efficient removal 
mechanisms can provide an incentive for removal even when the 
intermediary lacks intrinsic motivation to mitigate the harm of of-
fensive content.
Unlike the previous solution of nudges, which focused on ar-
ranging the decision-making context, this solution applies directly 
to the code itself and the possibilities it affords and focuses on the 
result (efficient removal). Therefore, there are fewer opportunities 
for intermediaries that lack intrinsic motivation to evade imple-
mentation. In this case, a combination of legal and technological 
measures is preferable to voluntary self-regulation.
From a normative perspective, as technologies advance and the 
moderation and influence of intermediaries on the flow of infor-
mation become a fundamental aspect of any platform, it is high 
time to rethink their legal obligations. Scholars have proposed that 
the law should refine the immunity regime granted to intermediar-
ies in § 230.473 Some have asserted that the law should adopt a ver-
sion of a “notice-and-takedown” regime for social network plat-
forms.474 Yet, a condition should be added to this safe haven. 
Accordingly, the safe haven should apply only upon efficient re-
moval of offensive content shared via publish, share, or re-tweet 
buttons. Conditioning the safe haven on efficient removal 
measures can mitigate injury to victims since they would not need 
to point out every location where the falsehood was shared in or-
der to remove it. Instead, the victim could send a “notice-and-
takedown” notification to the intermediary regarding the original 
post only. Taking down the original post would lead to removal of 
all replications that were created using the share button.
Efficient “removal of offensive content might [also] be achieved 
even without amending [§] 230,”475 by adopting other formal regu-
DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2018) (referring to changes in policies of social media platforms 
adopted to stave off the threat of European regulation).
472. Bond, supra note 307.
473. 47 U.S.C. § 230. For scholarly proposals to narrow down immunity, see Citron & 
Wittes, supra note 174, at 420; Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just 
Backpage, Revisiting Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 470–71 (2018); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMENDMENT INST. COLUM. U., 4–5 (Apr. 6, 2018); and Citron, supra note 114, at 1074.
474. See supra Part II for a discussion on this regime. See also Citron & Wittes, supra note 
473, at 470 (“Sustained failure to remove an account despite repeated notifications . . .
might well strip the company of immunity in a specific case.”); Lavi, supra note 52, at 930–31 
(arguing that a version of notice-and-takedown regime is optimal for regulating secondary 
liability of intermediaries on social network platforms).
475. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2669.
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lations. Such regulations might impose an obligation to design ef-
ficient mechanisms to remove replications of unwanted posts along 
with the original post. In many cases, the law in the United States
allows victims of alleged defamation to file legal suits against the
person that published the original post.476 A defamation suit is pos-
sible if the plaintiff uses his real name and can be identified.477
Many website platforms allow the original publisher of posts or 
comments to remove them. The publisher may then remove his 
posts or comments at the request of the victim, following a direct 
lawsuit filed by the victim, or if a court orders the defendant to do 
so.478 Such regulation would lead to removal of all replications 
along with the publisher’s removal of the original post.
Moreover, in spite of the immunity outlined by § 230, “some 
courts may order the intermediary to remove the offensive state-
ments” following a ruling that the statements were defamatory.479 A
lower court in California already extended an order to remove de-
famatory online reviews to the intermediary. Even though the Su-
preme Court of California reversed this ruling, extending an order 
to remove harmful content to third-party platforms can be adopted 
in other states.480 Moreover, the practice of enjoining non-liable 
platforms to defamation lawsuits can develop.481 This may allow ef-
ficient removal of falsehoods when the publisher does not appear 
at a court hearing or refuses to take statements down.
“This solution mitigates [the] harm of the victim, enhances the 
publisher’s control over content, and allows him to remove the 
content ex post facto.”482 It reduces administrative costs and pro-
motes efficiency while preserving freedom of expression and avoid-
476. See, e.g., Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir. 2019) (dismissing claim be-
cause the defendant added question marks to his defamatory tweets, making it not actiona-
ble); see also Lavi, supra note 47, at 2669; Hunt, supra note 19, at 560–62 (reviewing defama-
tion lawsuits regarding libelous statements posted on Twitter).
477. Many social network platforms, including Facebook, require users to construct a 
profile that reflects their real identity (“real-name policy”) and use their offline names when 
interacting within the platform. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/terms (last modified Jan. 30, 2015); Lavi, supra note 32, at 2669.
478. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2669.
479. Id. at 2670.
480. Id.; see, e.g., Hassel v. Bird, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203 (Ct. App. 2016) (granting default 
judgment and injunctive relief to a lawyer who sued Yelp for a defamatory review), rev’d, 420 
P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018); see also Eric Goldman, The California Supreme Court Didn’t Ruin Section 
230 (Today)—Hassell v. Bird, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 2, 2018), https://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2018/07/the-california-supreme-court-didnt-ruin-section-230-today-
hassell-v-bird.htm.
481. For a proposal of enjoining non liable platforms and allowing courts to grant in-
junctions of removal directed at the platforms, see Maayan Perel, Enjoining Non-Liable Plat-
forms, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30–41 (2020).
482. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2672.
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ing disproportionate infringement on the intermediary’s right to 
conduct a business.
The concept of a legal obligation for intermediaries to imple-
ment efficient removal technology at the design stage of the plat-
form, together with defamation suits to remove the content, might 
mitigate harm mainly in cases of negative falsehoods against pri-
vate individuals because the standard of liability is lower relative to 
the standard in defamation suits of public-figures.483 Yet, in cases of 
severe fake news against public figures, state and local law en-
forcement authorities could be involved and might order the re-
moval of fake news.484 In such cases, an efficient removal mecha-
nism can increase the likelihood of achieving better results in the 
removal of fake news.
E. Efficient Removal Ex Post Facto: Addressing Limitations and 
Objections
First, it can be argued that the solution of efficient removal of 
shared content is insufficient because only content that was dissem-
inated using the platform’s sharing feature buttons would be re-
moved.485 Users would still be able to copy false or defamatory posts 
and paste them elsewhere on the platform without using any of the 
platform’s built-in sharing features.486 These replications would 
remain on the platform even if the original post is removed, thus 
undermining the efficiency of the proposed solution.
This argument underlines a genuine weakness of the solution. 
In contrast to clicking a button, however, copying and pasting con-
tent elsewhere on the platform is cumbersome, and such a manual 
sharing is not automatic. Thus, while the efficient removal of con-
tent ex post facto is not a perfect solution, it will likely reduce the 
reputational harm of victims of falsehoods.487
483. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), the U.S. Supreme
court held that malice must be proven rather than presumed in cases involving the alleged 
defamation of public officials. In contrast, the Court has held that a private-figure plaintiff 
must show, at a minimum, that the defendant was negligent in verifying the allegedly de-
famatory false claim; thereby it is much more difficult for a public figure to win a defama-
tion lawsuit. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
484. States (or supranational entities like the E.U.) are trying to regulate key players that 
shape the internet in order to influence them to design infrastructure to control the con-
tent that users post and disseminate. This is already happening in the context of terrorist 
content and fake news and incitement to terror. See Michal Lavi, supra note 141, at 506; 
Balkin, supra note 332.
485. See Lavi, supra note 32, at 2673.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 2670–71.
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Moreover, with the advance of technology, market forces are 
likely to bridge the gap in regulation.488 Social media giants like Fa-
cebook and Twitter can cooperate and share unique digital finger-
prints that are assigned to videos or photos containing extreme 
defamation, false rumors, or unambiguously fake news and that 
have been removed from one of their websites.489 This system al-
lows other intermediaries to identify the same offensive content on 
their platforms and remove it even if the user who shared it did not 
use the share button.490 Intermediaries already share digital finger-
prints that allow their counterparts to identify replications of most 
offensive content and remove content in related contexts such as 
child pornography and incitement to terrorism.491 These detection 
tools, however, are currently flawed and cannot properly interpret 
the context of expressions. Inaccurate interpretation of context 
can result in over-removal that would chill legitimate content.492
Therefore, the law should not obligate intermediaries to use these 
tools, and it should be an intermediary’s choice to use them volun-
tarily. “[R]emoval of all replications of text-based [posts or com-
ments] should not be used to automatically prevent the up-
load[ing] of content” and should be used narrowly only for 
absolute falsehoods and identical replications.493 It should only be 
used for detection once the offensive content has already been 
488. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1799 (“ ‘ISPs and social networks with mil-
lions of postings a day cannot plausibly respond to complaints of abuse immediately, let 
alone within a day or two,’ yet ‘they may be able to deploy technologies to detect content 
previously deemed unlawful.’ ”).
489. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2673.
490. For further discussion on such technology and its uses, see Rafal-Kuchta, The 
Hash—A Computer File’s Digital Fingerprint, NEWTECH.LAW (Oct. 9, 2017), https://newtech.law
/en/the-hash-a-computer-files-digital-fingerprint; Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media 
Compliance Programs and the War Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 79–81 (2017); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1955–58 (2019); and Klonick, supra 
note 297, at 2429–30 (“Though there have recently been steps forward in using artificial in-
telligence to screen for things like extremism and hate speech, the vast majority of this sys-
tem works by matching the uploaded content against a database of already known illegal or 
impermissible content using what is known as ‘hash technology.’ ”). It should be noted that 
this technology is less efficient in removing replications of text-based content, which require 
more sensitivity to context, rather than pictures.
491. See generally Fioretti, supra note 443.
492. See Citron, supra note 282, at 1057–58 (referring to the possible chilling effect of 
digital fingerprints, especially if intermediaries adopt it in the shadow of law in order to 
avoid regulation); KELLER, supra note 235, at 23–26 (noting that the filters might not be suf-
ficiently context-sensitive in determining whether content is legal).
493. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2674; see also, e.g., Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Fa-
cebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶37 (Oct. 3, 2019) (discussing removal of content 
previously declared unlawful). The ambiguity of equivalence can lead to removal of legiti-
mate content such as parody and satire. To prevent this consequence, intermediaries should 
be encouraged to use technological tools only to remove identical content to unlawful con-
tent.
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published on the platform.494 Furthermore, human oversight
should be incorporated to prevent platforms from removing legit-
imate content.495
Second, it can be argued that imposing an obligation on inter-
mediaries to embed efficient removal in the design of the plat-
form’s code may lead to a more extensive chilling effect when this 
obligation is combined with a regular “notice-and-takedown” re-
gime or an immunity regime. This solution may lead to the remov-
al of legitimate comments on the original post as a by-product of 
its removal. Arguably, this solution disrupts the balance between 
protection of reputation and freedom of expression and results in 
a disproportionate chilling effect. Indeed, the proposed solution can 
exacerbate the removal of legitimate content. A closer look, how-
ever, reveals that this balance is still maintained because dissemina-
tion of offensive content also exacerbates harm to reputation. 
Moreover, removal occurs ex post facto, meaning that the content 
receives exposure until the victim complains. Removal may be re-
quested only after a while or may not be requested at all. Thus, the 
potential chilling effect remains proportionate.
Third, it can be argued that imposing legal obligations on in-
termediaries to embed efficient removal mechanisms to their code 
might result in a chilling effect on developing advanced technolog-
ical features for sharing content and other types of innovation,
which is an undesirable outcome.496 This outcome is unlikely, how-
ever, because social network intermediaries profit from features 
that facilitate content sharing. These mechanisms allow interper-
sonal communication and enhance participation and advertising 
profits. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis would incentivize intermediar-
ies to continue developing innovative content-sharing features 
alongside implementation of the proposed code-based solution to 
attract more users and garner more profits. Concerns that incen-
tives to implement code-based solutions might hinder future inno-
vation are also unwarranted. The proposed solution does not obli-
gate intermediaries that embed content sharing features to prefer 
494. Lavi, supra note 32, at 2674.
495. Id.; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 98–100; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 4 (2017) 
(“Today’s tools for automating social media content analysis have limited ability to parse the 
nuanced meaning of human communication, or to detect the intent or motivation of the 
speaker. . .”); FILIPPO RASO, HANNAH HILLIGOSS, VIVEK KRISHNAMURTHY, CHRISTOPHER 
BAVITZ & KIMBERLY LEVIN, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & HUMAN 
RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES & RISKS (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3259344.
496. Scholarly work indicates a linkage between lenient liability regimes and innovation. 
See ANUPAN CHANDER, THE SILVER SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD TOGETHER 
IN COMMERCE 57 (2013); Chander, supra note 186, at 667–69.
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one technology over another. The focus of the conditioned safe
haven is on efficient removal. This solution allows flexibility with 
respect to the technology at use. Thus, the risk of hindering inno-
vation is relatively low.
Fourth, it can be argued that imposing an obligation to encode 
efficient removal mechanisms can be abused to undermine social 
campaigns. This regime risks removal of all content that elicits 
complaints, even if it is not false. “The chilling effect of this system 
[might result in] a veto power granted to anyone who has an inter-
est [in] silenc[ing] speech, including legitimate criticism.”497 Re-
moving all replications along with the original post is likely to 
make it more difficult to reveal offensive behavior that infringes on 
individual rights and the public interest, such as sexual harassment 
or corruption.498 Even without amending § 230 and outlining a 
“notice-and-takedown” regime, filing an action against the original 
publisher or warning that failure to remove the post would lead to 
a lawsuit, might lead to removal of the post. Embedding efficient 
removal mechanisms in the code would censor all replications of 
the post that were shared via the share button even if the post and 
the replications were legitimate, for example, posts and replica-
tions that benefit from legal defenses to defamation. This may in-
fringe on freedom of speech and the search for truth.
Efficient removal mechanisms can be abused to silence social 
campaigns and movements that promote the public interest, how-
ever, even social campaigns can at times be abused to spread false 
allegations and rumors when they go viral.499 Due to the immense 
harm caused by viral dissemination of false allegations and rumors, 
efficient removal mechanisms are of particular importance. In-
deed, removing all replications of a shared post may exacerbate 
the chilling effect when legitimate posts are removed. Yet, viral 
falsehoods cause tremendous harm to a victim’s reputation and in-
fringe on the public interest in reliable information and other hon-
est social campaigns. Efficient removal mechanisms preserve the 
497. Lavi, supra note 54, at 887.
498. See, e.g., Jamillah Bowman Williams, Lisa Singh & Naomi Mezey, #MeToo as Catalyst: 
A Glimpse into 21st Century Activism, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 371, 371 (2019) (discussing how 
the #MeToo movement has used Twitter to spread sexual harassment and abuse allega-
tions).
499. See Anita Raj, Worried About Sexual Harassment – or False Allegations? Our Team Asked 
Americans About Their Experiences and Beliefs, THE CONVERSATION (May 13, 2019), https:
//theconversation.com/worried-about-sexual-harassment-or-false-allegations-our-team-
asked-americans-about-their-experiences-and-beliefs%E2%80%A6 (“[F]alse allegations of 
sexual harassment and assault against high-profile individuals are a growing public con-
cern. . . . [O]ne in 20 women and one in 12 men felt that most or all of the allegations in 
recent high-profile cases were ‘false and that accusers are purposefully lying for attention or 
money.’”).
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balance between freedom of expression, protection of reputation,
and public interest in the viral age, while avoiding a disproportion-
ate chilling effect.
Moreover, removal from all profiles and locations is ex#post facto.
Thus, the post and its replications would remain available to the 
public at least until someone requests that the intermediary or 
publisher take them down. The gravity of harm that can be caused 
by viral dissemination of false allegations justifies efficient removal 
mechanisms, even if legitimate posts might be mistakenly removed 
ex post facto.
Fifth, it can be argued that efficient removal mechanisms could 
be abused by political or ideological groups that use these mecha-
nisms to silence competing political campaigns, thereby causing 
injury to the marketplace of ideas.500 Although efficient removal 
mechanisms can be abused by political and ideological groups to 
silence opposing ideologies, adopting this solution leads to a better 
balance between rights than its absence, where falsehoods dissem-
inate virally without redress. In addition, the result is not as severe 
as might appear at first glance, since legal liability would not be 
imposed on the intermediary (even if legislators amend § 230) or 
the publisher for avoiding the removal of legitimate posts upon no-
tice. Publishers and intermediaries might risk liability and avoid 
removing posts that are not absolutely false since they are protect-
ed by legal defenses to defamation. They might risk liability in or-
der to promote their ideology or enhance profits.501 In fact, not 
every item that users complain about is removed, as media giants 
use moderators that review complaints about offensive content and 
do not automatically remove every post upon complaint.502
F. A Remark on Smartphone Social Network Applications
This Article focuses on online intermediaries. Therefore, social 
network applications for smartphones, such as WhatsApp, are be-
yond its scope. Yet, dissemination of falsehood through 
smartphone apps is very common. A “notice-and-takedown” regime 
500. In a related context, people abuse reporting systems on offensive contact to silence 
legitimate political campaigns. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 49, at 37–39.
501. In the context of the EU “right to be forgotten” and removal of links to irrelevant 
search results on EU citizens, “Google received over 160,000 removal requests and denied a 
majority (approximately 58%) of them.” Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role 
of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1024 (2016).
502. Klonick, supra note 298, at 2433 (“[M]oderators are trained to determine if content 
violates the Community Standards. If a moderator determines that reported content is in 
violation, it is removed from the site; all content not found in violation remains published 
on the platform.”); see also GILLESPIE, supra note 297, at 120–28.
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cannot apply to them, though. Apps are similar to common carri-
ers; their programmers are not normally responsible for defamato-
ry statements transmitted through them since they have no editori-
al control.503
Nevertheless, the proposed solutions, which focus on the design 
stage, are not limited to online intermediaries and can be applied
to related smartphone applications. Thus, application providers 
can program the application to nudge users for accountability as 
well. Similar to intermediaries, many application providers can be 
incentivized to adopt this solution as part of their business model 
because offensive content is a potential threat to their profits.
The second solution of efficient removal is expected to require a 
significant change. Unlike Facebook and Twitter, the popular mes-
saging app WhatsApp, which boasts hundreds of millions of active 
users,504 was not designed to allow efficient removal. It was not until 
2017 that WhatsApp started to allow users to delete messages from 
recipient’s devices. At first, the framework for deletion was seven 
minutes from message transmission, and it was gradually extended 
to thirteen hours.505 If the recipient shares the content within this 
timeframe, the message is not likely to be deleted from the devices 
through which the message was shared and can still spread widely. 
Moreover, the removal mechanism does not currently delete all 
types of media from recipient devices.506 Technology should not be 
taken for granted; therefore, the proposed solution of efficient 
removal should be developed for smartphone apps as well.
Since messages in apps are end-to-end encrypted, apps neither 
operate editorial control over nor bear responsibility for the con-
tent.507 In this context, the victim of transmitted defamatory re-
marks would have to request removal from the original publisher. 
Designing the sharing feature of apps in a way that allows removal 
503. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 222, at 7. For further discussion of common carrier 
status, see Lavi, supra note 54, at 865.
504. Number of Monthly Active Whatsapp Users Worldwide from April 2013 to February 2016 (in 
Millions), STATISTA (Apr. 30, 2020), http://www.statista.com/statistics/260819/num
ber-of-monthly-active-whatsapp-users/; Number of Daily Active WhatsApp Status Users from 1st 
Quarter 2017 to 1st Quarter 2019 (in Millions), STATISTA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.
statista.com/statistics/730306/whatsapp-status-dau/ (referring to 500 million daily active 
users).
505. See Manoj Sharma, WhatsApp Sets Over 13-hour Window to Delete Message for Everyone 
Permanently, BUS. TODAY (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.businesstoday.in/technology/news
/whatsapp-sets-13hour-window-to-delete-message-for-everyone-permanently/story
/285164.html.
506. See Mohit Kumar, WhatsApp ‘Delete for Everyone’ Doesn’t Delete Media Files Sent to iPhone 
Users (Sept. 16, 2019), https://thehackernews.com/2019/09/whatsapp-delete-for-everyone-
privacy.html.
507. See Citron, supra note 115, at 1088–91 (criticizing this result and arguing that design 
choices that amounted to a failure to take reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful 
uses of services should not enjoy § 230 immunity).
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from all the devices when the original publisher deletes the mes-
sage, provides the publisher with an efficient way to remove his 
statement. The publisher can remove the defamatory statement in 
response to the victim’s warning before a legal defamation suit, or 
upon his own regret.508 Furthermore, since the publisher uses his 
mobile phone number, the victim can efficiently identify him and 
file a libel suit directly against him. In cases where the original 
publisher refuses to remove the statement, the plaintiff can seek a 
court injunction against him for removal of the message.
This technological solution and similar ones have already been 
adopted by some app providers. Messages sent through the popu-
lar app Snapchat are deleted by default after a few seconds from 
both the sender’s and the recipient’s devices.509 While, there are 
ways to save posts on the app, for example, by taking screenshots or 
using other applications to undo the protection,510 it is likely that 
most users share information by using the sharing feature embed-
ded in the app and do not bypass it because users tend to adhere 
to technological defaults.511 Therefore, most messages are likely de-
leted with the removal of the original post.
Similar to Snapchat, different technological supplements to a 
user’s e-mail can “un-send” e-mails.512 The emergence of these apps 
that limit dissemination might indicate a shift in market prefer-
ences to protect reputations and the general public interest. Argu-
ably, other driving forces outside of the law governing dissemina-
tion and formal regulation would be redundant.513 But I believe 
that there is reason to doubt that this would be the outcome in all 
cases. Similarly to intermediaries, there are different kinds of apps
with different business models and attitudes towards content, and 
not all of them allow for efficient removal. There may be a need to 
incentivize app providers to adopt this solution. Providers of apps 
that are end-to-end encrypted lack editorial control over state-
508. The original disseminator may agree to remove a statement that has gone out of 
control if he did not spread it with malice but rather believed it to be true and discovered 
that it was inaccurate later on. Alternatively, the original disseminator may remove the 
statement in response to a libel suit.
509. See Tal Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 115, 
167 (2015).
510. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 354, at 135 (explaining that the FTC charged Snapchat 
with deceiving its users for claiming that messages sent to others would be automatically de-
leted even though popular applications were available to undo the protection); In re Snap-
chat Inc., FTC File No C-4501 (Dec. 23, 2014).
511. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 8 (explaining that “people have a strong 
tendency to go along with the status quo or default option”).
512. See, e.g., CRIPTEXT, https://www.criptext.com [https://perma.cc/N9UT-WJGG] 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2020); VIRTRU, https://www.virtru.com/gmail-encryption/recall-gmail-
messages/ [https://perma.cc/YM7L-M4W9 ] (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
513. See Zarsky, supra note 509, at 167.
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ments transmitted over them. Thus, a conditioned “notice-and-
takedown” regime would not be applicable. Mandatory design 
standards for apps are a possible solution, but this may not be an 
optimal solution with respect to apps. The range of uses of social 
network apps may be different from online platforms. Thus, there 
is no need for efficient content removal mechanisms with respect 
to all types of social network apps.514 Design standards may not be 
sensitive to the differences between apps and may lack flexibility, 
hindering efficiency and chilling innovation.
Furthermore, end-to-end encrypted apps for secured messaging
that are used by mobile devices, such as WhatsApp are considered 
closed spaces relative to online platforms. The content transmitted 
through them is less searchable, and, by default, it is difficult to 
find it by search engines.515 Although falsehoods can spread among 
WhatsApp groups rapidly, the scope of harm may be narrower and 
the necessity of mandates with respect to apps is unclear. Any deci-
sion about legal regulation of apps would require evaluation of 
harm, the likelihood for private ordering, and the potential influ-
ences of regulation on innovation. For the time being, this Article 
leaves the question of mandatory incentives for app providers 
open.
CONCLUSION
Dissemination of content is more common today than ever be-
fore. The rise of social network platforms and their new infor-
mation sharing features have increased the circulation of content 
exponentially by making sharing as easy as the click of a button. 
Each and every individual can spread almost any message he wants, 
as long as he could get a crowd to listen. Within seconds, a message 
or a post can travel around the world and be viewed by thousands
of users. While online dissemination affords many benefits, it can 
infringe upon important values. Content disseminated may include 
falsehoods, defamation, and risk: harm to the victim’s reputation 
and his standing as an equal member of society, economic loss, 
514. For example, app providers may develop social network apps for professional uses 
in specific organizations. See, e.g., Chris Welch, Microsoft’s Latest ‘Garage’ Project Is a Dead-
Simple Email App for iPhone, THE VERGE (July 22, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7
/22/9013885/microsoft-send-email-app-announced.
515. See Lisa Vaas, Google Stops Indexing WhatsApp Chats; Other Search Engines Still at It,
NAKED SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2020), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/02/25/google-
stops-indexing-whatsapp-chats-other-search-engines-still-at-it/ (noting that secured private 
messaging should not be found on search engines, whereas messages sent via group chats 
should be difficult to find).
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and severe emotional harm. Moreover, the damage caused by dis-
semination of falsehoods extends beyond private individuals, as it 
becomes more difficult to separate truth from falsehood and en-
gage in truthful discussions on matters of public importance, 
thereby impinging upon the general public interest.
The widespread dissemination of falsehoods online poses com-
plex challenges to legislators, courts and policy makers. This Arti-
cle has endeavored to identify potential remedies to meet the chal-
lenges posed by spreading falsehoods on social networks. Policy 
discussions on this issue thus far have failed to account for human 
motivations to spread falsehoods, the social dynamics of networks, 
and the influence of intermediaries on the flow of information. 
Only by understanding the social dynamics and motivations be-
hind spreading falsehoods can a solution be developed. Analysis of 
the way falsehoods spread constitutes an indispensable step to-
wards fully acknowledging the challenges and potential solutions.
As the influence of intermediaries on the flow of information 
becomes a fundamental aspect of any platform, their duties should 
be reconsidered. The proposed solutions for mitigating the harm 
of dissemination of falsehoods focus on the design stage of plat-
forms. The first solution utilizes choice architecture and nudges to 
dissuade users from sharing falsehoods ex ante. The second solu-
tion utilizes code to allow efficient removal of falsehoods from eve-
ry profile and location where they were shared ex post facto. Under 
this solution, unless intermediaries develop efficient removal tech-
niques for mitigating harmful content shared via publish, share,
and re-tweet buttons, they would lose § 230 immunity.
Outlining fair and efficient regulation of dissemination of false-
hoods is one of the most prominent challenges of the digital era.
The analysis and solutions proposed here have vast potential to 
meet this challenge and improve the current regulatory regime.
The solutions are important, especially in light of the influence of 
falsehoods on political views, voters election results, and democra-
cy. This Article is not the last word on the topic, as digital dissemi-
nation creates new risks to reputation and the public interest. 
There are further avenues of analytic inquiry on the power of in-
termediaries and their influence on the flow of information. 
Should intermediaries bear additional duties and obligations in 
light of their influence? And if so, what should be the normative 
framework and scope of these duties? What should be the scope of 
§ 230 CDA’s immunity? Should the law impose transparency and 
due process obligations on intermediaries, even though they are 
private actors? These challenges and others await another day.

